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ABSTRACT 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, the influential Grand Chamberlain of the 
fifth Tokugawa shogun, has traditionally been cast in a bad role. This 
reappraisal attempts to show that his unprecedented rise from humble 
bannerman to powerful minister and the animosity it provoked were inti-
mately linked with the shogun's efforts to e'stablish autocratic power. 
During the reign of the fourth shogun the fudai dairnyo had come to 
dominate the administration, considerably weakening the authority of the 
shogunate. The fifth shogun attempted to remedy this situation by emp~ 
loying men who identified with his aim of strengthening central author-
ity. Yoshiyasu, born into the household of the shogun-to-be and trained 
to obey and serve, was eminently qualified to become Tsunayoshi's dedi-
cated minister. As the man who deprived the fudai of their influence in 
the administration and executed policies undermining the privileged posi-
tion of the military aristocracy, his unp<:>pularity was inevitable. 
Yoshiyasu was well aware of his powerful enemies and took elaborate steps 
to defend his reputation and to ensure the continued prosperity of his 
house after Tsunayoshi 's death. 
Using Max Weber's theory as a guide, it is suggested that Tsuna-
yoshi' s much criticised policies were motivated by his desire to turn a 
society with feudal characteristics into a centrally dominated state. 
The resultant increase in the sophistication of the bureaucraQY led to 
the appearance of Japan's first "professional pcli ticians" with Yoshiyasu 
distinguishing himself as the "leading politician." 
ii 
'.!'his interpretation of the period is contrasted with Kurita 
Mototsugu's theory of change from militarism to civil administration. 
In addition the political writings of Ogyu Sorai are examined for 
their views on shogunal authority and for the light they throw on the 
government of the fifth shogun and his Grand Chamberlain Yanagisawa 
Yoshiyasu. 
iii 
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NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Names of historical figures are abbreviated by citing the personal name 
unless convention dictates othe:rwise (e.g. "Asano" and not "Naganori "). 
Age is given according to Japanese calculation. 
The following abbreviations have been used: 
Ason jikki 
E,J.byo 
HJ 
KCS 
MK 
Nenroku 
NZKS 
SJ 
TJ 
Kai shosho ason jikki 
Eibyo gojitsuroku (4 Vols: haru, natsu, aki. 1 fuyu) 
Yanagisawa ke hizo jikki 
Kansei ohoshu shokafu 
Matsukage nikki 
RakushidB nenroku 
Nihon za.isei keizai shiryo 
Shoho jiroku 
Tokugawa jikki 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. APPRAISAL OF EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP 
No sovereign in all history was ever more 
blighted in his career or reputation than 
Tsunayoshi by his favourite, Yanagisawa •.• 
A History of Japan, 19261 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, the Grand Chamberlain of the fifth Tokugawa 
shogun, has traditionally suffered from a bad reputation. Like other 
men whose rise from humble birth to high official appointment defied 
the strict hierarchical order of Tokugawa society, he was cast into the 
classical mould of the evil counsellor, Japan's equivalent to the 
eunuchs of China. Together with Tanuma Okitsugu (1719-1788) and Mizuno 
Tadaakira (1762-1834), Yoshiyasu was mocked in popular verse, and his 
many vices were described at length in theatrical plays, historical fie-
tion and works which made more claims to scholarship. 
When the ridiculing of upstarts lost much of its political signifi-
cance with the Meiji restoration, Yoshiyasu's reputation still did not 
improve markedly.' One scholar, Sakata Morotoshi, however, sat down to 
examine in thirty years of painstaking work all available documentation 
on Yoshiyasu's life and in one hundred Japanese volumes exhaustively 
1. James Murdoch, A l!isto:r:y of Japan (London, 1926i, 3:215. This 
note, added by Joseph H. Longford, well sums up Murdoch's descrip-
tion of Yoshiyasu's vices. 
3 
examined every charge brought against him. He came to the conclusion 
that Yoshiyasu's bad reputation was not justified and that, on the cont-
rary, he was one of the most loyal and enlightened ministers of his age. 
Sakata's monumental work, completed in Meiji 30 (1897) and entitled Kai 
shi5sh8 ason Jikki had little impact upon the general trend of historic-
graphy and in spite of its meticulous scholarship remains unpublished to 
2 this day. Neither did a lengthy article published in the same year by 
Torino KOji, similarly trying to give a favourable image of Yoshiyasu, 
3 have much effect. 
Towards ~~e turn of this century Japanese scholars were attempting 
to gain a more comprehensive view of the Tokugawa era and the theory of 
alternating periods of strong and weak government evolved. In this ana-
lysis the early reforms of Tsunayoshi's administration at the time of 
Hatta Masatoshi were seen as strong government, while the later period, 
that of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu's influence, was described as weak. 4 The 
standard histories that appeared in the first half of this century, such 
as Ikeaa KOen's Tokugawa jidai shi 1 Tokutomi IichirO's Kinsei Nihon 
kokumin shi and Mikami Sanji's Eda jidai shi, all basically conformed to 
this view. It was not difficult to find documents proving the ineffici-
ency and moral bankruptcy of Yoshiyasu's so-called chamberlain govern-
ment in the writings of people deeply antagonistic to the rise of this 
upstart. Material, such as the relatively popular and easily accessible 
2. For location of manuscripts see bibliography. 
3. "Yanagisawa Dewa no kami," Kokugakuin zasshi, 2.5 :87-90; 2.6:73-76; 
2.9:66-70; 2.11:69-74; 3.2:69-75; 3.5:92-98; 3.6:114-18; 3.7:132-36; 
3.8:168-73; 3.9:180-85 (1897). 
4. Ikeda Koen, "Tokugawa shi shisei no chi5shi o hyo su," Shigaku zasshi 
4.40 (1893). The article is discussed in Tsuji Tatsuya, Kyoho kai-
kaku no kenkyu (Tokyo, 1963), pp.3-4. · 
4 
works of Arai Hakuseki - strongly critical of Tsunayoshi's later govern-
ment - convinced many scholars that this negative view of the period and 
particularly of ,Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was a justifiable one. 
All the same there were some historians who did not follow this 
trend. In Taisho 1 (1912) Yoshiyasu was accorded posthumous honours by 
the emperor for his restoration of the imperial tombs prompting re-
appraisals of both the man and the period. Among the earliest was 
that of Kurita Mototsugu, who came to the conclusion that Tsunayoshi's 
government represented one of the high points of the Tokugawa period, 
marking the important change from militarism (budan shugi) to civil ad-
ministration (bunji/bunchi shugi). 5 Another important contribution was 
made by Tsuji Zennosuke, who in the course of reappraising Yoshiyasu's 
character paid special attention to his religious and philosophical 
ideas and activities. 6 Also around this time excerpts from Sakata's 
painstaking work were for the first time made available to the public in 
a book-length work on Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, which quoted verbatim long 
passages from his Kai shosho ason jikki, but failed to acknowledge this 
7 fact. 
The trend towards reappraisal has continued in the second half of 
this century and produced such scholarly works as Tsuji Tatsuya's Kyoho 
kaikaku no kenkyii, devoting much thought to Tsunayoshi' s administration, 
and Mori ta Yoshikazu' s careful study of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu. The image 
of Yoshiyasu as the villain of Tokugawa history still exists, especially 
5. "Inu kubo ran," Chuo shidan, 1.3, 1.5 (1920); "Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu 
ron," Chuo shidan, 2.5 (1921); Edo jidai shi (reprint, Tokyo, 1976). 
For discussion of Kurita's theory see Chapter 5, Section 4. 
6. Tsuji Zennosuke, "Yanagisawa no ichimen," Shirin, 10.3 (1925), and 
Nihon bunka shi (Tokyo, 1953) betsuroku 3. 
7. Hayashi Masaru, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (Tokyo, 1921). 
in popular Japanese literature, but most historians now temper their 
description of his vices by some expression of doubt as to their histo-
rical soundness. 
Also, English language works on Japanese history no longer uphold 
the extreme views of Murdoch's History of Japan. Two scholars, Donald 
H. Shively and Harold Bolitho, have written short but excellent 
studies on Tsunayoshi. Both writers have examined the problem of sho-
gunal authority and its relationship to the appraisal of the period and 
it is in many ways their fundamental approach upon which this study is 
8 
also based. 
As a result the fifth Tokugawa shogun and his Grand Chamberlain 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu are no longer seen as caricatures, but as men, 
whose administration, however, had serious faults. The majority of 
5 
writers are critical of at least two of Tsunayoshi's policies. Firstly, 
the devaluation of the coinage, usually seen as causing great financial 
hardship to his subjects. Secondly, the Laws of Compassion, resulting 
in the punishment of men for cruelty or negligence to animals; a policy 
with which even the most tolerant critics have been unable to justify. 
There is unanimity amongst Japanese historians that, if not the former, 
at least the latter policy must be ranked as the worst in Tokugawa his-
tory, inflicting untold sufferings on the people. Many historians seem 
strangely unconcerned that the prevailing impression of the Genroku 
period, spanning the greater part of Yoshiyasu' s influence, is one of 
8. Donald H. Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, The Genroku Shogun" in 
Albert M. Craig and Donald H. Shively, Personality in Japanese His-
tory (Berkeley, 1970); Harold Bolitho, "The Dog Shogun" in Wang 
Gungwu, Self and Biography (Sydney, 1975). Also Harold Bolitho in 
Treasures among Men (New Haven, 1974) concerns himself in some de-
tail with the issue of power in the Tokugawa administration. 
6 
prosperity, cultural renaissance if also moral laxity, prompting com-
parison with the boom of the Showa years. Not only the artistic heri-
tage of the late seventeenth century, but also the perceptive observa-
tions of the novelist Saikaku confinn the picture of rising living 
standards, especially amongst the townspeople, and the euphoric mood 
which accompanied these changes. Scant evidence is found here of a suf-
fering populace. 
The economic historian Oishi Shinzabur5 noted on a more scholarly 
basis, this contradiction between the prosperity of the period and t.he 
image of a country oppressed by a cruel and autocratic government. While 
studying the economic progress of villages, he came to the conclusion 
that periods of prosperity were not associated with "moral" government, 
but, on the contrary, were periods much maligned for their corruption, 
such as that at the time of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu. 9 While in his earlier 
·t· o-· h' h d d d h' • dm' · · 10 h h ld wri ings is 1 a con emne Yos 1yasu s a 1n1strat1on, e now e 
h . . k h' 11 1m up as one of the most enlightened statesmen of To ugawa 1story. 
The commonly-praised early reforms of Tsunayoshi 's government were 
called reactionary, while the policies of Yoshiyasu's administration, he 
saw as progressive and foresighted. He noted that surprisingly little 
detailed scholarship had been done on the period and condemned much of 
what had been done as coloured by moralistic prejudice .12 
Oishi's new attitude placed emphasis on Yoshiyasu's political ac-
tivity, something previous reappraisals had tried to avoid. Unable to 
come to terms with Tsunayoshi's policies, other scb.Olars sympathetic to 
9. Oishi Shinzaburo, Genroku jidai (Tokyo, 1970), pp.i-iii. 
10. For example in Nihon keizai shi ron (Tokyo, 1967), pp.76-77, 86. 
11. Genroku jidai, pp.139-40, 161, 186-87. 
12. ibid., pp.ii-iii. 
7 
Yoshiyasu had tried to establish his moral fibre by concentrating on his 
achievements outside the political arena, and at times gone so far as to 
assert that he had no political influence at all. Even Oishi, however, 
could not fit the Laws of Cornpassion into his new interpretation of 
Yoshiyasu's administration, and, like his predecessors, had to view it 
in terms of moral bankruptcy. By implication Yoshiyasu must be seen as 
the man who tolerated what Oishi also calls "the worst laws in the his-
tory of world feudalism. 013 Thus having overcome some of the contradic-
tions inherent in previous interpretations of the fifth shogun and his 
Grand Chamberlain, he still leaves us with the rather incongruous situa-
tion where an otherwise progressive and enlightened government enforces 
a cruel and misguided policy upon its subjects. Furthermore, Oishi is 
compelled to resort to the same kind of moral judgement which he pre-
viously condemned to explain the adoption of this policy. 
2. METHOD 
My own research on this topic has shown that the question of cent-
ral authority is one of the fundamental issues of this period. Under 
the fourth shogun Ietsuna shogunal power had greatly declined in favour 
of the fudai daimyo who carried on the administration o.f the country in 
the interests of the daimyo rather than the shogunate. Tsunayoshi's 
government and Yoshiyasu' s career were shaped by the shogun's struggle to 
regain and enhance this lost authority. 
A scholar who treated the issue of domination, authority and poli-
tical power exhaustively was Max Weber. T'ne scope of his scholarly 
activity finds expression in his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft where he 
13. Oishi, Genroku ji dai, p. 20. 
8 
attempts to establish a pattern for forms of political and social organ-
isation appearing throughout the. course of human development. The "ideal 
types", or "models," he establishes are theoretical abstractions of basic 
trends in history. As representing the underlying pattern of historical 
reality they have, for Weber, universal validity. 
Amongst these "models" the most interesting and relevant for this 
thesis is that concerning itself with the change from feudal society to 
modern central bureaucratic state. In the European setting this was a 
slow process, taking approximately half a millen.~ium to complete. The· 
dominant feature of this development, for Weber, is the attempt of the 
feudal ruler to establish an autocratic government by ·expropriation of 
the material goods and authority hitherto held by his most powerful 
vassals. To assist him in this attempt, he relies on men with the re-
quisite education outside the military aristocracy, within which he so 
far has stood as primus inter pares. The new men whom the ruler calls 
into his service are of relatively humble status and completely dependent 
upon him for the advancement of their career and material sustenance. 
Assisting him in the execution of his policies with undivided loyalty, 
they become his most important tool in the fight for authority against 
his powerful vassals. Once the process of centralisation has begun, the 
development of a central bureaucracy is essential to fulfill the new de-
mands made upon the administration of the country. ·The ruler's new men 
distinguish themselves by their service in this institution and some ad-
vance to the position of what Weber terms "leading politicians. "14 
14. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (reprint TUbingen, 1972), 
pp.823-37 (henceforth cited as WG). The greater part of this work 
has been translated as Economy and Society (New York, 1968), but 
Section 8 of the last chapter has been omitted. References to the 
translation are given where appropriate. 
It is suggested here that this particular model in Weber's theories 
can profitably be employed to analyse the significance of the period un-
der discussion and the part played by Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu in the govern-
ment of the fifth Tokugawa shogun. This should not be seen as an attempt 
to interpret the period in terms of European history. It must be empha-
sised that Weber's model is only an abstraction of human behaviour. As 
such it classifies the underlying similarities of the political process 
as a manifestation of this behaviour. 
In this context some explanation is needed of the term "feudal." 
The question whether it is permissible to apply the word in the context 
of Japanese history is a controversial one. In this thesis the term is 
used within the reservations and limitations proposed by Hall when he 
writes that "Japan during a certain period of its history developed a 
pattern of society which bore a specific resemblance to the essential 
features of an admittedly theoretical social model. ,,lS 
Max Weber saw Tokugawa Japan as feudal but without the system of 
secure land tenure characteristic of some types of feudalism. 16 
Another question to be discussed is Weber's statement that the 
development of a rational bureaucratic state was not possible in the Far 
East due to the irrational magical beliefs to which governments were 
b . 17 SU JeCt. During the period under discussion, the governing elite as 
well as the rest of the population were strongly influenced by what 
Weber would term 0 irrational beliefs." There is no indication, ho•..iever, 
that these beliefs influenced practical administration. Ceremonial 
15. J.W. Hall and M.B. Jansen, Studies in the Institutional History of 
Early Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968) , p. 35. 
16. WG, p.627-29; Economy and Society, 3:1072. 
1 7 • E.g., ~1G, p. 826. 
10 
taboos were strictly adhered to and natural catastrophies interpreted as 
reproof by the gods, but they did not significantly alter political 
strategies. 13 These beliefs, in fact 1 were no more or less irrational 
than some of the Christian doctrines that appeared throughout the ages 
and which, similarly, did not prevent the formation of rational bureau-
cratic institutions. 
Finally it must be made clear that in adopting Weber's model of 
change from feudal society to central bureaucratic state, it is not sug-
gested that such a fundamental change took place within the thirty-year 
period of Tsunayoshi's government. It is suggested only that in the 
period under discussion an early stage of this development took place, 
characterised by the initial efforts of the ruler to acquire some of the 
authority hitherto vested in his powerful vassals. Inherent in this 
process was the rise of a man like Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu. In replacing 
the upper military aristocracy as senior administrator of the country 
and executing the shogun's policies, which eroded the privileged posi-
tion of the samurai and especially the daimyo, he played a significant 
part in this development. 
Seeing the period and Yoshiyasu against the background of Weber's 
model has several advantages. The most important of these is that moral 
value judgements can be dispensed with. Apart from the fact that sub-
sequent subjective judgements serve no useful purpose in describing his-
torical events, the documents furnish inadequate information on the pri-
vate character of either Tsunayoshi or Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, and the 
little reliable information that is available does not support the 
18. See Chapter IV, Section 2, where it is suggested t-Ciat the Laws of 
Compassion, though prompted by religious sentiments / \\l'ere not due 
tQ 0 irrational beliefs• H 
traditional picture, In the process of such an analysis it becomes ap-
parent that the bad r-eputation of the ruler and his Grand Chamberlain 
11 
was the natural result of the struggle for political domination.; one 
party in this contest - the upper military aristocracy - using its in-
fluence in later decades to popularise its one-sided version of this 
confrontation. Both the opposition Yoshiyasu already encountered during 
his lifetime and the extent to which his personal behaviour was slandered 
after his death, were indicators of his effectiveness in increasing sho-
gunal authority at the expense of the daimyo. 
Furthermore, when the policies of the period are seen against the. 
frairework of Weber's model, they no longer appear as the erratic schemes 
of a half enlightened and half evil government, but as conforming to a 
consistent pattern of political thought. In the final analysis it was 
the shogun's efforts to establish autocratic power which resulted in 
such apparently unconnected measures as the monetary reform and the 
strict enforcement of the Laws of Compassion. 
This reappraisal of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu will be structured in the 
following way. The final part of this first chapter will discuss the 
primary sources used in the thesis. These primary sources form the 
backbone of the argument and consequently some thought must be devoted 
to their reliability and limitations. Secondary sources have been con-
sulted at length, but as, in general, their fundamental approach differs, 
they have frequently not been cited in the text. On the whole, the 
existing secondary. literature relies heavily on some works which are 
here regarded with suspicion and has neglected others, which have been 
found of great value. However, apart from occasions where it is rele-
vant to the argument, criticism of individual writers has been avoided. 
12 
Instead an attempt has been made to look at the period free from the 
value judgements that resulted from the traditional preference for cer-
tain selected sources. 
The second chapter is devoted to a narrative of Yoshiyasu's life, 
based mainly on two documents which so far have received little atten-
tion from historians: the diary of his concubine and a record compiled 
by the Confucian scholars of his house. The purpose is to acquaint the 
reader with the background and main events of Yoshiyasu's career, and 
little attempt has been made at analysis. 
The third chapter begins with an examination of the socio-political 
situation confronting the fifth shogun on his accession and the measures 
he chose to deal with it. This is followed by an analysis of both the 
men he called into his service and the new offices he created to make 
use of their potential ability. Yoshiyasu's rise to a position of influ-
ence is examined in this context and some attention paid to the opposi-
tion produced by this process. In conclusion, Weber's model is applied 
to the subject under discussion and the question examined whether 
Yoshiyasu can be seen as a forerunner of Weber's "leading politician." 
Some of the major policies of Tsunayoshi's government are discussed 
in the fourth chapter. Both the role Yoshiyasu played in their execution 
and the effect these measures had in promoting the political aims of the 
shogun are analysed. 
The fifth chapter is devoted to various aspects of Yoshiyasu's 
reputation. To begin with, material is presented to document that 
already during his lifetime Yoshiyasu was well aware of the politically 
dangerous pat.~ he was treading. An account is given of the elaborate 
precautions he took, both to fortify his reputation against later 
13 
slander and to ensure the continued prosperity of his house, even after 
his personal influence had ceased. In this context the writings of the 
philosopher Ogyu Sorai are examined with regard to the information they 
furnish about the thought - and the perpetuation of this thought -
underlying the policies administered by Yoshiyasu. Finally the theory 
fundamental to Kurita Mototsugu's revaluation of Yoshiyasu and the per-
iod is examined and juxtaposed to that of Maz Weber. 
3. SOURCES 
As in other areas of Tokugawa history, the basic work for the period 
is Tokugawa jikki. Although this nineteenth century compilation is not 
strictly speaking a primary source, it nevertheless provides a detailed 
and generally reliable description of events. The work is mainly based 
on the monumental Edo bakufu nikki, a detailed and as yet unpublished 
record of the daily events of the government, which has not been available 
to the writer. It is hoped that the main drawback of Tokugawa jikki - the 
fact that the selection of material is limited to matters deemed important 
to the compiler - has been overcome by cross-checking the material with 
basically similar documents which were available in the original. 
The most important of these, and a work frequently cited in Toku-
gawa jikki, is Kembyo jitsuroku,19 the official account of Tsunayoshi 's 
reign. Controversy exists about its authorship. Usually it is attri-
buted to the scholar Ogyu Sorai, who spent the early part of his career 
20 in the Yanagisawa mansion and was also later supported by the family. 
Assigning the authorship to Sorai appears to be justified by the story 
19. Manuscript, see Bibliography. 
20. E.g. Endo Motoo, Kokushi bunken kaisetsu (Tokyo, 1957), p.87, gives 
OgyU Sorai as author. 
14 
that Yoshiyasu asked sorai why he had attributed to him responsibility 
th . k . 21 h for e policy nown as Laws of compassion. One can argue, owever, 
that the source containing the story, compiled after Sorai 's death by an 
unknmm disciple, is not altogether reliable on this point. The passage 
in Kembyo jitsuroku does not completely lay the blame on Yoshiyasu's 
shoulders, but by subtle argument shifts it to the rest of the official-
dom; a piece of writing one could well imagine to have come from the 
h h . ' 22 and of the man w o personally had to apply these policies. Several 
sources state that Sorai received his final increase of stipend on comp-
. 23 leting this document for presentation to the eighth shogun Yoshimune, 
but this does not necessarily imply that he wrote the work. It could 
24 
merely indicate that he was responsible for editing the final draft, 
which would be in line with the claims made by another retainer of the 
Yanagisawa family, the scholar Hattori Nankaku. Nankaku maintains that 
the Kembyo jitsuroku was written with his assistance by Yoshiyasu during 
' ' 25 the latter's retirement. Most probably several scholars worked on the 
document under Yoshiyasu' s direction and, at any rate, there can be 
little doubt of its historical reliability. It is said that tbe eighth 
shogun studied the work carefully and approved all, except the passage 
discussed above concerning the responsibility for the Laws of Compassion. 
21. Ken'en zatsuwa translated in Olaf G. Lidin, The Life of Ogyu Sorai 
a Tokugawa Confucian Philosopher (Lund, 1973), p .161. 
22. See Chapter lV, Section 2 for elaboration of this topic. 
23. Eibyo goji tsuroku, haru, natsu. Manuscript, see Bibliography and 
below (henceforth cited as E.ibyo) . Also Yanagisawa ke hizo jikki, 
in Vol.3 of Kai sosho kanko kai, Kai sosho (Tokyo, 1974), 54-55, 76, 
(henceforth cited as HJ) • 
24. See Lidin, Ogyu Sorai, p.56. 
25. Letter of Hattori Nankaku quoted by Hino Tatsuo, Sorai gakuha 
(Tokyo, 1975), p.182. 
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Apparently not inclined to tolerate any excuses on behalf of his prede-
cessor, Yoshimune maintained that the fifth shogun was solely responsible 
f th · l h k a d. l 26 or 1s unpopu ar measure and t e wor was altere accor 1ng y. 
A manuscript seldom mentioned by historians, but of great value to 
this thesis, is Rakushido nenroku, 27 similarly compiled by the Confucian 
scholars of the Yanagisawa mansion. The circumstances of its origin are 
well documented. A sudden fire in Genroku 15 (1702) burnt down the Yana-
gisawa mansion, allowing not even the family records to be saved. Con-
cerned at this loss, Yoshiyasu set out to search for oral testimony and 
chronicles about his ancestry as well as his own life and finally managed 
to obtain documentation covering about half the records that had been de-
strayed. It was then compiled into one manuscript and named RakushidO 
nenroku, and from that time on daily entries of Yoshiyasu's official life 
28 
were added. 
Rakushido nenroku starts with a summary of Yoshiyasu's distant an-
cestry and concludes with his retirement several months after Tsunayoshi's 
death in Hoei 6 (1709). Except for the initial discussion of Yoshiyasu's 
geneology it is written in the form of dated entries, although at first 
these were not daily. All the same, even during the early stages of 
Yoshiyasu's career, information is fairly detailed and covers events not 
mentioned in more official documents, such as a broken promise of marri-
age, when the groom-to-be of an adopted daughter fell from grace with the 
. 29 
shogun. By about Genroku 8 (1695) a profuse amount of detail starts to 
26. EibyB, haru; HJ, p.55; Kuroita Katsumi, Tokugawa jikki (Tokyo, 1929-
35), 43:752 (henceforth cited as TJ). 
27. See Bibliography (henceforth cited as Nenroku). 
28. Nenroku, Vol.111, l8D 12M Genroku 15. 
29 .. ibid., Vol.21, 4D 2M Genrcku 7. The groom-to-be was Yamana Yasutoyo. 
TJ, 43: 189 of this date merely notes that Yamana was punished. 
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fill the pages, noting every gift exchanged and ceremony performed. In 
later years the manuscript painstakingly records all occasions on which 
Yoshiyasu or a member of his family visited Edo castle - not infrequent-
ly several times daily - and goes to the extent of specifying the type 
of garments worn. 
Nevertheless, amongst all these trivia a wealth of more important 
information can be found. Correspondence received by Yoshiyasu is 
copied, ranging from notes by the shogun himself to letters from reli-
gious dignitaries and court nobles. There are what appear to be fac-
similes of documents such as shogunal patents and word-for-word records 
of religious and philosophical debates, often in Chinese with the Ming 
pronunciation carefully noted in Japanese script. Of greatest interest 
to this thesis, however, are the verbatim reports of Tsu.~ayoshi's 
speeches on Yoshiyasu's promotions. One might question whether t.~ese 
are in fact a true record of the shogunal words and not Yoshiyasu's ver-
sion for posterity. However, if the shogun's speeches had been tailored 
by hagiographical considerations, it is most likely that this fact would 
have been noted somewhere in the later writings of the many famous and 
less famous scholars serving at one time or another at the Yanagisawa 
mansion, for RakushidO nenroku was not kept secret. This is apparent 
from the fact that, for instance, the record of Ienobu' s reply to Yoshi-
yasu's petition for retirement, after Tsunayoshi's death, is not inclu-
30 ded, it being only noted that such information was kept elsewhere. 
When Rakushido nenroku was completed several mont.'1s later, after 
Yoshiyasu had finally been permitted to retire, this issue was still a 
30. Nenroku, Vol.225, lOD and llD lM Hoei 6. Unfortunately the loca-
tion is not given. 
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sensitive one. Yet if the scholars responsible for the record had been 
sworn to secrecy, such precautions would have been unnecessary. In view 
of the above, it seems highly unlikely that Yoshiyasu, with his great 
concern for his reputation, would have charged his scholars to falsify 
the shogun's public statements on his promotions. 
Rakushiao nenroku supplies a wealth of detail about Yoshiyasu's 
life, but in its terse, semi-official style does not volunteer any infor-
mation about the more personal side of his existence. This gap is filled 
b uk 'kk' th d' f h' ub' h'k 31 y Mats age ni i, e 1.ary o is cone ine Mac 1. o. In the stric.t 
sense of the word, it should not be called a diary, for it is not a re-
cord of daily occurrences, but a sophisticated narrative, artistically 
weaving together individual events. Reminiscent in style and language of 
the great works of the Heian period, it is what Earl Miner would call a 
"poetic diary. n 32 Frequent allusions to the classical literature of 
China and Japan expand the horizon of the narrative and give Yoshiyasu's 
life deeper symbolic meaning. Poetry is used to further heighten the ar-
tistic element, yet never serves as mere embellishment. Miner points out 
h t . 1 . l . f 33 d 1 . M t t at poe ry was an integra part of upper c ass li e, an a so in a -
sukage nikki, the verses cited are those composed by Yoshiyasu, his fami-
ly and friends, or an expression of the author's deep-felt sentiments. 
In spite of the literary merits of this work, its authenticity can-
not be doubted. All its descriptions of major events correspond 
31. Matsukage nikki in Vol.3 of Kai sosho kanko kai, Kai si5shci (TOkyo, 
1974), (henceforth cited as MK). See also B.M. Bodart-Bailey, 
"Councillor Defended, Matsukage Nikki and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu," 
Monumenta Nipponica, 34 .4 (1979). 
32. Earl Miner, Japanese Poetic Diaries (Berkeley, 1976), Preface artd 
pp.8-9. 
33. ibid., p.9. 
18 
accurately with evidence from other documents and when the shogun's 
words are quoted, they closely resemble those recorded in Rakushido nen-
roku. One may, of course, suspect that Machiko based her diary on the, 
latter document when, after Yoshiyasu's retirement, she decided to write 
her personal account of his career. If she did, it would nevertheless 
not detract from the value of her work, for frequently it is not the de-
scription of actual events, but her personal comments, observation of 
detail and recollection of common talk which subtly reveal a great 
amount of information. 
In her final pages Machiko frankly admits that Matsukage nikki'was 
written for a purpose. It was to counteract the malicious gossip sur-
rounding Yoshiyasu and furnish, for his descendants, a record of his re-
markable achievements. The reader, therefore, has reason to suspect 
hagiographical tendencies. Machiko was well aware of this possible 
charge and protested that even though her account might sound flattering, 
she could only faithfully describe the events she had witnessed. 34 If, 
in spite of Machiko's protestations, some allowance is made for the fact 
that she was after all Yoshiyasu's concubine and mother of his second 
and third sons, her diary is still of great historical value. 
The importance and reliability of Matsukage nikki is also conceded 
by Matsuura Seizan (1760-1841), who as an associate of Matsudaira Sada-
nobu (1758-1829) is an unlikely candidate to defend upstarts such as 
h . 35 Yos iyasu. It is to this diary of Yoshiyasu's concubine that he 
refers his readers for a true picture of Tsunayoshi's government in his 
34. MK, p.227. 
35. Matsuura Seizan, Kasshi yawa in Vol.76 of Zoku zoku gunsho ruijii 
(Tokyo), pp.252-53. For Seizan's connection with Matsudaira Sada-
nobu see Kodama K6ta, Nihon rekishi no shiten (Tokyo, 1973) 1 3:289. 
criticism of two other works, which gave rise to much of the colourful 
but historically unsound literature on the fifth shogun and his Grand 
Chamberlain. 36 
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The first work he censures is Sanna gaiki, a mock biography in the 
t t 1 f th Ch ' 1 ' 37 d ' th l' f th f' fth erse s ye o e 1nese c ass1cs, paro y1ng e 1ves o e· 1 , 
sixth and seventh shogun, with by far the most imaginative treatment 
being accorded to the alleged vices of Tsunayoshi. The author chose to 
remain anonymous, but the work is generally attributed to Dazai Shundai, 
a view to which Matsuura Seizan also subscribes. 38 Shundai was a disci-
ple of OgyU Sarai and it is unexpected that he should set out to slander 
the fifth shogun and Yoshiyasu, men with whom his teacher had stood in 
high favour. Yet Shundai was a somewhat reluctant student of Sorai's, 
jealous of the greater attention younger disciples received and was not 
beyond later criticising his teacher on various points. One of the 
differences between the .two men hinged on the proper approach to the an-
cient Chinese sages, perhaps pronq:iting Shundai to parody Sorai's treat-
ment of the classics and to ridicule the patrons of his teacher in Sanna 
'k' 39 gai i. 
Matsuura Seizan greatly condemned Shundai' s spread of "false 
scholarship'' and was adamant that not more than one tenth of this work 
36. There are a number of works such as Nikko kantan makura, Genroku 
Hoei shinwa, Gensho kanki, TOeizan tsuya rnonogatari, etc. Because 
of their total unreliability they have not been used or discussed 
in this thesis. 
37. Sanna gaiki (Tokyo, 1880). The work is written in the style of 
Ssu-Ma Ch'ien's Historical Records. 
38. See also Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," pp .88-89. 
39. For Dazai Shundai see T. Naji ta, "Poli ti cal Econornism in the 
thought of Dazai Shundai," Journal of Asian Studies, 31.4: 823 
(1972). For Sorai' s use of the classics see Chapter V, Section 3. 
. d 1 40 describe actua events. He quoted the authority of his teacher 
·Hayashi Jussai (1768-1841), but this judgement can soon be verified by 
cross-checking the contents of Sanno gaiki with other, more reliable 
41 documents. 
The second work which Matsuura Seizan condemns as spurious is 
Gokoku onna taiheiki, believed to have been written by a dissatisfied 
42 
minor official at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Contem-
poraries knew it was pure fiction, he notes, but as time passed people 
43 began to wonder whether it might not have been true after all. 
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Seizan is somewhat less critical of another writer, also frequently 
cited to document the moral bankruptcy of the Genroku period, namely 
Arai Hakuseki. Although he notes that this scholar, who came to promi-
nence under the sixth shogu.~, Ienobu, never ceased to criticise the pre-
ceding government of Tsunayoshi, Seizan is satisfied that Hakuseki did 
not carelessly slander people and mislead posterity with falsehoods. 44 
The high moral standards Hakuseki had set for himself would hardly 
have allowed him iD consciously distort historical events. Yet he believed 
in the Confucian dictum "put in History that only which is worthy of the 
record," and consequently decided that such shameful acts as Ienobu' s 
passion for dancing in no performances should find no mention. 45 
40. Kassh.i yawa, p.253. 
41. A thorough rebuttal of Sanno gaiki is contained in Sakata Moroto-
shi, Kai shasho ason jikki, manuscript, see Bibliography (hence-
forth cited as Ason jikki). A good shorter work is Morita Yoshi-
kazu, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (Tokyo, 1975). 
42. Tsukamoto Tetsuzo, Gokoku onna taiheiki (Tokyo, 1927). For author-
ship and date see Kasshi yawa, p.253. 
43. ibid •• 
44. Kasshi yawa, p.253. 
45. Ori taku shiba no ki transl. G.W. Knox, "Altobiography of Arai l!akuseki", 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 30, Part 2:146 (1902). 
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While Hakuseki saw it proper to prune in such a fashion the history of 
the government he served, he obviously did not follow the same princi-
ples when writing about that of the preceding shogun. Thus while Haku-
seki might have seen himself as a scrupulously honest historian, uncri-
tical acceptance of his writings - without due allowance being made for 
his different approach to different periods - must necessarily result in 
a distorted picture of actual events. 
In a similar vein Hakuseki occasionally cannot resist quoting mali-
cious gossip about people he disliked, such as Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu. He 
duly gives some indication that he cannot vouch for the complete authen-
ticity of such stories, but the fact that a serious scholar like Hakuseki 
considered them worth citing, might easily lead a reader to ignore these 
ak . 46 we protestations. Thus Hakuseki's strong bias against the period 
under discussion in general and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu in particular, to-
. th ' h th f h . h ' . 1 . . f d 47 ge er wit e act t at at times e is simp y misin orme , means 
that his evidence must be treated with great care. 
Machiko's diary had been written to correct damaging gossip circu-
lating during Yoshiyasu's lifetime. After his death in Shotoku 4 (1714), 
the spread of malicious rmnours took on even greater proportions, aided 
in no small measure by the circulation of manuscripts such as the two 
discussed above. This threat to the reputation of the Yanagisawa family 
now prompted one of their senior retainers, Yabuta Shigemori, 48 to 
record his personal experience of Yoshiyasu's achievements and attitudes. 
46. For exa~ples see Chapter II, section 6 and Chapter IV, section 2. 
47. For examples see Taya l!irokichi, Kinsei ginza no kenkyu (Tokyo, 
1963), pp.187, 194. 
48. Yabuta Shigemori was also known as Gor5emcn and later became Yana-
gisawa !chi no Kami with a stipend of 3,000 koku. Kofu shiyaku sho, 
KOfu ryakushi (reprint, Tokyo, 1974), p.106. 
The manuscript, dated Genbun 5 (1740) is known as Eibyo gojitsuroku or 
Genko 49 tsuroku. In its complete form it has not been printed, but 
the first half, with some variations, is known as Yanagisawa ke hizo 
jikki, and has been published.so At some stage the second part of a 
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certain copy of ,Eibyo gojitsuroku must have been lost, leaving the owner 
of this particular manuscript without the information supplied at the 
end of the original, such as author and date of completion. This frag-
ment was then renamed Yanagisawa ke hizo jikki. To my knowledge the 
close relationship between Eibyo gojitsuroku and Yanagisawa ke hizi5 
jikki has not been pointed out previously, the introduction to the prin-
ted versions of the latter document stating merely that the author was 
an unknown retainer of the Yanagisawa family. 
The information contained in Eibyo gojitsuroku accurately reflects 
the position of its author and therefore ideally complements that fur-
nished by other records. Here the practical implications upon the run-
ning of his house of Yoshiyasu's unparalleled career are discussed and 
the views he imparted to his retainers find eiqoression. Episodes not 
deemed interesting or prestigious enough to merit inclusion in either 
the official record of Yoshiyasu's life or the diary of his concubine 
are narrated and eiqoose different sides of his character. At times 
these events do little to enhance the reputation of the Yanagisawa fami-
ly and their inclusion gives the impression that the author was earnestly 
49. ~.orita's statelt>3nt that the title on the outside cover of the manu-
script is Kembyo jitsuroku, is presumably a misprint. ~,orita, p.274. 
SO. Published in Hayakawa Junsaburo, Rekko shimpi roku (Tokyo, 1914), 
and in Kai sosho, Vol. 3, referenced above. The latter edition has 
been used in this thesis. For convenience, references to Eibyo are 
accompanied by references to HJ where appropriate, with differences 
in the text duly noted. 
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trying to convey a true picture of his dead lord, rather than merely 
attempting to whitewash his tarnished reputation. In conjunction with 
other material and with the possibility of hagiographical tendencies 
kept in mind, the work becomes a useful tool in the study of Yoshiyasu's 
life. 
Besides the above-mentioned sources, a number of other works of of-
ficial as well as of private nature, shed light on various aspects of 
Yoshiyasu' s career. In as much as they constitute the usual fare from 
which the student of history must piece together the subject of his or 
her research, they need no further elaboration. 
Finally, however, some mention must be made of writings which gen-
erally are not used as documentation for the government of the fifth 
shogun and his Grand Chamberlain. These are the works of the philoso-
pher Ogyu sorai. 
Sorai' s important works all fall within the reign of the eighth 
shogun Yoshimune and it is with the latter's government that his poli-
ti cal thought is generally associated. Under Yoshimune, however, Sorai 
never achieved the standing he had under Tsunayoshi, and although vari-
ous assignments were passed to him through official channels, he was not 
even accorded the honour of a shogunal audience until shortly before his 
51 death. Previously, as Yoshiyasu's retainer, Sorai had been closely 
associated with the men responsible for the government of t-he country, 
and in a letter to a friend he recalled these days in glowing terms: 
" thanks to the power of the outstanding and en-
lightened lord of our clan, although I was only a 
baishin retainer, yet I went to the golden castle of 
court, I ascended the jade steps, I was a guest among 
51. Lidin, Ogyu Sarai, pp.59-71. 
great guests, I received honours from the dragon 
(the shogun) ; for more than ten years I enjoyed 
this. This was by no means a short time! ...... 52 
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During those ten years Sorai had the opportunity to gain the prac-
tical experience upon which his later theories were based, and conversely 
his mature thought bears the stall1P of this environment in which his in-
tellectual development had taken place. Sorai's political philosophy -
it is suggested here - constitutes the theoretical framework on which 
the actual policies of Tsunayoshi's and Yoshiyasu's government were 
53 based. As an exposition of the thought underlying the political acti-
vity of this period, Sorai's writings are valuable in understanding 
Yoshiyasu's career. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the praise 
Sorai earned and the harsh criticism of L~e actual policies upon which 
his writings were based, well demonstrate the bias with which the period 
and the career of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu has been viewed. 
52. Letter to Yamagata Shfulan, translated by Lidin, ibid., p.80. 
53. See Chapter v, Section 3, for elaboration of this topic. 
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CHAPTER II 
YANAGISAWA YOSHIYASU'S LIFE AND BACKGROUND 
1. ANCESTRY AND EARLY YEARS 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was born on the eighteenth day of the twelfth 
month, Manji 1 (1658) . 1 The family was only of lower bannerman (hata-. 
2 
nvto) status, but, like many samurai, prided itself on its descent from 
the Seiwa Genji branch of the imperial house. Matsukage nikki succeeds 
admirably in elegantly summing up the intricate genealogy the family lay 
claim to: 
In ancient times there lived a grandson of the emperor 
Mizuno-o by the name of Lord Tsunemoto. He was the 
very first of the Genji warriors. The courtier Yoriyo-
shi of this family was the sixth generation descendant 
of the emperor Mizuno-o. These men of past genera dons 
all impressed their names upon the world as champions of 
the court.3 His third son was called Lord Shiragi4 no 
Saburo Yoshimitsu. He was appointed lord of Kai. His 
children, grandchildren and other descendants populated 
that province and they were therefore called Kai Genji. 
Twenty generations lie between this same Yoshimitsu and 
our present lord. 5 
1. Unless otherwise stated the information contained in this section 
is taken from Nenroku, Vol,l. 
2. In the translation of bakufu offices and official terms John Whit-
ney Hall, Tanurna Okitsugu (Cambridge, Mass •. , 1955), Conrad D. Tot-
man, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), and 
Koza Yamamura, A Study of Samurai Income and Entrepreneurship (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1974), have been followed whenever possible. 
3. Allusion to Genji m:mogatari, Chapter I, Kiri tsubo. 
4. Also 11 Shira,." 
5. MK, p.120. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. 
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Amongst the descendants of Yoshimitsu the Takeda family came to 
rule over the province, their victories culminating in the famed con-
quests of Takeda Shingen (1521-73). Yoshiyasu's forefathers served them 
in battle. The family settled at Koma-gun and together with related 
houses became known as the warriors of Mukawa (Mukawa shii) • While the 
claim of Yoshiyasu's descent from the emperor Mizuno-o might be regarded 
with some suspicion, his family's position as a member of this warrior 
6 group is reasonably well documented. 
Yoshiyasu's grandfather, Nobutoshi, was born the third son into the 
house of Aoki. Later he was ordered by Takeda Shingen to succeed to the 
related house of Yokote. In Tensh5 8 (1580) the head of yet another 
collateral branch from Yanagisawa village was ordered to commit suicide 
by Takeda Katsuyori (1546-1582) for disobedience and Nabutoshi was ins-
talled as head of the Yanagisawa family. 
When Katsuyori two years later was defeated by Oda Nobunaga and 
himself connnitted suicide, the warriors of Mukawa unanimously decided 
not to follow suit. After a brief spell under Nobunaga, the land fell 
to Tokugawa Ieyasu and the warriors of Mukawa became some of his staun-
chest supporters. Their valiant fighting in Ieyasu's quest to establish 
himself in the Kanto area is documented by a letter, in which Ieyasu 
7 gratefully acknowledges their support. Also various enfeoffments speak 
of their slowly rising fortunes under Ieyasu. 
Yoshiyasu's grandfather, Nobutcshi, died in Tensho 19 (1589) and 
was succeeded by Yasuyoshi, Yoshiyasu's uncle. His father, Yasutada, 
6. For members of the Mukawa shii and discussion of the concept of shli, 
see Nakamura Keya, Ieyasu den (Tokyo, 1965), pp.210-12. 
7. Letter dated 13D lM assigned by Nenroku, Vol.2 to the year Tensho 
14. 
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was the younger son. However, in Genna 1 (1615), at the age of only 
thirteen, Yasutada took the place of his sick elder brother at the battle 
of Osaka. As a consequence he was granted an audience with the second 
shogun llidetada and his brother's stipend of 160 koku8 was transferred 
to him. Afterwards both brothers came into the employ of Iemi tsu' s un-
fortunate younger brother, Tadanaga, whose domain included Kai, the home 
of the Mukawa warriors. Their service came to an end when in Kan'ei 10 
(1633) Tadanaga was forced by Iemitsu to commit suicide. 
In Kehm l (1648) Yoshiyasu' s father finally became part of the re-
tinue of the then three-year-old Tsunayoshi. On this occasion his sti-
pend was increased by seventy koku. When Yoshiyasu was born ten years 
later, his father had reached the position of Chief of Finance (kanjo 
gashira) with a stipend of 530 koku. 
9 Yoshiyasu was born in his father's house at Ichigaya in Edo. He 
was first named Fusayasu and, as was the custom, changed his name several 
times. Finally the shogun granted him the use of the character yoshi, 
a.~d he became Yoshiyasu. He was his father's eldest son, although his 
cousin, whom his father had adopted previously, was senior to him in the 
family hierarchy. His mother was a secondary wife, who for unknown 
reasons returned shortly after her son's birth to her original family, 
by the name of Sase, at Fukuro-mura, part of his father's fief. Yoshi-
yasu was brought up by his father's main wife, who came from the related 
family of Ao~i, and apparently until his stepmother's deat.~ was unaware 
that he was not her true son. Later, however, motivated by a strong 
8. One koku is equal to 5.1 American bushels. 
9. Information until the end of this section is taken from Nenroku, 
Vol.3 unless otherwise stated. 
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sense of filial duty, he sought out his true mother and installed her in 
10 his mansion, where she lived till a ripe old age. 
At the age of seven Yoshiyasu for the first time had an audience 
with the then nineteen-year-old Tsunayoshi. Besides the fact that 
Yoshiyasu performed the various ceremonies appropriate at t,he different 
stages of childhood and youth, nothing else is known about his earlier 
years. Stories that Tsunayoshi took a strong liking to the boy at their 
f . · 11 ub · b d h ak h ·a-irst meeting are not s stantiated y a ocurnent sue as R us i o 
nenroku, which conceivably would have made the most of any early signs 
of favour from the future shogun. What one may assume, however, is that 
Yoshiyasu's boyhood education differed considerably from that of the 
daimyo's sons, with whom he was later to compete in office. Like them, 
he most probably underwent instructions in the martial arts and the Con-
fucian classics. Yet unlike the sons of the daimyo, he would have been 
trained not how to govern and command, but in the art of serving. Yasu-
tada himsel.f had achieved his position through years of faithful ser-
vice and similarly any career for his son would necessarily depend on 
how much he was able to assist and endear himself to his lord. As, for 
instance, Tsunayoshi was known to prefer the early Confucian classics to 
the ~eo-Confucian works studied by the Hayashi school, Yoshiyasu's 
father most probably saw to it that his son was educated in such a way 
that he could respond to and appreciate his lord's discourses on his 
favourite topics. similarly, his fat.~er would have instructed him in 
other likes and dislikes of his lord, and Yoshiyasu, no doubt, grew up 
with a definite appreciation of Tsunayoshi's authoritarian temperament. 
10. MK, p.292-93. 
11. Morita, p.33. 
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Historians frequently attribute Yoshiyasu's rise to power to an early 
homosexual relationship with the future shogun. Apart from the fact 
that such relationships were in no way unusual, there is no evidence to 
either prove or disprove this allegation. Analysis of Yoshiyasu's 
career, however, demonstrates that it was his ability to finely attune 
to his lord's thoughts and temperament, rather than any other factor, 
which brought about his unprecedented rise to high office. 
In Emp6 3 (1675) Yoshiyasu's father reached the age of seventy-four 
and retired. Yoshiyasu, then eighteen, succeeded as head of the house 
and was gra.~ted his father's stipend of 530 koku. At the same time he 
was employed as Page (kosho) in Tsunayoshi's residence at Kanda. Soon. 
afterwards Yoshiyasu married a girl carefully matched to his background, 
named Sada.~o, from the house of Sone. The family was related to his 
·father's side and, according to his concubine Machiko, as "she was also 
a descendant of the Kai Genji, their life together was especially har-
rnonious. 012 
When Yoshiyasu was twenty / his step-mother died. Since his early 
youth he had been preoccupied with religious matters, and it appears 
that the death of the woman, wr.om he had always believed to be his 
mother, suddenly intensified his need for spiritual guidance. He began 
to doubt whether he would ever become master of his emotions, but he 
looked in vain for someone to resolve his questions. Finally his search 
for truth led him to a senior Rinzai priest. Machiko wrote: 
At about that time he went to the abode of the 
abbot Jukudo. It was around the eleventh month 
and as he went on his way the air was heavy with 
sleet and icy cold. But brushing his sleeves he 
U. MK, J? .121. 
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went ahead and the sage, deeply impressed, listened 
to him. Finally he taught him a koan of great value. 13 
Jukudo was to die seven years later, but the koan Yashiyasu re-
ceived on this occasion continued to provide him with a topic for spiri-
tual reflection and became the basis for dialogue with many well-known 
zen masters. 
In the fifth month of Empo 8 (1680) the fourth shogun Ietsuna died 
and three months later Tsunayoshi was proclaimed as the fifth Tokugawa 
shogun. With this sudden turn in the fortunes of his lord, Yoshiyasu's 
career prospects similarly took on new dimensions. Moving with Tsuna-
yoshi's household into Edo castle he now became part of the bakufu, and 
in the eleventh month of that year was officially appointed Attendant 
14 (konando). Soon his salary was raised commensurate with his new posi-
tion: 300 koku were added to his stipend. 15 It was his first increase 
in salary, the first of numerous shogunal promotions which later were to 
arouse the envy and anger of his contemporaries. 
Yoshiyasu's position in terms of bakufu hierarchy was still rather 
a lowly one. His close mental affinity with the shogun, however, was 
demonstrated when he became Tsunayoshi's disciple in Confucian learning 
in the sixth month of Tenna 1 (1681). 16 During the following New Year's 
13. MK, p.138. A koan is a religious episode, usually containing a 
question by a monk and the oracle-like answer of a famous Zen mas-
ter. The koan Yoshiyasu received relates how a monk came to the 
master t.Jmon and asked "When emotions no longer arise, is there 
anything more to do?" The master answered: "Shumisen" (mountain 
at the centre of the universe). See also Eikeiji, Yanagisawa Yosh-
iyasu ko san zen roku (Koriyama, 1973), pp.16-17. 
14. Nenroku, Vol.3, 3D llM Emp<S 8. 
15. ibid., 25D 4M Tenna 1. 
16. ibid., 3D 6M Tenna 1. Nenroku merely states that he became Tsuna-
yoshi's disciple, but Eibyo, natsu and HJ, p.76, make it clear that 
Tsunayoshi was his teacher in Confucian learning. 
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celebrations Yoshiyasu was given the honour of delivering the first 
reading of the Confucian classics, a ceremony he was to perform yearly 
until Tsunayoshi's death. 
Tsunayoshi' s interest in Yoshiyasu' s education seems to indicate 
that already at this time he was purposely grooming him for high office 
in years to come. The shogun's advice on how to succeed was contained 
in a short poem for Yoshiyasu, appropriately entitled "Loyalty to One's 
Lord": 
If, indeed, a man were not to forget the 
two characters that. stand for the word sincerity (makoto), 
he would prosper for generations to come.17 
These words were not lost on Yoshiyasu. It was his unconditional loyalty 
and obedience to the shogun which distinguished him from other officials 
and - as Tsunayoshi had promised - resulted in the prosperity of his 
house. 
In Tenna 3 (1683) a further rise in income gave Yoshiyasu a stipend 
18 
of over 1,000 koku. In that year, however, an incident occurred which 
could have jeopardised the career of a man of lesser standing with the 
shogun. His father's adopted son, Nobuhana, became involved in a quarrel 
within the precincts of Eda castle and eventually died of his wounds. 
Bloodshed within the walls of the castle was considered a serious crime 
and Nobuhana's stipend was confiscated, leaving his heir without an in-
heritance. Customarily Yoshiyasu, as his stepbrother, would have been 
17. Nenroku, Vol.3, llD lM Tenna 2. The two characters of the word 
makoto must refer to the literal style of writing it with the char-
acters for SHIN (truth) and koto. The original is in kana. 
18. Nenroku, Vol.3, llD 111 Tenna 3. 
. 19 
similarly liable to punishment, but he was pardoned by the shogun. 
Several months later the shogun personally praised Yoshiyasu for his 
services, showing his appreciation with a gift of gold coins and cere-
20 
monial garments. Apparently Yoshiyasu's untiring work had well com-
pensated for the misbehaviour of his stepbrother. 
2. RISING TO HIGH POSITION 
By the time Yoshiyasu had reached the age of twenty-seven, it be-
came apparent that in spite of his low samurai origins, traditionally 
33 
placing severe limits on his career, the shogun was to keep his promise 
and reward him richly for his loyal services. At the end of JOkyo 2 
(1685) he was honoured with the lower fifth court rank and became Dewa 
no Kami. 21 Shortly afterwards his stipend was nearly doubled to reach 
22 2,030 koku. As a courtier he now attended the official New Year re-
ception, was invited to the shogun's own no performances and presented 
23 
with a precious sword by Tsunayoshi personally. His new standing was 
further reflected by t.lie fact that he was now considered well-to-do 
.enough to receive a concubine from one of Kyoto's noblest families. she 
was Tanaka Machiko, who was later to use her education and skill to fur-
nish a permanent record of Yoshiyasu's achievements in the pages of her 
Matsugake nikki. 
Machiko was the daughter of the high-ranking courtier Ogimachi 
Dainagon Sanetoyo. Her mother was probably not of noble descent. It is 
19 . ibid., 25D 6M Tenna 3. 
20. . ibid., llD llM J5ky5 1. 
21. ibid., 100 12M .Tokyo 2. 
22. ibid~, 110 lM Jokyo 3. 
23. ibid.' lD lM and 27D 6M Jokyo 3, lD lM J5ky5 4. 
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likely that for this reason Machiko' s name does not appear in the Ogima-
chi genealogy24 and that she was adopted into the Tanaka family whose 
name she used. Perhaps this somewha.t obscure background on her mother's 
side was responsible for the various rumours concerning her origin. The 
suggestion was made that she was a common dancing-girl, offered by the 
h 'k h' h' d 25 mere ant Kawamura Zu1 en to Yos iyasu to procure is own a vancement. 
The highly sophisticated style of Matsukage nikki, spiced with learned 
allusions, makes such a proposition highly unlikely. Furthermore, Mach-
iko's own account leaves no doubt that she was not only the daughter of 
Sanetoyo, but was also brought up close to her father's side. Although 
she had several brothers, it was she whom he always called to keep him 
company, mix his ink and dip his brush. 26 The experience of watching 
her father' at work during her childhood was most probably responsible 
for her erudite bent and the literary skills she displayed during later 
years. At the age of sixteen she gained the opportunity of being intro-
duced to Edo society by a relative attached to the shogunal household. 
At first she hesitated, reluctant to venture so far from home, but 
finally she embarked on the journey. Soon after her arrival in Edo she 
entered the Yanagisawa household as Yoshiyasu's secondary wife. 27 
Yoshiyasu at that time was increasingly occupied with large amounts 
of government business and Machiko observed him as "working diligently 
28 
night and day, without a break." 
24. Hogetsu Keigo and Iwasawa Yoshihiko, Keizu san'yo (Tokyo, 1973-76), 
5:423-24. 
25. Sanada Z:Oyo, MeiTlJO kDhan (Tokyo, 1912), p.532. 
26. MK, p.203-204. 
27. MK, p.204. 
28. MK, p.121. 
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In Jokyo 3 (1686}, Yoshiyasu's aging father fell seriously ill. 
The shogun showed his great concern by sending medicines and ordering 
his personal physicians to attend the bedside of the ailing Yasutada. 
Daily messengers from Edo castle inquired after the old man's state of 
health and the shogun's righthand man, the Grand Chamberlain (sobayonin) 
Makino Narisada, visited the Yanagisawa mansion to convey Tsunayoshi's 
personal messages. The shogun - Machiko noted in her diary - gratefully 
remembered the long years of service Yasutada had rendered, and, she 
quickly added, his deep sympathy on this occasion was, of course, also 
h . . . 29 due to t e important work Yosh1yasu was now performing. 
One day when Yasutada's health had somewhat improved, Makino Nari-
sada announced that he had been charged by the shogun to hear the old 
man's final requests. At first Yasutada refused this honour, but in re-
sponse to the Grand Chamberlain's pleading, finally consented. A loyal 
retainer, he first unselfishly addressed himself to the problems sur-
rounding the shogun himself. As a result of Tsunayoshi 's strict judge-
rnent of the Echigo quarrel (Echigo sod5l the lord of this domain, Matsu-
daira ~..itsunaga, had been deprived of his fief and placed under house 
arrest. The shogun did no more than carry out justice, but Yasutada 
imagined that he must personally suffer from watching the plight of this 
man, who was his relative. Yasutada, therefore, thoughtfully made it 
one of his last wishes that Matsudaira Mitsunaga be pardoned. 30 
Secondly, Yoshiyasu's father was concerned about the state of the 
bureaucracy. Increments which had previously been paid only during the 
performance of special official duties, were, according to a recent 
29. ibid. 
30. See Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p,92-93, for Echigo sodo. 
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order, to be added permanently to a family's stipend, even when such 
duties were no longer performed. Yasutada had noticed some slackness in 
the bureaucracy and suggested that if higher salaries were paid only 
during the performance of higher duties, officials might show more dili-
gence in their work. 31 
Only Yasutada • s final request was of a more personal nature. It 
was a plea for promotion of his grandnephew, Yamataka Nobutaka, whose 
h d f h h . 32 career a so ar not s own mucr promise. 
The shogun granted all of Yasutada's three wishes, although some 
years were to pass before they were implemented. Matsudaira Mitsunaga 
eventually was pardoned and became the heir of Matsudaira Naotoshi with 
a stipend of 100,000 koku. In Genroku 5 (1692) salary increments were 
again made dependent on the continued performance of specific duties and 
on Yasutada's thirteenth death anniversary, the shogun distributed gold 
coins to lower officials in memory of his late retainer's services. 
Finally, Yasutada's grandnephew became attached to the entourage of the 
h • d d d h h . th d f . 33 s ogun s a opte aug ter upon er marriage to e Lor o Mlto. 
Before Yasutada died at the venerable age of eighty-six, he was· 
able to witness the birth of his grandson, and to proudly hand to the 
infant the sword with which he had fought for the Tokugawa house at the 
34 battle of Osaka. 
The child, who was later granted the name Yoshisato by the shogun, 
became ·the focus of what is generally known as the Yanagisawa quarrel 
31. Increments were added to salaries in the fourt,~ month of Tenna 2. 
See Kitajima Masamoto, Bdo bakufu no kenryoku kow (Tokyo, 1964), 
pp .4 74-76. 
32. MK, p.122 and Nenroku, Vol.3, SM Ji5ky5 4. 
33. Bibyo, haru and HJ, p.51. For salary increments, see Kitajima, Edo 
bakufu, p. 4 76; for gold coins, see MK, p .1 70-71. 
34. MK, p.125. 
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(Yanagisawa sodo). He was born to Yoshiyasu's concubine, Someko. Both 
Sanno gaiki and Gokoku onna taiheiki, however, claim that he was in fact 
not Yoshiyasu's son, but fathered by the shogun himself, and that al-
though this was kept a well-guarded secret, it was ultimately responsi-
ble for Yoshiyasu's rise to influence and prosperity. In Hoei 6 (1709) 
- so these works claim - the shogun and Yoshiyasu were planning to re-
veal the true identity of Yoshisato and have him proclaimed shogunal 
successor. Official chronicles maintain that the fifth shogun died in 
the first month of that year from an attack.of measles, an illness from 
which various members of his family and entourage had already suffered 
35 for several months. According to Sanno gaiki and Gokoku onna taiheiki, 
however, he died by the hand of his own wife. Apparently more devot~d 
to the future of the country than her husband, she prevented the impend-
ing disaster of having his "bastard" son rule over the Japanese isles, 
by stabbing first the shcgun, and then herself. 36 
There are some obvious flaws in this story. A number of historians, 
for instance, have pointed out that Tsunayoshi's first official visit to 
the Yanagisawa mansion took place only in Genroku 4 (1691), five years 
after Yoshisato was born, and that consequently he could not have been 
the child of Someko and Tsunayoshi. 37 There is, of course, no way to 
prove that she did not, prior to this event, secretly meet the shogun. 
However, if a boy had been born.as the result of such a union, it seems 
likely that he would have been proclaimed the shogun's son upon his 
birth. Curiously enough, the same works which claim that Tsunayoshi 
35. E.g. TJ, 43:721-23. 
36, Sanno gaiki, pp.4, 9. Gokoku onna taiheiki, pp.154-68. 
37. E.g. Morita, p.137. 
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carefully kept the existence of a son secret for some twenty years, also 
maintain that his overwhelming anxiety for a successor finally drove him 
to proclaim the infamous Laws of Compassion. 38 It appears reasonable to 
assume that if Someko had been found pregnant with the shogun's child, 
she would have been moved to Edo castle as his concubine to give birth 
there to Tsunayoshi's longed-for heir. 
Another contradiction inherent in the story of Sanna gaiki and'Gokoku 
onna taiheiki is the fact that Ienobu had officially been installed as 
Tsunayoshi's successor some years prior to the intended proclamation of 
h . h . h . h 39 th . . Yos isato as eir to t e fifth s ogun. Moreover, e circumstances 
surrounding Ienobu's birth and childhood somewhat resembled those attri-
buted to Yoshiyasu's eldest son. Ienobu was born the son of a chamber-
maid when his father, Iemitsu's son Tsunashige, was only nineteen. So 
that this fact might not preclude Tsunashige's marriage to a girl of 
suitably high status, the birth was kept secret and the child brought up 
by a retainer. Only when Tsunashige died without an heir, was Ienobu's 
true identity revealed and he was permitted to inherit the domain of his 
40 father. It appears highly unlikely, therefore, that Tsunayoshi would 
have installed the "illegitimate" child of his brother as his heir, if 
he himself had a son born under similar circumstances. 
It might even have been the story of Ienobu's birth and childhood 
which led some people to assume that Tsunayoshi similarly had asked his 
loyal servant Yoshiyasu to bring up his illegitimate child, when they 
looked for an explanation for Yoshiyasu's wealth and influence. More-
over, Tsunayoshi is quoted as having once expressed his regret at not 
38. See Chapter IV, Section 2. 
39. See Section 4 of this chapter. 
40. tlaramoto Tatsuya, Nihon no rekishi (Tokyo, 1966), 17:27-30. 
39 
having made Yoshisato his son-in-law. 41 Such statements, together with 
the fact that Yoshisato was generously treated by both Tsunayoshi and 
his successor Ienobu, must have further induced people to speculate 
about the true identity of Yoshiyasu's eldest son. 
There can be little doubt that the claims made by Sanna gaiki and 
Gokoku onna taiheiki are spurious. Yet this story was apparently too 
colourful to be ignored and even historians writing in recent times are 
knol\lll to have defended it with arguments such as that Yoshiyasu would 
have been too busy to beget his own child. 42 
It is true that after Yoshisato's birth the fortunes of the Yanagi-
sawa family continued to rise, but Matsukage nikki points out that Yoshi-
yasu's success was due to other reasons: 
As the fleeting days and months passed we 
came to the year called Genroku 1 (1688). 
As his lordship was working steadily without 
a single break, his stipend was increased 
this winter. From the shogun's own hand he 
received the sword nruned Ace.43 
The increase of stipend Machiko referred to was a substantial one 
of 10,000 koku, which placed Yoshiyasu with a total income of 12,030 
koku amongst the ranks of the daimyo. 
The year Genroku 1 (1688) not only witnessed Yoshiyasu's rise from 
bannerman to daimyo status, but was also significant in terms of his 
career within the bakufu. The shogun commanded that henceforth Yoshiyasu 
was to work alongside two of his Grand Chamberlains. The order is 
41. Eibyo, haru; HJ, p.45. 
42. Kodama KOta, Jimbutsu Nihon no rekishi (Tokyo, 1976), 13:39. Gomi 
Yasuke, the author of this section, is also wrong in stating that 
Yoshisato's title of yakatasama was limited to children of the sho-
gun, ibid., p.40. 
43. MK, p.125. 
generally taken to indicate that from then on Yoshiyasu, too, had ac-
quired this status. 44 
40 
In his new function Yoshiyasu accompanied the shogun on most occa-
sions, be it on his frequent calls on Keisha-in, his mother, or visits 
to the mansion of his senior Grand Chamberlain, Makino Narisada. Sho-
gunal presents of food, ceremonial clothing or coins, became too fre-
t . 45 quen to mention. Tsunayoshi • s appreciation of Yoshiyasu • s services 
was again demonstrated when early in Genroku 3 (1690) his stipend was 
46 
more than doubled, reaching a total of 32,030 koku. In addition a 
loan of 30,000 ryo was granted by the bakufu to cover the expenses of 
1 han f 'd 47 severa c ges o resi ence. 
Yoshiyasu, however, did not become complacent as a result of these 
exceptional favours. On the contrary' 
During recent months and years his lordship had a 
great amount of government business to attend to 
and even in the evenings stayed at the castle. 
This year, too, he generally remained almost every 
second night at the castle. Thus when around mid-
summer it became unbearably hot, even the shogun 
felt sorry for him and ordered that henceforth he 
was to return home every night.48 
Such diligent efforts were again rewarded at the end of the year 
(1690), when Yoshiyasu was promoted to the lower fourth court rank and a 
few days later was granted permission to have the two-lance insignia 
44. Nenroku, Vol.3, 12D llM Genroku 1 records the order that Yoshiyasu 
was to work alongside the shogun's Grand Chamberlains, while TJ, 
43:26 of this date notes that Yoshiyasu was appointed Grand Cham-
berlain. 
45. Nenroku, Vol.4. 
46. Nenroku, Vol.5, 26D 3M Genroku 3. 
4 7. ibid., 280 3M C,enroku 3. 
48. MK, p.126. 
(nihon dOgu) carried in front of him, a privilege granted to senior 
49 daimyo only. 
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The following year (1691) the Yanagisawa family for the first time 
was given the great honour of receiving the shogun in their own mansion. 
Machiko well recalled the feverish activity that overcame the household 
once the shogun had announced his intention. The estate, which only re-
cently had been granted to Yoshiyasu, proved too small for the buildings 
to be constructed for this occasion, and the adjacent land, occupied by 
another daimyo, was hurriedly resumed by the bakufu and bestowed upon 
Yoshiyasu. The new buildings were elaborate; there was an audience hall 
50 for the shogun of fifty square ken, a new Eastern and a new Western 
residence, additional store houses and kitchens, a theatre, rest houses 
for his attendants and private quarters for Tsunayoshi himself. The 
gardens were rearranged too, and great care was taken that trees and 
shrubbery would please the shogunal eye. Yoshiyasu was happy with the 
result, and finally: 
Thus the day of the shogun's visit, the twenty-second 
of the third month, drew near. At the break of dawn 
his lordship went to the castle to hear the shogun's 
formal announcement of his visit today. However much 
he thought about it, there was no way to describe the 
buildings shining brilliantly on this balmy spring day. 
In the Northern mansion hung the picture of a horse with 
cherry blossoms, painted by the shogun's own hand and 
mounted most exquisitely. Two vases of silver with in-
describably beautiful flowers were placed in front of it. 
An inkstone decorated in gold and lacquer depicting fal-
ling maple leaves, a scroll painted by the shogunal 
49. Nenroku, Vol.6, 25D and 29D 12M Genroku 3. Nihon dogu was granted 
only to kunimochi daimyo, those in possession of one or more than 
one province. For exact definition of kunimochi daimyo, see Sasama 
Yoshihiko, Edo bakufu yakushoku shusei (Tokyo, 1965), p.73. 
50. One square ken equals 3.3lsq.m. 
artists and a congratulatory urn decorated with 
scenes of the tea harvest at Uji were placed on or 
above the shelves •••• 
The Senior Councillors (ri?jii) Okubo Kaga no Kami, Abe Bungo no 
42 
Kami, Toda Yamashiro no Kami and Tsuchiya Sagami no Kami, and the Grand 
Chamberlain {sobayonin) Makino Narisada, as well as other "important of-
ficials and friendly lords" thronged the Yanagisawa mansion. Finally at. 
noon the shogun himself arrived. Once the appropriate ceremonies had 
taken place, it was time to proceed with the exhange of innumerable 
presents. Even the women of the household, Yoshiyasu's mother, wives 
and daughters, were presented with shogunal gifts, while his retainers 
were rewarded with coins. Later the shogun delivered a lecture on the 
Great Learning to the patient audience of his ministers, Confucian 
scholars and invited clergy. Next Yoshiyasu was called upon ta expound 
the same Confucian classic in front of this select company, and his re-
tainers, too, received the honour of having their interpretations heard 
by the shogun. These learned discourses finally were followed by 
several no plays, and the beauty and excitement of the performances left 
51 Machiko at. a loss for words. All the splendoiir and extravagance for 
which the Genroku period has become famous, and for which later Tsunayo-
shi was to be severely criticised in more stringent economic times, is 
vividly reflected in Machiko's account of this occasion. 
The shogun, apparently, had been pleased with his visit, for during 
th h . h . . 52 at same year e called four more times on t e Yanagisawa mansion. 
Three to five times yearly was to become the average number of such 
shogunal outings, bringing the total number of visits with which 
51. MK, pp.127-29. 
52. TJ, 43:109, 9D SM; p.121, llD 9M.; p.123, 13D lOM; p.128, llD 12M.. 
43 
Tsunayoshi honoured that family to fifty-eight. 53 The shogun, Machiko 
maintained, was greatly burdened with government affairs and was in need 
of a place where he could relax in a casual atmosphere. His visits to 
the Yanagisawa mansion, therefore, provided him with a most stimulating, 
as well as interesting, experience. 54 Yoshiyasu, on the other hand, was 
kept so occupied with these frequent shogunal entertainments that he had 
barely time to pray at his father's grave or supervise the construction 
55 
of an appropriate memorial temple. 
At the end of Genroku 4 (1691) Yoshiyasu was granted permission to 
visit Go no Maru, the mother of the shogun's only surviving child, 'l'su-
ruhime. It was a rare privilege, as Machiko points out: 
In the eleventh month his J.ordship was given per-
mission to visit the lady called Go no Maru and for 
the first time have an audience with her. Since 
early times he had frequently communicated with her 
in writing, but it was difficult to see her in per-
son, for as the shogun greatly relied on her, every-
thing she did became the subject of gossip.56 
A few days later Yoshiyasu received an invitation likewise to visit 
. 57 . din Tsuruhime, again an honour which would have been considered extraor -
ary, even for the most high-ranldng daimyo. 
Tsunayoshi has frequently been criticised for relying upon the ad-
vice of his mother. The above passage indicates that his favourite 
concubines also received his confidence in important matters. The route 
via the women's chambers provided throughout the existence of the 
53. Eihyo, haru; HJ, p.45. 
54. MK, p.135. 
55. MK, p.132-23. 
56. MK, p.135. 
57. ibid. and Nenroku, Vol. 9, 150 UM Genroku 4. 
shogunate an important unofficial approach to the ruler. Generally, 
however, officials had no direct access to the women of the immediate 
shogunal entourage and more subtle means, sue.~ as passing me,ssages to 
58 the attendants of these ladies, had to be employed. In his capacity 
44 
as Grand Chamberlain, Yoshiyasu was in charge of all official communica-
tions with the shogun. Establishing direct contact with the important 
women of the shogurial household meant that this second avenue to Tsuna-
yoshi also came under his control. 
With such well-established connections.it is perhaps not surprising 
that in the next year (1692) his work on behalf of the shogunate was 
again rewarded handsomely. Yoshiyasu's stipend was once more virtually 
59 doubled, bringing it to 62,030 koku. 
While Yoshiyasu's career progressed brilliantly, shadows were cast 
over his personal life. His second son, the child of his concubine 
Someko, had been born in Genroku 3 (1690). Now two years later the 
child fell sick and soon afterwards died. "Like blossoms falling before 
their bloom" mourned Machiko. 60 
A visit from the fifth Obaku patriarch, the Chinese priest Kosen, 
in the next month might have brought spiritual solace. Yoshiyasu had 
many religious topics to discuss with the well-known sage and on his 
departure was again given a koan to help him on the road of spiritual 
61 development. It was indicative of Yoshiyasu's rise to influence 
during the last fifteen years that he no longer arduously had to seek 
58. Conrad D. Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu (Cambridge, Mass., 
1967), p.107. 
59. Nenroku, Vol.13, 14D llM Genroku 5. 
60. MK, p.137. 
61. MK, p.138 and. Nenroku, Vol.11, 17D 4M Genroku 5. 
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out a teacher, but that the most high-ranking priests were grateful for 
an opportunity to visit his mansion. 
3. LORD OF KAWAGOE CASTLE 
In Genroku 7 (1695) Yoshiyasu received new status by being appoin-
ted lord of Kawagoe castle. At the same time his stipend was increased 
62 by a further 10,000 koku. 
New challenges awaited Yoshiyasu in administering a fortress, which 
owing to his heavy load of government work, .he himself would hardly have 
time to visit. At the same time his promotion created fresh opportuni-
ties for his retainers, and Machiko was obviously impressed with the 
large delegation that was despatched by her lord to take command of his 
new domain. 
Senior officials of our house.were appointed as 
Castle Superintendents, and to other positions of 
importance. On the day of their departure his lord-
ship was in high spirits and the retainers that had 
been appointed were overjoyed and bustled about ex-
citedly. Their earnestness and determination to do 
their duties in every respect with the utmost serious-
ness and devotion was just delightful and, more than 
that, reassuring. As these one hundred to two hundred 
men in full formal dress stood in rank along the road, 
he gave them detailed orders concerning their journey 
to the castle and the taking up of residence there. 
Putting his heart with great seriousness into these 
solemn orders he instructed them gravely and very ar-
ticulately and sent them on their way.63 
The same ambition that drove Yoshiyasu to exert himself to his ut-
most in his service for the shogun now turned him into a model domain 
lord. His lengthy instructions to his retainers concerning the running 
62. Nenroku, Vol.21, 7D lM Genroku 7. 
63. MK, pp.141-42. 
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of the castle are still extant64 and the elaborate programme of land-rec-
lamation he initiated soon afterwards to resettle the Musashino plains, 65 
testifies to his constant endeavour to perform at the highest standards. 
Yoshiyasu acquired further prestige when he was granted the imperial 
title of Gentleman-in-waiting (jiju) and his eldest son was accorded the 
honour of using the two-lance ins:l,gnia (nihon dogu) like his father. 66 
Yet again his joy over such unusual success in his career was dampened by 
a tragic event in his personal life. The third son of his concubine Som-
eko also died in infancy. 67 Several months later, however, he was rewar-
ded with another male heir, and this child was to grow up to reach man-
hood. It was Machiko's first son, who owing to the death of his step-
brothers was to receive the shogunal honours and public attention due to 
the second-eldest of the Yanagisawa mansion. 
Yoshiyasu's increasingly prestigious position brought him into close 
contact with the highest-ranking men of the country. The imperial pre-
late of Nikko, Koben Shinno, on several occasions had been his partner in 
discussions of government affairs. In Genroku 9 (1696) Yoshiyasu was 
privileged to receive this member of the imperial family together with 
his entourage of a large number of Buddhist dignitaries at the Yanagisawa 
mansion. It was the first informal encounter between the two men and a 
rare privilege for Yoshiyasu to be in personal contact with such a senior 
member of the imperial family. A shogunal messenger with presents and 
food for the banquet to be served further heightened the dignified at-
h th . . 68 mosp ere on is occasion~ 
64. Nenroku, Vol.22, lOD 2M Genroku 7. 
65. · ibid., Vol. 34, 21D 9M Genroku 8. See also Chapter V, Section 1. 
66. ibid., Vol.28, 9D 12M Genroku 7. 
67. MK, p.142. 
68. MK, pp.148-49. 
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The sixth 5baku patriarch, Senka, was the next distinguished visi-
tor at the Yanagisawa mansion. His predecessor, Kosen, had recently. 
died and Senka's call, shortly after his appointment, demonstrated that 
he was similarly concerned to establish close ties with Yoshiyasu. 
Senka, too, was Chinese and Machiko recalled with delight the strange 
sounds of his language: he was speaking Chinese while Yoshiyasu replied 
iri Japanese. When it came to more difficult topics the two men conver-
sed in writing and some of the things Yoshiyasu wrote for the patriarch 
were astonishing indeed. In no uncertain terms Yoshiyasu impressed upon 
him that in recent years the members of his sect had neglected their 
religious obligations and in a self-indulgent fashion were preoccupied 
with secular matters. The continued success or decline of the sect 
rested on Senka's shoulders and Yoshiyasu urged him strongly to exert 
himself and root out this evi1.69 
This was no longer the posture of a man reverently looking up to 
religious dignitaries, but the stance of a politician, whose commands 
could significantly influence the future of the clergy. The patriarch 
acknowledged Yoshiyasu's authority by humbly accepting this harsh criti-
cism and as a further gesture of acquiescence pleaded for Yoshiyasu him-
self to set out new guidelines for the order. 70 
Senka was not alone in paying homage to Yoshiyasu' s authority. As 
the shogun's right-hand man the latter had been assigned to supervise a 
project of great importance to Tsunayoshi, namely the restoration of an-
cient temples and shrines. All petitions had to be channelled through 
Yoshiyasu, sending an endless stream of supplicants to his gates. 
69. MK, p.151. 
70. ibid. 
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"When .on occasions he approved some project, people were overjoyed and 
. . . . 'd 71 happily worshipped him · 1ike a god" Maclnko remembered with some pr1 e, 
By the time Yoshiyasu was forty, in Genroku 10 (1697), he occupied 
a position of great prestige, His income was steadily increasing, 
72 
amounting at that time to over 90,000 koku. The shogun was not only 
frequenting his mansion several times a year with undiminished splen-
73 dour, but also called on the newly established residence of his eldest 
74 
son. A villa at the hamlet of Komagome, which he had previously bes-
d h ' 75 h' 1 d hi t 1 f towe on Yos 1yasu, Tsunayos 1 now se ecte as s res p ace or a 
planned shogunal pilgrimage to the sanctuary at Nikko. 76 Yoshiyasu was 
on friendly terms with the shogun's favourite concubine, and Keisha-in, 
the shogun's mother, similarly made known her affection by according him 
the honour of a visit. 77 
Yoshiyasu in turn could boast of an army of scholars under his roof, 
whose far-reaching knowledge never failed to impress his distinguished 
visitors. He unquestionably had great talent in selecting men of high 
intellect. Only the previous year (1696) he had employed an unknown 
scholar who had been content to serve in the Yanagisawa mansion at an 
extremely low stipend. During the shogun's visit ten days later, this 
fledgling scholar - later known as ogyu Sarai - had stood his own in a 
discussion with the head of the Confucian school, Hayashi Nobuatsu, and 
so pleased the shogun that he was rewarded with a ceremonial robe. 
71. MK, p.152. 
72. Nenroku, 26D 7M Genroku 10. 
73. E.g. MK, p.156. 
74. Nenrolrn, Vol.46, 25D 3M Genroku 10. 
75. ibid., Vol.30, 21D 4M Genroku B, the present-day Rikugien. 
76. ib.id., Vol.47, 4D SM Genroku 10. 
77. UK, p.157. 
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An order that Sorai present himself at the castle a few days later 
further indicated shogunal recognition of his talents. From then on 
Sorai attended upon Tsunayoshi three times monthly and was honoured with 
78 invitations to shogunal no performances several times a year. Even 
amongst the official scholars employed in the castle, there was none to 
equal him. 79 "An ornament to our house" Yoshiyasu called him proudly. 
Relatively little is known about the. exact nature of Yoshiyasu,.s 
involvement in day-to-day government affairs during this period. His 
own chronicle, Rakushido nenroku, makes no mention of the documents that 
passed through his hands or decisions made, and Matsukage nikki limits 
itself to events of significance to the writer. But in spite of Machi-
ko's selective approach one gains the impression that, as during his 
later years, Yoshiyasu was handling in a general fashion all matters 
concerning the shogun, whether of public or private nature, being more 
deeply involved in those issues of special interest to Tsunayoshi. 
At the beginning of Genroku 11 (1698), for instance, Yoshiyasu was 
charged with supervising the construction of a large new temple, the 
Kempon Chudo, at the shogun's ancestral sanctuary at Toeizan. His ef-
forts to satisfy his lord with an early completion of the project kept 
him more than busy, but the next month he had to attend Tsunayoshi on a 
procession to the related house of OWari, whose daughter the shogun was 
adopting. In the summer of that year another of Tsunayoshi's adopted 
daughters, Yaehime, formally entered the house of her groom, the Lord of 
Mito, similarly a member of the Three Related Houses (gosanke). Here 
also, Yoshiyasu was responsible for handling "matters great and small" 
78. Nenroku, Vol.42, 18D and 26D 9M Genroku 9 and Yuishogaki translated 
by Lidin, The Life of Ogyu Sorai, pp.173-75. 
79. Eibyo, natsu; HJ, p. 76. 
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pertaining to the elaborate ceremonies and festivities of this occa-
. 80 
sion. 
"He executed the manifold affairs entrusted to him without a single 
misjudgement, but it left him not the slightest leisure." Finally the 
strain proved too much. "When the heat became so unbearable that even 
the soil cracked, his lordship fell sick. 081 The shogun was greatly 
distressed by Yoshiyasu's illness. Daily he sent messengers to inquire 
after Yoshiyasu's state of health, and gifts ranging from cakes to new 
bedding were sent to alleviate his uncomfortable condition. The shogun's 
wives and daughters also showered him with gifts and the constant stream 
of high ranking well-wishers was a suita.~le reflection of Yoshiyasu's 
important position. "People might well be jealous of such attention" 
mused Machiko. 82 
Yoshiyasu had hardly risen from his sickbed when the elaborate 
ceremonies for the opening of the new temple at Toeizan had to be organ-
ised. His exertions on behalf of this project were duly rewarded. He 
was greatly honoured by receiving the imperial title of Lesser Commander 
of the Guards (sakon'e no shosho). 83 During the lengthy rites for 
opening the new temple he was seated closest to the shogun, above all 
other officials. 14 
The joy at Yoshiyasu's rise to new honours was soon marred when 
disaster struck the Yanagisawa mansion only days later. A fire broke 
out in the neighbourhood and fanned by southerly winds quickly engulfed 
80. MK, p.161. 
81. MK, p.162. 
82. MK, p.162. 
83. Nenroku, Vol.SS, 21D 7M Genroku 11 . 
84. ibid.' Vol.57, 30 9M Genroku 11. 
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the residence. With the concerted efforts of other daimyo the shogunal 
villa within the compound could be saved, but the appartments of the 
children and retainers all fell to the flames. The fire spread as far 
as Toeizan and finally destroyed the ancestral hall of the fourth shogun, 
but the newly built temple was spared. Generous presents from the sho-
gun and his family compensated for some of the material loss Yoshiyasu 
85 had suffered, but the feeling of contemporaries and later generations 
that the fire was sent by the gods as a warning against the upstart's 
rise to power, could not be eliminated. 
The price Yoshiyasu had to pay for his ambitious devotion to his 
work increasingly began to show. Hardly had he attended the burial of 
his elder sister in the fifth month of Genroku 13 (1700), than his atten-
dance was urgently requested by the shogun. And although he was still 
supposed to remain in seclusion for the religious rites of mourning, he 
hurried to the castle to deal with government business which could suffer 
no postponement. Such strain took its toll; again Yoshiyasu fell sick. 
Although the illness was not serious, it was extremely painful. The 
shogun was desolated by Yoshiyasu's absence. When the illness had some-
what abated, Yoshiyasu pulled himself together and attended the castle, 
but the onset of the summer's heat again worsened his condition. Con-
tinued treatment by the country's most famous physicians eventually im-
proved the state of his health, but it was not until the eighth month 
that Yoshiyasu was finally able to take up his usual round of government 
duties. The doctors were handsomely rewarded for restoring back to 
86 health a man of such importance to the government. 
85. MK, pp.168-69. 
86. MK, pp.172-73. 
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After his suffering during the heat of summer, Yoshiyasu took new 
interest in his retreat at Komagome and set out for a visit. Machiko 
recalled later: 
The way was a little path, difficult to negotiate, 
but with unusual charm. The further we went, the 
remoter it felt. It was a retreat with great 
emotional appeal, where clusters of trees swayed 
in the wind and even the tips of the ordinary 
grasses ceaselessly rustled in the autumn breeze. 
In recent months, his lordship had had absolutely 
no leisure to attend to such a distant place, and 
the gardens had scarcely been touched. The sense 
of remoteness was heightened by the incessant 
chirping of the crickets.87 
It was perhaps at this stage of his life that the idea of early 
resignation from government service slowly entered Yoshiyasu's mind, 
leading to the creation of the still famous Rikugien gardens as his seat 
of retirement. 
A year after this visit to Komagome, Keisho-in, the shogun's 
mother, gave Yoshiyasu the honour of selecting his retreat as a place to 
rest during her visit to temples of the neighbourhood. This prompted a 
flurry of activity to tame the natural beauty of the landscape into 
well-cared-for gardens, worthy of such a distinguished visitor. Rare 
trees and shrubs were planted, rocks piled up into waterfalls and nine 
additional villas were built to accommodate KeishO-in and her large en-
tourage. When finally her long procession of attendants, .courtiers and 
monks arrived, it provided an unusual spectacle for the local inhabi-
88 tants. 
87. MK, p.174. 
88. MK, pp.178-79; Nenroku, Vol.82, 25D 4M Genroku 14. 
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4. THE PINNACLE OF SUCCESS 
With the beginning of the eighteenth century, Yoshiyasu's career 
reached its peak. On three different occasions the shogun singled him 
out with great honours and extravagant praise. Because he was born the 
son of a bannerman, Yoshiyasu could not occupy such high positions as 
Senior or Grand Councillor (rojil or tairo), but there could be little 
doubt that next to the shogun he was the most influential man in the 
country. Yet even as he was climbing the last rungs in the ladder of 
success, Yoshiyasu increasingly showed signs of weariness from the pres~ 
sure of government business. 
At the end of Genroku 14 (1701) Yoshiyasu and his sons were given 
the rare distinction of receiving the shogunal family name, Matsudaira. 
The announcement was made on one of Tsunayoshi's visits to the Yanagi-
sawa mansion. Preparations were more elaborate than usual and even the 
Buddhist clergy had been invited in full numbers. Once the usual cere-
monies had been completed, the shogun called Yoshiyasu to his side and 
made a lengthy speech, the most important parts of which RakushidO nen-
roku summarises: 
•'allowing the orders of the third shogun, your father 
Yoshitada served us for many decades since our child-
hood. You, Yoshiyasu, have attended upon us since you 
were young. From the time you received the order to 
become our disciple you have acted in accordance with 
our wishes and have faithfully executed your duties,. 
and as a consequence you have been successively promo-
ted. You have become a model for all officials. Today 
we bestow upon you the name Matsudaira as well as an 
ideogram from our personal name. Henceforth we consi-
der you a member of our family.89 
From then on Ycshiyasu was known as Matsudaira Mino no Kami, the style 
89. Nenroku, Vol.93, 26D llM Genroku 14. 
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of Matsudaira Dewa no Kami being already that of Matsudaira Kiyotake. 90 
Yoshiyasu's eldest son was granted the same honours as his father, re-
ceiving the name Matsudaira Ise no Kami Yoshisato. His second and third 
sons, the children of his concubine Machiko, were similarly permitted to 
call themselves Matsudaira. As a further honour these two boys at only 
six and eight years of age were made the shogun's disciples, just as 
91 their father had been when he was young. 
Barely four months later the shogun again had reason to bestow high 
praise on Yoshiyasu' s services. Through Yoshiyasu' s efforts the emperor 
had consented to bestow the first rank upon Keisho~in, the shogun's 
mother. 
Keisho-in's origins are somewhat obscure. Various chronicles claim 
that she was born the daughter of a lowly greengrocer in Kyoto. After 
her father's death her mother entered the house of Honjo, a retainer of 
the Iehijo family, as a servant, taking her children with her. Eventu-
ally Keisha-in, when a young girl, came to accompany one of Kyoto's 
noble ladies as an attendant to Edo castle. There Keisho-in, apparently 
a great beauty, caught the eye of the third shogun, Iemitsu, and final-
ly received official recognition as his concubine when she bore him a 
92 
son. Her lowly origins have been made much of by historians as t.~e 
cause of her bad influence t1POn her son. It appears reasonable to as~ 
sume that during her lifetime her humble background had put her at a 
disadvantage to those ladies of the shogunal household who could boast 
of aristocratic or even imperial ancestry, and her elevation to the 
90. Hatta Masaatsu, Kansei ch15shii shokafu (Tokyo, 1917-18), 1:265 
(henceforth cited as KCS). 
91. Nenroku, Vol.93, 26D llM Genroku 14. 
92. E.g. Hayakawa Junsaburo, Ryuei fujo denso (Tokyo, 1917), pp.39-40. 
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highest rank in the imperial hierarchy was therefore of special signifi-
cance. Naturally t.~e court had been reluctant to grant these extraordi-
nary honours to a woman of such hrnnble descent, and it had required 
great diplomacy and skilful manipulation of Yoshiyasu' s connection with 
members of the imperial household to finally be granted the title'. 93 
Yoshiyasu's task had not been easy. Yet whatever his efforts, he 
could rest assured that not only Keisho-in, but also.the shogun himself, 
with his strong sense of filial piety and deep respect for his mother, 
would reward them appropriately. Tsunayoshi • s gratitude was expressed 
in the following words: 
The.petition for her ladyship our mother•s94 investi-
ture was in the very first instance despatched by Yoshi-
yasu for submission at the court. Our great act of filial 
piety in obtaining the first rank for her ladyship our 
mother in her old age, entirely relied upon Yoshiyasu's 
help. Over and above this we consider the fact that he 
conducts private and official matters for us single-hand-
edly a true indication of his talents. For these reasons 
we bestow on him an increase in salary of 20,000 koku.95 
Barely a month after Yoshiyasu was honoured by such extravagant sho-
gunal praise; misfortune again befell his house. During the night a fire 
broke out in the Yanagisawa mansion and before help could be summoned the 
96 flames spread and razed the whole property to the ground. Was it an 
accident that coincided with Yoshiyasu's new honours, or did some human 
hand help to make known the disapproval of the gods? If Yoshiyasu sus-
pected arson, it found no mention in the records. 
93. See diary of Konoe l'JOtohiro quoted in Tokutomi Iichir5, Kinsei 
Nihon kokuminshi, Vol.17, Genroku jidai (Tokyo, 1936), pp.431-42. 
94. San no maru sama. 
95. Nenroku, Vol.95, 9D 3M Genroku 15. 
96. Toda Mosui, Gotodaiki in Hayakawa Junsaburo, Toda Mosui zenshu 
(Tokyo, 1915), p.186, SD 4M Genroku 15. 
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This time even the villa used by the shogun could not be saved and 
Yoshiyasu himself had to move into the house of his retainer Yabuta 
Shigemori. Tsunayoshi and his family helped by supplying clothing and 
utensils, but the loss went far beyond the goods of everyday use. Among 
the burnt property were, for instance, a valuable collection of swords, 
many of them shogunal presents, and paintings and writings by famous men. 
Perhaps most painful to Yoshiyasu, however, was the loss of his family 
97 
records. ~~chiko recalled: 
His lordship was most grieved by the loss of all the 
records of our house, and whenever he had a spare 
moment he devoted all his energies to looking into 
this matter. He summoned his scholars together and 
charged them to do likewise and finally around this 
time the task was completed. Because he had put his 
great influence behind this project, the scholars were 
able to reconstruct most of the records. Material 
from the days of his distant ancestors until this year 
were collected in over eighty-eight volumes and called 
Rakushido nenroku. Rakushi might have been the name 
of a temple. Even now they continue to record year by 
year the events of this unparalleled reign.98 
With t.'1.e generous assistance of the shogun and his family t.'1e Yana-
gisawa mansion was quickly rebuilt, and only five months after the fire 
had totally destroyed the residence, Tsunayoshi and his entourage could 
inspect the new buildings. 99 
At the same time Yoshiyasu's retreat at Kornagome was being further 
improved. His workload did not permit him to visit the location himself, 
and his retainers, furnished with sketches of his ideas, went back and 
' 
forth daily. As Yoshiyasu's interest in the gardens became known, a 
97. Nenroku, Vol.99, 60 4M Genroku 15. 
98. MK, p.203. 
99. MK, pp.198-99; 202. 
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stream of gifts arrived to add to its embellishment. Innumerable cart-
loads carrying rocks of unusual shape and rare plants and shrubs made 
100 their way to Komagome. 
Finally Yoshiyasu went to inspect the gardens: 
They were exquisite beyond compare. The tranquility 
of the broad lake, the outline of the mountains 
looming in the distance, the composition of the rocks 
and the evanescent trees and plants formed a setting 
of unparalleled beauty.101 
As Yoshiyasu was enthusiastically inspecting every corner of his 
retreat Machiko observed this and concluded: 
Hearing him chant "make your fame, make your name 
and then " people knew what he had his heart set 
on.102 
Yoshiyasu was alluding to a saying from Lao-tzu, which suggests 
th ho la . h h h th k f h' 103 at a man s u retire once e as reac ed e pea o 1s career. 
His ambitions in the political arena of Edo had been fulfilled. He was 
still unerringly executing his duties for the shogun, but from now on 
his personal interests lay in more leisurely pursuits. Besides the ela-
borate landscaping of his gardens at KDmagome, poetry, and the arbitra-
tor of this art, the imperial family, increasingly became the focus of 
his attention. In spite of the pressure of government business, Yoshi-
yasu found time to compose over 1,000 poems for judgement by the retired 
emperor and to keep in constant correspondence with Machiko's elder 
brother, who acted as his go-between with the imperial·family. 104 
100. MK, p.199. 
101. MK, p.200. 
102. ibid. 
103. Lao-tzu, Chapter 9. 
104. See Chapter v, Section 2, i. 
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Yoshiyasu's flagging enthuGiasm for government service might well 
have diminished further when at the end of Genroku 16 (1703) natural 
calamities devastated part of Edo and the Kanta region. On the twentieth 
day of the eleventh month an earthquake of unheard-of proportions shook 
the city and its environments. Areas along the coast were comple~ 
tely wiped out by the ensuing tidal waves, while in Edo and the surroun-
ding villages, houses collapsed as tremors continued for several days. 
But worse was to come. Machiko wrote: 
On the twenty-ninth day of that month a fire of again 
unheard-of size broke out and spreading to frightful 
proportions burned over one third of the city. When 
the so-called Ryogoku Bridge collapsed in the blaze, 
innumerable people who in their distress had fled from 
the neighbourhood to the bridge died in the flames. 
When I think back on the events of this period, every-
thing is so thoroughll frightful; I am not going to 
write any of it down. 05 
It was not only the loss of life and the destruction of the city 
the government had to worry about. Without doubt the disaster had to be 
seen as a horrible punishrr£nt sent by the gods, and the question of who 
bore the guilt could increasingly be heard •. Machiko maintained that the 
government was not at fault, for there had been no negligence in its 
workings. Were there perhaps rumours that the calamities se.rved as 
divine punislunent for the rise of an upstart to unprecedented influence 
and riches? And was this one of the "thoroughly frightful" things she 
refused to write down? 
Tragedy of a more personal nature struck the shogun only a few 
months later. Tsuruhime, his only child, died i.n the fourth month of 
105, MK, p.223. 
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106 Genroku 17 (1704). Tsunayoshi's sole male heir, Tokumatsu, had died 
in childhood. Tsuruhime, suitably married to Kii Tsunanori, a member of 
the Three Related Houses, had represented the shogun's only hope of ins-
talling a direct descendant as his successor. Had she borne a son, the 
child could then be installed as future shogun, and in this hope Tsuna-
yoshi had delayed the painful decision of naming a successor who was not 
his direct descendant. Now Tsuruhime's death left him with no alterna-
tive but to hand back the shogunate to the line of his brothers. 
It was this task of installing Tsunayoshi's nephew, the future 
Ienobu, in the Western citadel (nishi no maru) as heir that brought 
Yoshiyasu unparalleled shogunal praise and a domain few fudai dai:myo 
could boast of. The sources do not specify what these preparations were, 
but the fact they were kept secret from the Senior Councillors (roju) 
and even the Three Related Houses (gosanke) indicates that they were 
most probably of some political importance.107 While the nature of Yoshi-
yasu's preparations for the announcement of the shogunal heir remain un-
clear, the praise he received for them is well documented. The shogun's 
words were recorded for posterity in a special document, but Matsukage 
nikki also reports the situation in detail: 
After the ceremonies were completed the shogun re-
tired to his private chambers and in very good humour 
he summoned his lordship to his presence and thereupon 
said: "During recent years there has been a great 
amount of business and you have devoted yourself most 
diligently to it. We have gladly and without anxiety 
entrusted everything completely to you. It would har-
dly be the first time that we are now saying how 
106. TJ, 43:535, 13D 4M Genroku 17. The year was later renamed Hoei 1 
to break the chain of misfortune. 
107. Ryiiko sojo nikki in Nagashima Fukutaro, Hayashi Ryosho, Shiry~ 
sanshu, kigai (Tokyo, 1969-70), 3:290. 
delighted we are with your performance. Furthermore, 
the fact that on this occasion, when it was a question 
of deciding on our successor, you alone daily carried 
the burden of all public and private aspects and execu-
ted all matters great and small to our entire satisfac-
tion, gives us exceedingly great pleasure. Words are 
not sufficient to express our gratitude~ One hesitates 
to speak of oneself in such terms, howei.rer, for the 
person who is charged with the government of the whole 
country there is, to our mind, nothing of greater impor-
tance than the decision we have just taken. From the 
time of our initial secret decision you have handled all 
matters, completely freeing us from anxiety. We are 
quite unable to even express one hundredth part of .the 
gratitude we feel. Thus we are enfeoffing you now with 
t.~e domain of Kai. This domain belonged to the Lord 
Ch\1nagonl08 and it should not be be.stowed on an out-
sider. However, your distant ancestors and their des-
cendants Uved in that province, and since you have per-
formed services far above the ordinary, the dictates of 
our heart command that your rewards be also above the 
ordinary." Speaking thus, the shogun took a document 
from his sleeve and bestowed it upon his lordship. over-
whelmed by this honour his lordship did not know whether 
he was awake or dreaming. You can imagine his awe as he 
slowly received the document in his hands.109 
The domain bestowed upon Yoshiyasu had an official value of just 
110 
over 150,000 koku, but the actual yield well exceeded 200,000 koku, 
giving him one of the largest fudai holdings in the country. 
5. FINAL YEARS IN OFFICE 
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With the year Hoei 2 {1705) Yoshiyasu's official career entered its 
last phase. As the most influential man in the country next to the sho-
gun he had attained a position which could not be surpassed. The re-
wards for his services - his domains - were similarly reaching ultimate 
limits. Yoshiyasu's ambitions had been fulfilled and the pressures of 
high-powered government business no longer provided the challenge they 
108. Ienobu. 
109. MK, pp.236-37. 
uo. TJ, 43: 559' 21D 12M Hoei 1. 
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had in the past. Enthusiasm for work turned into weariness. The shogun, 
too, was growing older and suffering from spells of illness. 111 After 
the proclamation of Ienobu as his successor, his interest in national 
affairs declined markedly. The subdued atmosphere surrounding the sho-
gun and his Grand Chamberlain turned into gloom when several members of 
their family and circle of friends died in rapid succession. 
In the fourth month of Hoei 2 (1705) Someko, the mother of Yoshi-
yasu's eldest son, a woman to whom he was deeply attached, fell ill. 
The innumerable prayers and offerings on her behalf at first seemed to 
have restored her to health. The priests had already been richly rewar-
ded for their efforts, when some weeks later her illness worsened and 
she died. Yoshiyasu was desolate. Even years later, Machiko recalled, 
h . . f h k 112 is grie over t e loss of Some o was unabated. 
Next, Kii Tsunanori, the husband of the shogun's deceased daughter, 
unexpectedly passed away. 113 
Shortly afterwards the poet Kitamura Kigin died. As Yoshiyasu's 
teacher, Kigin had frequently visited the Yanagisawa mansion and a warm 
friendship had developed between the two men. Poetry had assumed special 
importance for Yoshiyasu during the past years and much of his leisure 
had been spent in perfecting his skills in this art, so that his own 
verse might rival in elegance and beauty those composed by the courtiers 
of Kyoto. The death of Kigin, the man who initiated him into the secret 
teachings of the art of poetry, was therefore a most painful event for 
Yoshiyasu. 114 
111 .. E.g. MK, p.263. 
112. MK, pp.244-46, 268. 
113. TJ, 43:581, 19D SM Hoei 2. 
114. MK, pp.174, 183, 248. 
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In the sixth month of that same year the shogun's beloved mother, 
Keisho-in, fell ill. Yoshiyasu, standing high in her favour, was per-
mitted to visit her several times during her sickness. Already in her 
eighties, she had not the strength to recover and soon died. The shogun 
was broken-hearted and Yoshiyasu had lost one of his staunchest suppor-
115 ters. 
At the end of this same tragic year, smallpox appeared and robbed 
116 Yoshiyasu of his adopted daughter Etsuko. 
Only weeks after Kei.shl5-in 's death Yoshiyasu petitioned the shogun 
for partial retirement. The great stream of suppliants daily lining 
Yoshiyasu's route to the castle no longer held any fascination for him 
and he found it increasingly painful that the pressure of official en-
gagements did not even permit him the leisure to have his hair dressed 
three times daily, as was appropriate for a man of his standing. Makino 
Terusada, his son-in-law, had worked as his assistant for a number of 
years and in Yoshiyasu's eyes was ready to relieve him from some of his 
official responsibilities. Finally the right moment arrived for Yoshi-
yasu to voice his request to the shogun diplomatically: 
In the early days of autumn when it was still rather 
warm the shogun sent for his lordship and said: 
"How terribly hot the weather still is! It is es-
pecially hard to bear when one is busy. lVhatever you 
do, do not exhaust yourself. Leave the routine work 
to others." When the shogun had said this his lord-
ship thought he would take the chance to submit his 
own wishes on the matter. "I gratefully received such 
benign orders on past occasions. How could I presume 
to be lax in my service? I have not the slightest in-
tention of sparing myself any pains. Over the years 
my duties have not been in any way excessively taxing. 
However, just recently for some reason I have been 
115. MK, pp.248-49. 
116• MK, p.252. 
feeling out of sorts. Wnen I think how easily mis-
takes can happen, I apply myself even more diligently 
to my work. But still, with so much to be done, in-
evitably there are many tasks I cannot handle and so 
I have been thinking it might be better if, with your 
august pennission, I were to devote all my attention 
to just one task." 
This picture of a man worn out and tired of government service is 
convincingly drawn, Tsunayoshi, too, was persuaded and consented to 
Yoshiyasu 's requests. From that time on, Matsudaira Terusada was per-
mitted to take over from Yoshiyasu the handling of certain official 
117 documents and correspondence. 
Yoshiyasu's desire to disengage himself from the exertions of 
public life became similarly apparent when he repeatedly found excuses 
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to postpone a visit by Ienobu, the shogunal successor! to the Yanagisawa 
mansion. Ienobu had heard how pleasant his uncle, Tsunayoshi, found 
such visits and was now eager to call on Yoshiyasu himself. Finally 
Ienobu's requests could be ignored no longer. Elaborate preparations 
were made for the event because - Machiko noted - Yoshiyasu did not want 
people to think that Ienobu was less welcome than the shogun. Ienobu's 
passion for brilliant display was well known and the storehouses of the 
Yanagisawa mansion were emptied for this special day. As was the custom 
on Tsunayoshi's visits, scholarly debates and no performances took place 
and finally Ienobu himself performed on the stage. Before leaving the 
shogun-to-be was presented with all objets d'art decorating the resi-
dence on this occasion, a gesture much appreciated, but thoroughly ex-
h ti th f th Y . f · 1 118 aus ng e resources o e anagisawa anu y. Historians, 
117. MK, pp.251-52. For details of Yoshiyasu's partial resignation, see 
Chapter III, section 9. 
118. MK, pp.255-57. 
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curiously, make much of Tsunayoshi's love for luxury and devotion to no, 
yet rarely mention that the sixth shogun was even more partial to such 
pleasures. 
The year Hoei 4 (1707} marked Yoshiyasu's fiftieth birthday. Con-
gratulations and presents were elaborate to suit the occasion. What was 
unusual for even a minister of great influence in the bakufu at Edo were 
the numerous congratulations from the Kyoto aristocracy. The attention 
Yoshiyasu received testified to his success in establishing close ties 
with the imperial family and entourage, ties which ·only recently had 
been further strengthened by his adaption of the daughter of a high-
k • bl 119 ran ing no e • 
From his domain of Kai old men over the age of seventy had been in-
vited to pay their respects to Yoshiyasu on this occasion. Machiko re-
called how they came in great numbers, all in all about 3,000 people, 
she reckoned. Frequently they were too frail to make the journey by 
themselves and were supported by their grand- and great-grandchildren. 
For their efforts they were rewarded with generous gifts of rice. 
In this year of his fiftieth anniversary (1707), Yoshiyasu received 
his last great honour from Tsunayoshi. Both he and his eldest son were 
granted permission to display t.'1e halberd {nag.inata) in their proces-
sions. Machiko recalled: 
Verily indeed, his lordship and his son the 
Gentleman-in-waiting (jiju gimi), were permitted 
to display the halbera.120 Since this is restric-
ted as a mark of the most noble houses, it is 
rarely seen nowadays, even amongst the highest 
119. MK, pp.264-66. For details of adoption see Chapter V, Section 2, ii. 
120. MK only states that permission was granted for the display of uchi-
mono, a generic term for weapons including the halberd. Other 
sources specify that it was the halberd. See Chapter 3, Section 9. 
personages. Thus his lordship firmly declined to ac-
cept the honour. But since the august orders had al-
ready been issued, this honour was impossible to ref use 
and he had to accept. You must understand that his ex-
traordinary position of authority was unparalleled.121 
RakushidO nenroku sheds further light on this episode. Yoshiyasu 
suggested that only his son Yoshisato should be accorded such an unusual 
honour, but the shogun replied that people would consider this very 
strange indeed. He, the shogun himself, was not the eldest son, yet the 
blood of Nitta122 was flowing in his veins. The thread of continuous 
rule was thin and narrow, but it was unbroken. Although Yoshiyasu could 
not trace his ancestry back to Takeda Shingen through firstborn sons, 
he was, all the same, a blood relative, and consequently there was no 
123 
reason to refuse the honour of displaying the halberd. Yoshiyasu's 
career had reached a stage where he felt that as the son of a bannerman 
(hatamoto) he could accept no further advancement. His own son he saw 
as better qualified for such rare privileges, being born, after all, 
into a daimyo mansion. 
The next year (1708) was the last before Tsunayoshi's death and the 
d th th h ' . . . . • . 124 secon mon saw e s ogun s final visit to Yoshiyasu s mansion. 
Before the shogun died and both the Yanagisawa family and the sho-
gunal wives were to retreat from the centre of the stage, Machiko had a 
chance to appear in the limelight. The occasion was the pregnancy of 
Ienobu's concubine, Sume, a distant relative of Machiko's. 125 Machiko 
121. MK, p.271. 
122. The Tokugawa family claimed descent from Nitta Yoshishige (1135-
1202). 
123. Nenroku, Vol.207, 4D 9M lloei 4. 
124. MK, p.275. 
125. MK, p.278. For details of the relationship see Ason jikki, Vol.60, 
18D 7M Helei 5. 
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was granted the great honour of being invited to tie Suroe 's maternity 
belt (yuhada obi), an event requiring celebration and an elaborate ex-
change of gifts. But perhaps of even greater significance for Machiko 
was that on this occasion presents from the shogun's wife (tai no ue) 
arrived, with an acknowledgement that Machiko was in fact related· to her 
as a younger cousin. 126 During the two decades Machiko had been in Edo, 
she had never received a gift from the shogunal consort, nor been recog-
nised as her relative. 
Her attendants wrote to me about her in detail. In 
spite of this, it would never do for someone as lowly 
as myself to speak to a lady as high above me as the 
clouds that course the skies. The fact that all the 
same she bears me in mind is truly a rare honour 
Mach1.ko noted 1'n her di'ary. 127 h' d h' f ·1 h d f' 11 b Yos iyasu an is ami y a 1na y e-
come acceptable in even the highest social circles of the country. 
"As the autumn winds became chilly, an illness called measles ap-
peared in Japan."128 Yoshiyasu's eldest son, Yoshisato fell ill, but 
recovered. So did his youngest son Rokur5. Yoshiyasu himself became 
unwell and could not attend at the castle. By the twelfth month, how-
ever, he had recovered sufficiently to supervise the arrangements for 
the birth of Ienobu's son. But just when the baby was expected any day, 
Ienobu contracted measles. Next his wife (tai) went down with the same 
illness. Neither case was serious, but the stream of visitors to their 
sickbed threw the castle into confusion and did little to stop the 
126. Machiko wrote that her father's wife was tai no ue's aunt. 
The expression "father's wife" must presumably refer to her step-
mother. 
127. MK, p.278; Nenrok11, Vol.220, 18D 7M Hoei 5. 
128. MK, p.289. 
spread of the illness. Finally, before the year had ended, a healthy 
129 
son was born to Ienobu. 
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The illness, however, continued to spread. One of the shogun's 
concubines contracted measles, and shortly afterwards he himself succum-
bed to this illness. Tsunayoshi had frequently been unwell during the 
previous months, and his renewed indisposition did not cause any alarm. 
Even when on the second day of the new year he showed the first sigris of 
measles, his entourage took it calmly, for the illness had passed lightly 
in nt0st cases. It was not considered serious enough to inform his sub-. 
jects of their ruler's illness, and when the customary procession of 
·well-wishers arrived for the New Year ceremonies, Ienobu simply took the 
shogun's place during the performance of the formal rites appropriate on 
this occasion. 
Only Yoshiyasu was deeply concerned. He was constantly at Tsuna-
yoshi 's side and,grudgingly obeyed his command to now and again retire 
to rest. He faithfully noted down the words of the shogun and in times 
of doubt advised him. 130 
At one stage the crisis seemed to have passed. On the ninth day of 
the new year the ritual marking the end of illness, the bathing in sake 
(onsakayu) was performed. There were celebrations and innumerable pre-
sents, and Yoshiyasu eventually returned home to rest, assured by messen-
gers from the castle that the shogun was comfortable after a good meal. 
By daybreak, however, the situation had drastically changed. By 
the time Yoshiyasu reached the castle, the shogun's attendants were in 
great agitation. Yoshiyasu limited himself to only a few words with the 
129. NK, p.279. 
130. MK, p.280 and Nenroku, Vol.225, 1-BD lM Hoei 6. 
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greatly weakened shogun and then quietly withdrew. Anguished calls for 
the doctor prompted him to rush back to the shogun's bedside. His des-
perate efforts to get his lord to swallow his medicine were in vain. By 
the time Ienobu arrived, Tsunayoshi had already breathed his last. 131 
The country was totally unprepared for the shogun's death. At 
first there was widespread disbelief. 
As people were not properly informed of what had 
happened, rumours soon emerged and people were 
saying: "How strange! This is impossible to be-
lieve! Some fool is making up such stories to 
alarm people. ul32 
With this shroud of mystery hanging over the shogun's death at the 
very time of the event, it is not surprising that later fanciful stories 
attempting to explain Tsunayoshi's sudden end, often found believing 
ears. The rumour that the shogun's wife, determined to save the country 
from the rule of his "bastard" child, put a forceful end to t.he shogunal 
plans by stabbing first her husband and then herself, has already been 
. d 133 mentione . This rumoured death fitted in well with the picture 
traditional historians drew of Tsunayoshi. The ruler, .who is frequently 
seen as the worst of the fifteen Tokugawa shogun and accused of debauch-
134 
ery, disregard for the welfare of his subjects, and even madness, is 
very differently described in Matsukage nikki. 
If I am to put it into words, he bestowed upon us a 
blessed reign, committing not a single error in the 
131. MK, pp.280-82. 
132. MK, p. 282. 
133. See Section 2 of this chapter. 
134. E.g. Irizawa Tatsukichi, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi no seishin jotai ni 
tsuite," Kokka igakkai zasshi, 189:7 (1903), who suggests that the 
fifth shogun suffered from "ZOOphilomanie." 
thirty years of his far-reaching government of this 
country of Japan. Even on mornings of fog and deep 
snow he would rise early and with the people as his 
first concern never neglected to see that they suf-
fered neither hunger nor cold. In the dark of the 
night he did not sleep either, but untiringly devo-
ting himself to the study of government, he went 
over volume after volume of the writings of the an-
cient sages. And all that to care and provide for 
this countr-Y of ours1135 
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Machiko described how under Tsunayoshi the country was so well governed 
that even the farmers ceased their disputes over the boundaries of 
fields and taxes were willingly paid, drawing parallels with the famous 
. f . . f h f . h. 136 reign o King Wen o C ou o ancient C ina. 
Thus moss grew over the drum of complaintsl37 and 
grass spread over the prisons. Even the little 
birds nesting amongst the weeds were touched by his 
benevolence. His mind was constantly active and if 
just one thread of the common fabric of society went 
awry, he did not ignore it. On one hand, he valued 
the martial arts and urged the myriad samurai fami-
liesl38 to respect the traditions of their houses; 
on the other, he promotea literary learning ana there 
were many brilliant ana excellent scholars.139 Really, 
when one thinks back, it appears to be a dream. 
Finally Machiko likens Tsunayoshi to the Yellow Emperor riding around 
the heavens on his fabulous dragon. Yet, alas, unlike the Chinese sage 
king, Tsunayoshi aid not even drop his arrow as a keepsake for his de-
voted subjects.140 
135. Lit. country where b.lack-headed people are gathered. 
136. Ssu Ma Ch'ien, Book of History, Vol.4. 
137. Drum of ancient China, hit when complaints were made. 
138. Lit. the samurai of the eighty families. 
139. "Katsura no eda toridori ni tama hirofu yama no hikarimi" referring 
to History of Chin, Chapter 22, 3B. 
140. MK, pp.285-86. 
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The picture drawn in Matsukage nikki of Tsunayoshi bears so little 
resemblance to the image commonly presented by historians that it is 
hard to imagine that both are describing tJ:ie same ruler. Naturally, in 
Machiko 's case hagiographical tendencies must be taken into account, but 
even then, the discrepancies are altogether too great to be ignored. 
Yoshiyasu's reputation suffered a similar fate. Writers who do not 
believe that the shogun was murdered because of his plans for Yoshisato, 
still frequently assert that after Tsunayoshi's death, Yoshiyasu was 
driven out by Ienobu. But documentary evidence does not support this 
story. 
6. QUEST FOR RETIREMENT 
Even as Ienobu was stepping back from the body of the late shogun, 
Yoshiyasu approached him about his future. Rakushido nenroku does not 
disclose the discussion that took place on this occasion, noting that 
the record was kept elsewhere. Similarly the entry for the next day 
merely states that Ienobu had decided in the kindest fashion on Yoshi-
yasu • s petition of the previous day, and that the latter had expressed 
his gratitude accordingly. Again it is stated that details were recor-
141 ded elsewhere. 
Matsukage nikki, however, supplies the missing information. The 
diary notes only briefly that Yoshiyasu asked Ienobu about his future,142 
but t.~en gives the new shogun's answer in detail. 
The next day his lordship also went to the castle. 
When he called upon the shogun of the Western citadel, 
he found him in his personal apartments. The shogun 
141. Nenroku, Vol.225, lOD and llD lM Hoei 6. 
142. MK, p.282. 
summoned his lordship into his presence and spoke to 
him at length: "Once again I hear that you are earn-
estly desiring to take religious orders. That is quite 
understandable. However, because you rendered such 
distinguished services to my predecessor, I had hoped 
that you would put your talents at my disposal also. 
Your services will not be forgotten, and as long as I 
live your sons will under no circumsta.'lces suffer 
even the slightest neglect. Since over the years you 
have attained to considerable importance in government 
affairs and as there is nobody who can compare with you, 
people naturally would expect that you would assist the 
present shogun also. Of course, now that your lord is 
no longer among us, it is understandable that you would 
want to spend all your time in devotions for the repose 
of his soul. However, if you could bring yourself to 
consider my suggestion and put your talents at my dis-
posal for the next few months, how could your late lord 
possibly consider this to be disrespectful to his 
memory? If under the present circumstances you were to 
shave your head, the rmnour that something was perhaps 
amiss between us would quickly be circulated by unkind 
people. In addition it would be very difficult if in 
future we were to try to consult you on important issues. 
Don't do anything just yet, and even if you feel unable 
to serve us, wait for a little while." His eyes filled 
with tears as he spoke and his lordship was so deeply 
touched that he wept too.143 
7l 
Yoshiyasu finally submitted to the emotional pleas of the new sho-
gun. In return he asked that he be freed from routine matters and be 
144 
consulted on important issues only. Consequently there was good 
reason for Rakushido nenroku to state that Ienobu had answered Yoshi-
yasu's request "in the kindest fashion" and for Yoshiyasu to express his 
gratitude. 
Ienobu's fears that the question of Yoshiyasu's retirement might 
lead to rumours about an unsatisfactory relationship between the new 
shogun and his predecessor's chief minister, quickly materialised. Arai 
Hakuseki in his Oritaku shiba no ki relates a story, which, he admits, 
143. MK, p.283; see also Eibyo, haru and HJ, p.48. 
144. MK, p.284. 
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he did not hear through official channels. Consequently he cannot vouch 
for its authenticity, but as the person from whom the information came 
was - in his opinion - not someone who would repeat mere gossip, he was 
d d . . d f . 145 persua e to write it own or posterity. 
According to Hakuseki's source, Yoshiyasu was given the task of 
selecting amongst his late lord's closest attendants those who would 
take religious orders and serve at the funeral. Yoshiyasu petitioned 
that he himself be included, but he was told that there was no precedent 
for someone of his rank taking holy orders on the death of a shogun. It 
was pointed out that at the beginning of Ietsuna's reign, suicide at the 
death of a ruler was forbidden and that similar practices should not be 
revived. Ienobu, however, would have no objection if after the funeral 
Yoshiyasu were to resign his office, let his son succeed him as head of 
th h d h th . th d 146 e ouse, an t en enter e pries oo . 
The implication is that Yoshiyasu had wanted to take religious or-
ders without resigning his office. Naturally he would not have wanted 
to resign before the funeral, for then he could not have attended it in 
his capacity of Grand Chamberlain and to have occupied the position 
appropriate for Tsunayoshi's most senior and favourite minister. The 
story related here by Hakuseki suggests that the new shogun wanted to 
force Yoshiyasu' s resignation by not permitting him to take holy orders 
until he had renounced his office after the funeral. 
Ienobu's fears had not been ungrounded. The rumour Hakuseki had 
heard obviously implied that something was "amiss" between him and 
145. 
146. 
The story is quoted in TJ, 
that it was not official. 
other two sources cited in 
44:6, but without Hakuseki's warning 
It has not been possible to check the 
TJ. 
Arai Hakuseki, Oritaku Shiba no 
taikei (Tokyo, 1964), p.226-27. 
Knox.) 
ki, Vol.95 in Nihon koten bungaku 
(The episode is not translated by 
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Yoshiyasu. In view of the role Hakuseki later played in Ienobu's govern-
ment it is difficult to identify him with the "unkind people" Ienobu re-
ferred to in his speech to Yoshiyasu. Yet Hakuseki's animosity towards 
Tsunayoshi, his officials and policies, was undisputed, a fact also de-
monstrated by his constant petitions to Ienobu to sack Tsunayoshi's 
Superintendent of Finance (kanjo bugyo) Ogiwara Shigehide. Yet here 
again, Ienobu was reluctant to get rid of an official valued by his 'pre-
decessor, and it was not until Ienobu was sick and about to die that he 
apparently agreed to have Ogiwara Shigehide.dismissed. The actual dis-
missal took place only after !enobu had died.147 Ienobu's disagreement 
with his apparently so trus.ted advisers like Arai Hakuseki, in matters 
such as Yoshiyasu's and Ogiwara Shigehide's resignation, is interesting 
to note and in need of further investigation. 
Yoshiyasu's request for retirement and Ienobu's initial refusal is 
also documented by other material. In Eibgo gojitsuroku Ienobu is 
quoted as saying that although there were the Senior Councillors (roju), 
his predecessor had had not much faith in them when it came to ruling 
the country, and his own assistant, Manabe Akifusa, had as yet no exper-
. . h 148 ience in sue matters. Tokugawa jikki notes that Tsunayoshi's other 
Grand Chamberlains (soba gonin) Matsudaira Terusada and Matsudaira Tada-
shige had been granted permission to retire, but that a similar request 
149 from Yoshiyasu had been refused. 
The impression conveyed by Matsukage nikki, that after Tsunayoshi's 
death Yoshiyasu attempted to withdraw from official affairs, is also 
147. ibid., p.300, 352; Knox, p.171. See also below Chapter IV, Section 
1. 
148. Eibyo, haru; HJ, p.48. 
149. TJ, 44:5, 17D lM Hoei 6. 
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supported by the diary of the monk Ryi'iko. He noted that when two days 
after the shogun had died Yoshiyasu was approached for directions con-
cerning the funeral ceremonies, the latter replied that this was not his 
concern and that the Senior Councillor Okubo Tadamasu should be consul-
ted.150 
Yoshiyasu had agreed to stay in office, but his mind was focused on 
retirement. In important matters he was still attending to t.~e wishes 
of the shogun according to their agreement, but secretly he was making 
preparations for the day when he would completely relinquish his duties. 
Whenever he met an official of note, Machiko recalled, he would persuas-
ively press the point that he, Yoshiyasu, was becoming too frail for 
government service. 151 
With the beginning of the third month the official mourning period 
ended and Yoshiyasu privately deplored that no special arrangements had 
b d d ' 152 een ma e to exten it. His subsequent request to Ienobu to destroy 
the buildings within his residence which the previous shogun had used on 
his visits and to return the land on which they stood, subtly indicated 
that in his eyes his service to the shogunate had come to an end. 
Ienobu was perhaps not pleased with the hint that he was no longer to 
visit the Yanagisawa mansion, for it took him nearly two months to reply 
that Yoshiyasu was to do with the buildings as he pleased, but keep the 
land for the present. Yoshiyasu, however, was determined to sever his 
official connections with the new shogun and destroyed the buildings in 
153 ak' f th h 1 ' ' . 'bl 1 th question, m . ing ur er s ogu.na visits 1rnposs1 e, un ess e con-
siderable expense of erecting new ones was·undertaken. 
150. Rytiko sojo nikki, 3:284. 
151. MK, p.289-90. 
152. MK, p.290. 
153. MK, pp.290-91; Nenroku, Vol.218, 26D 4M and 3D SM Hoei 6. 
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Ienobu's intention to treat the Yanagisawa family with the friendli~ 
ness and generosity of his predecessor also became evident when both on 
the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Yoshiyasu's mother and the 
fiftieth birthday of his wife (kita no kata), shogunal messengers with 
'f d . . h d f h' 154 gi ts appeare JUSt as in t e ays o Tsunayos i. 
Finally at the end of the fifth month Manabe Akifusa was sent to 
inform Yoshiyasu that Ienobu had agreed to his resignation, and the 
third day of t.~e sixth month was chosen as appropriate for the occasion. 
Ienobu, apparently, had convinced himself that even during the last 
years under his predecessor, Yoshiyasu had not been required to attend 
to routine business due to his poor state of health. In the light of 
this fact Ienobu was now happy to let Yoshiyasu retire and have his el-
dest son Yoshisato succeed to his domain. In line with Yoshiyasu's re-
quest, his second and third sons were given 10,000 koku each from the 
total of the domain, the rest being transferred to Yoshisato. 
After the official ceremonies had been completed Ienobu called 
Yoshiyasu to his private chambers and spoke to him: 
Some time ago you asked permission to retire, but as 
you are still in the prime of life, we asked you to 
remain in office for a while. However, as you are ill, 
and we have learned in detail that you were in fact 
freed from routine business under our predecessor, we 
now think it proper that you retire so that you can re-
cuperate. Therefore, do not hesitate to do as you have 
requested and take life easy. All the same, feel free 
to come and see us at any time.155 
If Ienobu had had any misgivings about Yoshiyasu's persistent re-
fusal to serve him like his predecessor, he knew now that Yoshiyasu' s 
154. MK, p.293; TJ, 44:30, 2D 5M Hi5ei 6 and 44:32, SD SM Hoei 6. 
155. MK, p.295. 
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reluctance to stay in government service was not a personal rebuff, His 
permission for the transfer of Yoshiyasu's large domain to his sons was 
further proof of his goodwill towards the Yanagisawa family. On his re-
signation Yoshiyasu had to return his fief to the bakufu and it would 
have been a good occasion for the new shogun to allot to his heirs a 
smaller and less strategic domain, but he did not avail himself of this 
opportunity. Like his father, Yoshisato came to govern the province of 
Kai, and it was not until ten years after Yoshiyasu's death, under the 
eighth shogun Yoshimune that the family holdings were transferred to 
the less significant domain of Koriyama •156 
Yoshiyasu retired to his villa at Komagome. Freed from both offi-
cial influence and commitments he even refused to discuss political af-
f . . th h. f . . f h . 15 7 . 1 . airs w1 is requent visitors rom t e city. His warm re ation~ 
ship with Ienobu, however, continued. At New Year he would visit the 
castle to pay his respects, entering straight into the shogun's private 
chambers to chat with him there after the public ceremonies had been 
completed. And just as during the time of his influence he would after-
wards be granted permission to visit the apartments of the shogunal 
. d d h 158 wives an aug ters. 
Yoshiyasu apparently had shed all political responsibility and re-
tired with t-he blessing of the reigning shogun, and yet there were signs 
that the situation was not as peaceful as might appear. Although clad 
in poetic terms, Machiko's diary gives some indication of the problems 
facing the Yanagisawa family. She writes that once the bustle of city 
156. KCS, 3:257. 
157. MK, p.298. 
158. Eibyo, haru; HJ, p.49. 
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life had subsided the idea came to her that she, who had known Yoshiyasu 
so intimately over many years, should record the details of his singul-
arly successful life: 
In the lonely nights when I am awoken by the 
rustling of the pine and the sound of the water, 
I jot down things just as I remew.ber t.~em on 
scraps of paper, forgetting the rumours and 
nasty slander. 
These words were written in the shade of the everlasting pine, she con-
tinues, alluding to the protection and security the hero of the story 
has afforded her. Expressing the wish that generations to come might 
cherish her words, she leaves no doubt that her writing had a purpose; 
it was to counteract rllI!lOurs which were circulating at that time. 
Were these rumours in any way connected with those of which Ienobu 
was afraid? The question is difficult to answer, but there are some in-
dications that the problem centered around the possibility that Yoshi-
yasu and his followers might still exert some political influence. The 
scholar Hattori Nankaku, for instance, who had followed Yoshiyasu to his 
seat of retirement, was advised that he should no longer refer to poli-
tical issues in his poetic writings.159 Another retainer of the Yana-
gisawa family, Ogyu Sarai, had been given the task of instructing 
Ienobu's Pages. Yet on several occasions when entrusted with weightier 
. h th h. 160 assignments, tl ey were channelle.d secretly rough Yos iyasu. 
Yoshiyasu, even after his retirement, was a controversial figure 
and the opposition he still encountered, although he had relinquished 
all outward signs of political influence, foreshadowed his gradually 
159. MK. pp.303-304. 
160. Ken'en zatsuwa qucted by Hino, p.184. 
78 
worsening reputation. To gain some idea of how this antagonism arose 
and who his opponents were, it is essential to examine his rapid rise to 
power against the background of the established bakufu hierarchy and the 
prevailing political climate. 
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CHAPTER III 
YOSHIYASU'S PLACE IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
so 
CHAPTER II I 
YOSHIYASU'S PLACE IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
Yoshiyasu's rise to power under the fifth Tokugawa shogun and his 
bad reputation can only be understood if seen in the context of the sho-
gun's political ambitions and the measures required to realise them 
against the background of changing social conditions and an inflexible 
administrative machinery. 
1. THE SHOGUN'S POLITICAL &'!BITIONS 
The fifth Tokugawa shogun Tsunayoshi was not brought up to rule. 
On the contrary, tradition has it that his father, the third shogun 
Iemitsu, early recognised his brilliant intellect and fearing that he 
might compete with his elder brothers for the shogunate, ordered his 
fourth son to devote his time solely to the study of the Confucian clas-
sics. Thus while Iemitsu's three eldest sons were trained with other 
young dairnyo heirs in the martial arts as was seen fit for a future mil-
itary ruler, Tsunayoshi spent his early years surrounded by men devoted 
to the study of the Confucian classics.1 What the third shogun, of 
course, did not anticipate, was that the eldest son, the fourth shogun 
Ietsuna (1641-1680), would die without an heir, preceded already by the 
deaths of his two brothers Kanematsu (1645-1647) and Tsunashige (1644-
1. Buya shokudan in Kokushi kenkyu kai, Kokushi sosho (Tokyo, 1917), 
ser.2, pp.86-87; TJ, 43:727. 
1678), and that consequently Tsunayoshi with a training very unlike that 
of his predecessors would become the fifth Tokugawa shogun. 
Tsunayoshi's upbringing as a Confucian scholar rather than a war-
rior meant that his image of the ideal ruler differed greatly from that 
of both previous shogun and the military aristocracy of the day. He saw 
himself not as a military leader, but strove to become a sage king in the 
image of Yao and Shun of ancient China. 2 
The first three shogun, at some time or other during their reign, 
still had. to deal with the military control .of the country. The intro• 
duction of the system of alternate attendance at Edo (sankin kBtai) 
under !emitsu assured the unquestioned loyalty of the daimyo and by the 
time of the fifth shogun, military security was no longer a problem. 
Consequently Tsunayoshi could go one step further. The loyalty of the 
military class was taken for granted; what Tsunayoshi demanded was that 
their everyday behaviour also conform to his prescribed standards. In 
his eyes it was the duty of the ruler and the ministers who served him 
"to correct the spirit of the samurai and the behaviour of the people. "3 
This concept of the ruler's duties ill accorded with the accustomed 
status of the daimyo. Hitherto they had enjoyed a considerable amount 
of freedom in the administration of their domains, but Tsunayoshi was 
not inclined to keep the status quo. He considered it his sacred duty 
to shoulder the responsibility for the material and spiritual welfare of 
all his subjects. Consequently, in discharging his duties as ruler of 
the nation, he saw himself obliged to impose his 0'""1 values upon the 
2. TJ, 43:735. See also Shively "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi", p.111 and 
Bolitho, "The Dog Shogun", pp.126-27. 
3. llotta Masatoshi, YOgenroku in Vol.13 of Zoku zoku gunsho ruiju 
(Tokyo, 1909), p.32. 
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daimyo so that they in turn might govern their domains in accordance 
with his ideas. 
Tsunayoshi's notion that he and his ministers were directly respon-
sible for every single one of his subjects is well illustrated in the 
following episode related by his Great Councillor (tairo) Hotta Masato-
shi. Masatoshi had been moved by the abject poverty of two children he 
had seen on the street. Later he reported to Tsunayoshi how he had felt 
an inner compulsion to give help immediately, but then manfully had re-
jected this urge, it not being his duty as the shogun's minister to at-
tend to such a trifling matter. Tsunayoshi, however, corrected 
Masatoshi: 
Why should a truly benevolent man ask whether a 
matter is great or small? Even the smallest object 
is lit by the rays of t,~e sun and the moon. Actu-
ally your mistake was in thinking that it was wrong 
to agonize over such a small thing.4 
Masatoshi, accustomed to the hierarchical order where matters of 
lesser significance were dealt with by men of lesser status, considered 
it improper for himself to interfere with the individual concerns of the 
common people. In Tsunayoshi's eyes, however, the responsibi~ity for 
the common people did not rest with lower officials, but with the shogun 
and his highest ministers. It was a view that sanctioned interference 
in the local administration of the provinces; a view hardly popular with 
the military aristocracy. 
Moreover, the values Tsunayoshi felt committed to impose upon his 
people greatly differed from those cherished by his predecessors and the 
contemporary daimyo. By virtue of his unorthodox upbringing, he did not 
4. .Yogenroku, pp. 30-31. 
share the ideological background of previous shogun, and felt impelled 
to criticise the society over which they had ruled: 
The old practices of the warring states period be-
came the way of the samurai and officials; brutali-
ty was regarded as valor, high spirits were consi-
dered good conduct, and there were many actions 
which were not benevolent and which violated the 
fundamental principles of humanity •••• 5 
The third shogun Iemitsu had found pleasure in competing with his 
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daimyo in the martial arts, but the fifth shogun delighted in expounding 
the Confucian classics not just to the military aristocracy, but to all 
6 his retainers, down to the lowliest of them. All Tokugawa rulers shared 
some commitment to the virtues of Confucianism. Tsunayoshi, however, 
took them more seriously than any of his predecessors and he was not con-
tent merely to observe them himself. Like the sage kings of ancient China 
he wanted to diffuse these virtues amongst the common people. In order to 
carry out this grand design he required ministers who not only shared his 
concept of the ruler's duties, but.who were also prepared to devote their 
life to assisting him in achieving this goal. Furthermore, to succeed in 
persuading the military class to change their behaviour according to his 
ideas, he needed authority. The personal authority of the shogun, how-
ever, had declined :markedly during the decades prior to his accession. 
2. SHOGUNl\L AUTHORITY AND FUDA! DAIMYO 
When Ieyasu established his position as hegemon of the country, the 
houses which were later to be known as fudai played an important part as 
his advisers and military allies. Once the country was at peace, 
5. Kembyo ji tsuroku translated by Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p.113. 
6. TJ 43:84, 21D 9M Genroku 3; TJ 43:735. 
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however, he and his successors preferred to pick their advisers from 
families of less prominent samurai background than the original fudai. 
Gathering around them men of relatively humble lineage to assist in the 
still rather informal government of the country, they avoided the danger 
of a powerful military house gaining overriding influence in the civil 
administration. Thus the shogun had at their disposal two groups of 
men: the original · fudai - such as the Sakai family - and the newcomers 
which each ruler picked independently from the lower ranks of his mi1i-
tary retainers. Under Ieyasu such newcomers were Honda Masanobu and his 
son Masazumi; Hidetada relied on Doi Toshikatsu, Nagai Naomasa and Inoue 
Masanari, while Iemitsu chose men like Hotta Masamcri, Matsudaira NObu-
tsuna, Abe Shigetsugu and Abe Tadaaki to work under his personal direc-
tion. The government of the country, still retaining military household 
flavour, was thus divided into the personal staff of the shogun mainly 
responsible for internal administration - such as that of the shogunal 
domains and the direct retainers of the bakufu - and the ministers of 
old fudai status looking after matters external to the shogunate, such 
. . h d . 7 as issues concerning t e aimyo~ 
Around the middle of the seventeenth century, with the division of 
the administration into various fixed offices, the distinction between 
the two sets of administrators - the original fudai and the newcomers, 
now also considered as fudai - was lost. 8 With the progressively formal 
delineation of duties and standardisation of office procedures, a pat-
tern of social status corresponding to each office became established. 
A group of the shogun's most senior advisers, working as a body in 
7. Tsuji Tatsuya, Kyoho kaikaku no kenkyU (Tokyo, 1963), pp.50-51. 
8. ibid. Tsuji dates this process fairly precisely to the 1630s. 
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consultation and eventually kno•m as Senior Councillors (xoju), became 
the highest organ of government, increasingly replacing the shogun as 
central authority. Tsuji maintains that it was not so much the person 
of th€! at first immature, and later sickly, fourth shogun Ietsuna, 
which brought about this loss of shogunal power, but simply the gradual 
• . h' 9 development and later ossification of the administrative mac inery. 
This point is debatable. '.Ihe fact, however, remains that under the 
fourth shogun the bakufu became a bureaucracy where offices were strictly 
stratified according to social status, with the fudai daimyo - both the 
old and new houses~ occupying the leading positions. 10 
This administrative stratification was a step towards more centra-
lised government. on the other hand leadership by men with interests 
divided between their own domains and the central authority, resulted in 
increased privileges for the daimyo and a consequent weakening of bakufu 
authority. The policies of the thirty years under Ietsuna all bear the 
hallmark of this trend. 
The shogunate's most effective device for increasing its landhold-
ings - the escheatment of fiefs when the holder died without heir - was 
lost by officially sanctioning deathbed adoptions. Furthermore the num-
ber of domains .confiscated for mismanagement dropped conspicuously; even 
though there were some prominent examples of local disturbances, thus 
further limiting the growth of bakufu lands. Building and repair pro-
jects, which under previous shogun had heavily taxed the purse of the 
daimyo, also declined in number under Ietsuna, and the decision not to 
9. ibid. 
10. See also Fujino Tamotsu, Bakuhan taisei shi no kenkyu (Tokyo, 1961), 
pp.326-27, 401; Kitajima Masamoto, Edo bakufu, sono jitsur:yokusha-
tachi (Tokyo, 1964), 1:261-62. 
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rebuild the keep of Edo castle - the symbol of shogunal authority -
after the fire of Meireki, was indicative of the daimyo's reluctance to 
exert themselves for their ruler. 11 On the other hand, shogunal funds 
were generously distributed to the daimyo and lower samurai to repair 
the damage their own mansions had suffered during the fire. 12 
Daimyo independence was increased when the bakufu for the first time 
permitted the issue of local currency. Even the bakufu's most potent 
weapon in its control of the upper military aristocracy - the system of 
alternate attendance at Edo (sankin kotai) - was somewhat rela><ed when the 
children of senior daimyo vassals no longer had to reside in this oity.13 
When Tsunayoshi succeeded his elder brother., Ietsuna, as the fifth 
Tokugawa shogun in Emp5 8 (1680), he was faced with a situation where for 
three decades the fudai had been able to cement their position of domi-
nance in government and where some of the most important prerogatives of 
shogunal authority had been abolished or had fallen into disuse. In ad-
dition the Senior Councillors at the top of the administrative hierarchy 
were led by a man of strong personality and impeccable fudai background: 
Sakai Tadakiyo. If Tsunayoshi wanted to realise his political aims, he 
would have to break the power of the fudai and find ministers whose loy-
alties were not divided between the shogunate and their own domains. 
3. CHA.~GING SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
Tsunayoshi's ideas of government were based on the Confucian 
classics. His choice of strategies, however, was appropriate to 
11• Bolitho, Treasures, pp.166-69. 
12. Oishi, Genroku jidai, p.76. 
13. Bolitho, Treasures, p.169. 
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' developments whiCh were rapidly changing social conditions in seven-
teenth-century Japan. 
By about the middle of the seventeenth century a chain of inter-
related events had brought about a marked rise in living standards that 
was not confined to the samurai sector of the community. The peace that 
had followed the establishment of the Tokugawa hegemony had permitted 
farmers to cultivate their plots undisturbed by either invading armies 
or military conscription. Methods of cultivation were improved and new 
fertilizers, implements and plant strains increased yields per acre, 
h · 1 h . . . f d f rth h . . d d . . 14 w 1 e t e 1rr1gat1on o new lan s u er eigntene pro uct1v1ty. 
Possibly for the first time the Japanese rice farmer was successful in 
producing and retaining some surplus over and above the bare level of 
15 
subsistence after tax levies had been met. 
This surplus in turn permitted some sections of the community to 
specialise in the cultivation of cash crops other than rice, such as 
tea, cotton, tobacco, hemp and mulberry .and some to experiment with the 
cultivation of new strains of rice. Commerce increased rapidly to han-
dle the growing quantities of saleable commodities. Improving systems 
of communications, both by land and by sea, especially after the daimyo 
and their retinues were committed to regular attendance at Edo, further 
aided this development. While the growth of the cities in this period 
was made possible by improved crop production and communications, the 
growing demand for foodstuffs and other consumer goods by these new 
urban centres in turn accelerated agricultural production and encouraged 
14. Thomas c. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford, 
1959), p.211. For a study of increase of productivity in Musashi 
see Saitama ken shi hensan iinkai, Saitama ken shi {Tokyo, 1916), 
5: 350-51. 
15. Oishi, Genroku jidai, pp.43-52. 
rural handicrafts, bringing about a rapid development of the money 
16 
economy. 
Farmers, especially those in the vicinity of the grcwing cities, 
profited not only from the higher prices they could obtain for their 
produce as a result of this demand, but also frequently added to their 
. b i . d 17 income y engag ng 1n tra e. The most spectacular rise in living 
standards, however, took place amongst the merchant conununities of the 
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big cities. The unprecedented abundance of both cash and goods created 
a society that found lasting ei<pression in the writings of the novelist 
Ihara Saikaku. Elaborating on the· new-found wealth of the merchant com-
munity, he assured his readers that "there is an abundance of gold and 
silver in the world, and it would be a pity indeed if a merchant were 
unable to lay hands on at least a bit of it. 018 The demand for goods, 
he maintained, was so great that no trader ever had to throw away unsold 
merchandise; even the need for millstones, a conunodity lasting for seve-
ral generations, could not be satisfied.19 
The samurai profited comparatively little from the new-found wealth 
of the common people. Yamamura in his study of samurai income concluded 
that tax rates in daimyo fiefs as well as the domains of the bakufu and 
its bannerman, did not rise at an equal pace with increases in agricul-
t 1 d . . 20 ura pro uct1v1ty. Samurai expenditure, on the other hand, increased 
16. There is a great amount of literature on this subject. For brief 
accounts see Kurita, Edo jidai, 1:744-45; Kitajima Masarnoto, Nihon 
shi gaisetsu (Tokyo, 1968), 2:160-63; George Sansom, A History of 
Japan (London, 1964), 3:120-29. For a more elaborate treatment of 
this subject, see Horie Yasuzi5, Kinsei Nihon no keizai seisaku 
(Tokyo, 1942). 
17. E.g. Yamamura, pp.131-32, Sansom, 3:120. 
18. Ihara Saikaku, Seken munesanyo, transl. by David c. Stubbs and Mas-
anori Takatsuka as This Scheming World (Tokyo, 1965), p.126. 
19. ibid. 
20. Yamamura, pp.40, 202 fn.27. 
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at all levels. With the rising standard of living enjoyed by the com-
moners, the lower samurai especially found it more and more difficult to 
demonstrate their Stij?erior social standing by a greater display of aff-
luence. 21 When the wives of merchants indulged in extravagances to 
which "in olden times even the ladies of the mightiest lord were stran-
gers "22 it was increasingly difficult for the military class to compete 
with this on their generally fixed incomes. The punishment of two of 
the richest merchants for excessive display of luxury, as well as the 
numerous sumpttiary laws regulating the clothing, food and housing of the 
townspeople, were indicative of the malaise the samurai experienced at 
such threatening competition in social display from the lower sections 
f th . 23 o e cornmuni ty. Although the bakufu attempted to alleviate the in-
creasing financial insolvency of the samurai by various devices, such as 
exhortations to frugality, increasing stipends and making loans, it ap-
pears that the relative financial position of the lower samurai, at any 
rate, gradually decreased in relation to that of the commoners, finally 
reaching a point where those with the lowest income became "indistingui-
shable from most of the merchants, artisans and even peasants."24 
The daimyo were able to finance their growing budget expenditure 
vis a vis their relatively stable income by exacting loans from the mer-
chant community. Frequently these loans were not repaid for "when a 
daimyo cannot settle his accounts, there is nothing the merchant can do 
21. Yamamura, p.41. 
22. Stubbs and Takatsuka, This Scheming World, p.20. 
23. E.S. Crawcour, "Some Observations on Merchants,n Transactions of 
the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3rd series, 8:119 (1961); Donald H. 
Shively, "Smnptuary Regulation and Status in Early Tokugawa 
Japan," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 25:126-30 (1964-65); 
Oishi, Genroku jirlai, p.168. 
24. Yamamura, pp.42, 118, 132. 
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about it, n 25 a fact which led to the ruin of many a merchant house. Thus 
the upper military aristocracy could still alleviate their decreasing 
financial liquidity by virtue of their social status. All the same, the 
dairnyo, too, had lost some of their former lustre. They were still an 
essential element of society, but no longer played the vital role they 
did under Ieyasu, when often the peace and wellbeing of the whole nation 
depended upon their individual behaviour. The battle of Osaka in 1615, 
which confirmed Ieyasu as hegemon of Japan, had been their final hour of 
glory as warriors. Just over twenty years later, when the armies fight-
ing for the government, took inordinately long to quell the Christian re-
volts at Shimabara, samurai prowess had already suffered through years 
without military challenge. Their major skill - the martial arts - be-
came progressively redundant and t,~eir declining importance as warriors 
was compensated by their increasing involvement in the administration of 
the country. 
As military leaders in unstable times the upper military aristoc-
racy had been fundamental to Tokugawa supremacy. As administrators 
during the years of peace they were less essential, especially when a 
man of strong personality, such as Tsunayoshi, occupied the position of 
shogun. Their traditional samurai training, moreover, was no longer 
adequate in the face of new political problems arising from changing 
social conditions. At a time when conflicts between the government and 
the people were no longer amenable to military solutions, t,~e system by 
which military status rather than administrative training and ability 
dictated a man's position in the hierarchy of the bakufu was inapprop-
riate. In addition, the fudai, intent upon preserving their position at 
25. Crawcour, "Some Observations on Merchants," p.45. 
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the top of the official hierarchy, were opposed to change in the still 
essentially military character of the administration. For Tsunayoshi, 
consequently, the fudai daimyo impeded the administration of the country 
both by their inadequate performance as senior·administrators and their 
attempts to thwart any movements for change. 
At the same time, changes in the administration to enable it to 
cope with the challenges posed by the new social order were gaining 'in. 
urgency.· Such issues as the unprecedented wealth in the hands of com-
moners required the revision of political strategies. Further, the 
great accumulation of people in the rapidly growing urban centres, where 
natural disasters, bandits and not least of all the wrath of the connnon 
people could create havoc on a scale never experienced before, provided 
a new area of concern for the government. The essential daily supply of 
foodstuffs for the great cities was also controlled by commoners, placing 
the bakufu with its dependence upon the latter in an increasingly vul-
nerable position. Moreover, research seems to indicate that the farmers 
held more political power than has conventionally been believed, enabling 
t.1-iem to take a strong stand in their struggle with government and samu-
i f th d . h . 26 ra , or e surplus produce during t e period. 
On his accession in Empo 8 (1680) •rsunayoshi was faced with a com-
plex situation. Rapidly changing socio-economic conditions required re-
form of the administration and adjustment of samurai and especially 
fudai privileges. Under his predecessor the latter bad come to dominate 
the central administration, claiming not only that this position was 
rightfully theirs by virtue of their ancestry, but also maintaining that 
26. Ya:ma:mura, p.204 fn.27 quoting Ando Seiichi, Edo jidai no nomin 
(Tokyo, 1967), pp.194-95. 
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it was their sacred duty to watch over Ieyasu's heirs and uphold the 
system he had bequeathed, Tsunayoshi was not free to break openly with 
tradition. His own claim to authority also rested upon the tradition 
set by his great-grandfather Ieyasu, a tradition which his father had 
felt the need to strengthen by increasing its aura of sanctity with the 
building of the mausoleum at Nikk15. If Tsunayoshi were openly to attack 
the fudai's position of strength, he would simultaneously be weakening 
h . 1 . . . . l th 27 is own eg1t1misation to ru e over em. 
Tsunayoshi attempted to solve this dilemma in two ways. First he 
re-established shogunal authority with the same means the first three 
shogun had employed. Secondly, when he came to problems for which.he 
could find no solution in the reigns of his predecessors - such as those 
posed by the changing social conditions - he justified reform by basing 
himself on the classics of ancient China. 
4. CENTRALISATION OF POWER BY TRADITIONAL MEl\NS 
Tsunayoshi used some of the same means to centralise shogunal 
authority as his predecessors had done. The most important of these was 
the employment of new men in new offices to erode the influence of esta-
blished officials. Thirty years of fudai rule, in which shogunal autho-
rity had considerably weakened, however, had the effect that these same 
policies were not as easily accepted as t.~ey had been under Tsunayoshi's 
predecessors. 
Both the second shogun Hidetada and t.~e third Iemitsu spent their 
first years as rulers under the watchful eyes of their fathers, but one 
of the first steps they took after their predecessors had died, was to 
27. For legitimisation to rule by tradition, see WG, p.130. 
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dismiss their late father's powerful advisers and replace them with 
their own men. 
28 When Tsunayoshi dismissed Sakai Tadakiyo in Emp5 8 (1680), osten-
sibly because of ill health, he did no more than follow the example of 
his father and grandfather. The difference was that neither Ieyasu's 
nor Hidetada's men had reached a position of influence comparable to 
that of Tadakiyo. Known as geba shogun from the location of his official 
residence, 29 he, with the backing of the Senior Councillors, effectively 
ruled the country for the sickly Ietsuna. ~s Great Councillor (tairo) 
from Kambun 6 (1666), he had during fourteen years so well established 
his position that his simple dismissal by Tsunayoshi caused a sensation. 
The story that he was forced into retirement because he plotted against 
Tsunayoshi's accession could not be verified even by the contemporary 
writer Toda Mosui, and was probably no more than popular rationalisation 
of an apparently incredible event. 30 An indication that no great crime 
was committed by Tadakiyo is perhaps the fact that his son Tadataka·was 
later appointed as one of Tsunayoshi's Superintendents of Temples and 
Shrines (jisha bugya) and that Tadataka's daughter received the shogunal 
command to become the wife of Yoshiyasu's eldest son Yoshisato. 31 
Ieyasu, Hidetada and Iemitsu all brought to t-~e forefront their own 
men of relatively modest samurai origins. The origins of Hidetada's Doi 
Toshikatsu, for instance, were so obscure that his genealogy was said to 
have been lost. And just as under Iemitsu the men who came to power 
28. TJ, 42:391, 9D 12M Emp5 8. 
29. Tadakiyo's residence was situated at the Otemon entrance of the 
castle where a sign with the word geba signalled the visitor to 
disrr.ount. 
30. Gotodaiki, pp.2-41 Tsuji, Kyoho kaikaku no kenkyu, pp.43-44. 
31. KCS, 2:8-9. 
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were his attendants during childhood, Tsunayoshi promoted those who had 
h . i h . . b h. 32 served im fa t fully since his early days as Lord of Tate ayas i. 
Apart from the fact that under his predecessors no newcomer had reached 
the wealth and perhaps the influence of a Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, Tsunayo-
shi's government by so-called favourites was nothing new. Neither was 
the creation of official positions or widening the scope of old ones to 
furnish these men with powers over the established set of senior minis-
ters. It was Hidetada who formalised the office of Senior Councillor 
(rojii) in Genna 9 (1623) to appoint Abe Masatsugu to it, 33 while Iemit-. 
su's favourites, the Committee of Six (r.okunin shu) became the Junior 
Councillors (wakadoshiyori) of later times. 34 
Much the same happened with the position of Grand Chamberlain 
(sobayonin). The office of Chamberlain (sobashu), as personal attendant 
to the shogun without political duties, had come into existence under 
35 Ietsuna. It was to this position that Tsunayoshi appointed his long-
time retainer, tutor and confidant, Makino Narisada, shortly after he 
36 became shogun. Ju.st over one month later a shogunal directive stipu-
lated that daimyo were no longer to use the Senior Councillors as inter-
mediaries, thus requiring them to approach the shogun via t.~e Chamber-
1 . 37 ains. It was to he the beginning. of a process which transferred much 
32. Bolitho, Treasures, pp.162-63; Fujino Tamotsu, Bakuhan taisei, p.415. 
33. The Senior Councillors were first called shukur.o and only later 
r.o3u. Takayanagi Mitsunaga, Takeuchi Rizo, Kadokawa Nihon shi 
jiten (Tokyo, 1969), p.905. 
34. Totman, p.207. 
35. Rgiiei bunin in Tokyo daigaku shiryo hensanjo, Dai Nihon kinsei 
shiryo (Tokyo, 1963), 1:95. 
36. TJ, 42:363, 9D 7~! Empo 8; for Tsunayoshi 's relationship with Makino 
Narisada, see Engelbert Kaempfer, The History o.f Japan together with 
a Description of: the Kingdom of Siam, ·1609-1692 (Glasgow, 1906), 3:84. 
37. TJ, 42: 379, 300 urii 8M Empo 8. 
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of the Senior Councillor's traditional authority to Tsunayoshi's personal 
staff. At the end of Emp5 8 (1680), eight months after he had become 
shogun, Tsunayoshi promoted his favourite Senior Councillor, Hotta Masa-
toshi, to Grand Councillor. 38 At the same time Makino Narisada was 
given wider influence by setting him apart from the rest of the shogun's 
attendants and according him greater prestige with the title Grand Cham-
berlain (sobayonin). 39 Narisada, we are told, became the "eyes and· 
ears" of Masatoshi. 40 
When Masatoshi was assassinated close to the shogunal chambers in 
Jaky5 1 (1684), Tsunayoshi used the occasion to remove t.~e offices of 
the Senior Councillors to a more distant part of the castle and to de-
cree that all communication with him had to go via the Grand Chamber-
lains. Ostensibly designed as a security measure, it had, however, the 
effect that only information and advice approved by the Grand Chamber-
lains reached the shogun's ears; they had come to replace the Senior 
Councillors as the shogun's closest advisers. 41 
The office of Grand Chamberlain was unpopular with the fudai;;ifpr 
it considerably limited the influence of their representatives in the 
central government, the Senior Councillors. Previous shogun might well 
have employed their own men, who devotedly served them, but since then 
three decades had passed and the families of these very same men had 
reached positions of strength where such subservient behaviour towards 
38. For the question of whether Hotta Masatoshi should be seen as a re-
presentative of the fudai or one of Tsunayoshi's new men, see Sec-
tion 6 of this chapter. 
39. TJ, 42:432, llD 12M Tenna 1. 
40. Hatta Masatoshi, Fukyo koki quoted by Kitajima, Edo bakufu, sono 
jitsuryokushatachi, pp.262-63. 
41. Kurita, Edo jidai, p.489. 
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the shogun was considered inappropriate and unnecessary, Thus when men 
like Makino Narisada and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu were accused of currying 
favour with the shogun, and in their absolute obedience to the ruler 
were compared to the eunuchs of China, they behaved no differently than 
a Doi Toshikatsu or Hatta Masamori had done a generation previously. 
Now, however, the fudai had established themselves in a position where 
they no longer silently had to tolerate the competition of newcomers· and 
accordingly they made their protest heard. 
A more indirect means Tsunayoshi initially used to weaken the rigid 
administrative hierarchy over which the fudai presided, was to raise the 
permanent salaries o!' some of the lower officials. A decree of Tenna 2 
(1682) directed that the families of officials, whose salaries were sup-
plemented because their stipend was lower than the office they had been 
appointed to, should continue to receive the additional allowances, even 
after termination of their appointment. 42 This had the effect that 
chcsen families of lower origin could slowly increase their stipends and 
then in turn be eligible for higher officei a device to make the gradual 
promotion of lower officials possible, without seemingly violating the 
established order. 
Tsunayoshi has frequently been accused of extreme severity and even 
hostility against the fudai because of the great number of domains he 
confiscated. Here again his treatment of the fudai, and the rest of the 
daimyo, was severe only when compared with that of his immediate pre-
decessor, or with that of his successors, but not when judged against 
that of the first three shogun. The yearly average of land confiscated 
under Tsunayoshi was twice as high as the amount confiscated by the 
42. TJ, 42,445, 21D 4M Tenna 2. See also above C.hapter II, Section 2. 
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fourth or the sixth shogun. However, it only amounted to approximately 
43 
one sixth of the annual average confiscated by the first three shogun. 
Another method previous shogun had employed to increase their per-
sonal authority was to patronise both Confucian scholars and the Budd-
hist clergy. There were several advantages. Neither scholars nor cler-
gy generally had a vested interest in the welfare of the military class, 
and the shogun could assume that their advice would not be coloured·by 
personal considerations when it concerned issues dealing with the samu-
rai. They did not expect to be rewarded with personal fiefs and conse-
quently were unlikely to attempt to compete with the shogun for authori-
ty together with other powerful daimyo. Furthermore the shogun's empha-
sis upon Confucianism and Buddhism placed his daimyo in a position where 
they, too, had to submit themselves to the instruction of clergy and 
scholars, and as accomplished Confucian gentlemen, or devout Buddhists, 
they were more likely to accept the shogunate's leadership than if their 
fierce samurai ambitions had not been tempered by such doctrines. Fin-
ally, there was the important issue of the Tokugawa's legitimisation as 
hegemon of Japan, and Ieyasu's enthusiasm for Confucianism is generally 
attributed to the fact that this doctrine furnished him with justifica-
tion for the subordination of his fellow daimyo. 44 
43. Kitajima, Edo jidai, p.482, It is difficult to assess the rela-
tionship between confiscation of tozama and fudai lands, as the fu-
dai, due to their service in the bakufu, were in a position where 
they were much more likely to offend the shogun. Tsuji has attemp-
ted to compare punishment of the two groups of daimyo and has sug-
gested that the fudai were treated somewhat more harshly by Tsuna-
yoshi (Kgoho kaH:aku no kenkyii, pp. 46-50) . All the same, t>'l.e fudai 
would have fared better under Tsunayoshi than under the first three 
shogun. 
44. Maruyama Masao, Nihon seiji shiso shi kenkyii, transl. by Mikiso 
Hane as Studies in the Intellectual llistory of Tokugawa Japan 
(Princeton and Tokyo, 1974), pp.16-17. 
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Japan's history, however, had shown that especially the Buddhist 
clergy, somewhat like the daimyo, could become powerful enough to pcse a 
threat to the authority of the ruler and consequently Ieyasu was careful 
not to be dominated by the adherents of one doctrine only. He let 
Confucian scholars like Hayashi Razan compete for his favours with the 
Buddhist clergy and then, moreover, pitted the zen monk Suden against 
the Tendai priest TeIL~ai. 
Tsunayoshi used this means to increase his personal authority to an 
even greater extent than the first Tokugawa shogun had done. By virtue of 
his upbringing he had an even closer affinity with Confucianism a.~d it is 
not surprising that he should have surrounded himself with scholars of 
the Chinese classics in his quest for independence from the military ari-
stocracy. By decreeing that Confucian scholars no longer had to undergo 
tonsure like Buddhist monks, 45 he put them on a footing more equal to 
that of his samurai advisers, and with the establishment of the Confucian 
temple and school at Yushima he reinforced their pcsition as teachers of 
the military class. In addition, Tsunayoshi's own position was enhanced 
by the importance he attached to Confucianism, for he could make much of 
his superior knowledge of the classics rather than have to admit his in-
feriority to the daimyo in the martial arts. 
Like the first shogun, Tsunayoshi was careful to balance his encour-
agement of Confucianism with the patronage of Buddhism. The building of 
the Confucian hall at Yushima was matched by the erection of Buddhist 
temples and Confucian debates were generally followed by a Buddhist dia-
logue {mondo) . 46 Confucian scholars and Buddhist priests were encouraged 
45. TJ, 43:95, 13D lM Genroku 4, translated in Kate Wildman Nakai, Arai 
Hakuseki and the Reform of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 1709-1716 (Ph.D. 
diss., Harvard University, 1972), pp.76-77. 
46. E.g. Nenroku, Vols.158-59, SD 2M Hoei 2. 
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by Tsunayoshi to challenge each other in public debate, making it essen-
tial for each party to study the concepts of the other. Scholars and 
clergy were not permitted any complacency, but had to sharpen their ar-
guments to stand up to the fierce criticism of their opponents. Senior-
ity and prestige counted for little in these aebates and an unknown 
scholar like OgyU Sarai could quickly rise to distinction by virtue of 
his superior intellectual abilities. 47 
A ruler who encouraged his clergy to be challenged in such a way 
can hardly be termed a religious fanatic, a11d yet Tsunayoshi is accused 
of being one. Religious devotion - a trait greatly praised in rulers of 
early times - was severely criticised in the case of the fifth shogun. 
The criticism, however, must be seen not as directed towards Tsunayoshi's 
personal religious beliefs but towards his use of the Buddhist clergy as 
confidants and advisers. In the case of Ienobu's proclamation as sho-
gunal successor, for instance, the monk Ryilko was secretly told of this 
decision of national importance days before the Senior Councillors or 
. 48 
the Three Related Houses were informed. The intense hatred of the 
daimyo for monks like RyUko and their criticism of Tsunayoshi 's religious 
devoutness indicated the extent to which the fudai daimyo considered the 
Buddhist clergy a threat to their privileged position as the shogun's 
advisers. 
Further evidence that Tsunayoshi saw Buddhism and Confucianism as 
tools of government is furnished by a letter he addressed to Yoshiyasu 
on this subject: 
47, See above Chapter II, section. 3. 
48. Ryuko sojo nikki, 3:290, and above Chapter II, section 4. 
The Way of the Buddha and the Way of Confucius are 
based on compassion and require charity. They re-
sembie the two wheels of a carriage and both should 
be deeply revered. However, those who study the ·Way 
of Buddha are affected by the teachings of the sutras. 
In their desire to master the Way of the Buddha they 
part with their lords, send away their parents, leave 
their homes axid live in seelusion. Thus the Five Re-
lationships49 tend to be violated. We ought to be 
very much afraid of this. Those who study the Way of 
Confucius are affected by the sayings of the classics. 
At ceremonies it is common to use the meat of animals 
as food. They do not think it detestable to take the 
life of living creatures. Thus everybody will adopt 
the custo!llS of the barbarians and neglect benevolence. 
We ought to be very much afraid of this too. In the 
study of Confucianism and Buddhism, people must not 
lose sight of the notions on which these teachings are 
based.so · 
100 
No blind fanaticism can be detected in this letter. Both doctrines 
are criticially evaluated for their effects upon society; a pragmatic 
approach which would have done honour to Ieyasu • 
. The shogun's letter indicates that he would have been disinclined 
to choose as his closest adviser either a Buddhist priest, or a Confucian 
scholar. The man in whom Tsunayoshi was likely to put his total trust 
would have to believe in the same even-handed approach to the two doc-
trines as Tsunayoshi himself, like the man to whom this letter was ad-
dressed, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu. 
Tsunayoshi inherited from his grandfather the policy of using Budd-
hism and Confucianism as a subtle weapon against domination by the 'lpper 
military aristocracy by choosing someof his advisers from amongst the 
clergy and scholars.. New in Tsunayoshi 's letter, however, is the fact 
49. The Five Relationships of Confucianism between father and son, 
ruler and subject, husband and wife, older and younger brother, and 
between friends. 
SO. Nenroku, Vol.13, 22D 9M Genroku 5. Also reprinted in Kurita, Edo 
jidai, p.590. 
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that the two doctrines are not merely examined for their usefulness to 
the samurai only, but for their effect on society at large, because the 
observance of Buddhist practices, at any rate, affected all levels of 
society. For this much more universal approach to government whicn re-
sulted in an emphasis upon the common man as subject of the shogunate 
unprecedented in the military rule of the Tokugawa, Tsunayoshi could 
find no example in the reigns of his forefathers; here he had to seek a 
new source of legitimisation. 
5. THE USE OF TRADITION TO JUSTIFY CHANGE 
Changing socio-economic conditions required the fifth Tokugawa sho-
gun to give greater attention than his predecessors to the non-samurai 
sector of tJ1e community. Yet even when authority was concentrated in 
the hands of the shogun, he was not free to innovate policies in keeping 
with the new conditions. His own position as ruler was based on the 
sanctions of tradition, and he could ill afford to attack his own source 
of legitimisation. 
To overcome this dilemma, Tsunayoshi by-passed the tradition of his 
recent ancestors and justified change by citing the sages of ancient 
China. For a man with a deep admiration of the Chinese classical tradi-
tion, this was not necessarily a cynical move to deceive his contempora-
ries, but most probably a way to justify in his own eyes, just as much 
as theirs, untried methods, investing them with greater efficacy by as-
sociation with the sacred writings of tJi.e past. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of any other political theories which might provide guidelines for 
dealing with this new situation the experience of an agrarian-based and, 
according to the classics, absolutist state of pre-historic China was 
appropriate to Tsunayoshi's purpose. 
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Only four months after his accession in Emp5 8 (1680) Tsunayoshi 
issued a detailed order to his Intendants (daikan) of his domain couched 
in thoroughly Confucian terms: 
The people (tami) are the foundation of the state.51 
All Intendants roust bear well in mind the hardships of 
the people and rule them so that they do not suffer from 
hunger and cold. 
When the rule of the country is slack, the people 
take to luxury, and whe.n they take to luxury they are 
Liable to become lax in their work. There must be no 
luxury in the clothing, food and housing of the people. 
Because there is a great distance between t.~e people 
and their superiors, they do not trust them. For the 
sa~e reason superiors also frequently do not trust their 
inferiors. In all matters you must be diligent so that 
there is no lack of trust betweeen superiors and 
inferiors. 
All Intendants must always behave prudently, be 
frugal, be acquainted with the details of farming and 
be. diligent to deal properly with such matters as tax 
collection. It is essential that they perform these 
matters themselves and do not leave everything to their 
Assistants {tedai). Then it will be impossible for 
these Assistants, down to the last man, to act for their 
own benefit. 
Not only Intendants but also the Assistants are 
strictly ordered not to use the people of the intendancy 
for private purpose nor to borrow from them nor lend 
them rice or money •••. 52 
The pronouncement that the people are the foundation of the state 
53 had already been lllade in similar terms by Ieyasu. However, the 
51. The Works of Mencius, Part 2, Chapter 14. This exhortation was 
also frequently used by the emperors of Former Han. H. Bielenstein, 
Notes on the Economic History of the Han (Seminar paper, Australian 
National University), p.234. 
52. Gotoke reijo, Vol.2, in Ishii Ryosuke, Kinsei hosei shiryo sosho 
(Tokyo, 1938), pp.165~66, 3D ur!l 8M Empo 8. TJ, 42:367 notes the 
order under 3D SM Empo 8. For controversy about dates see Tsuji, 
Kyoho kaikaku, p.37 fn.6. 
53. Honda Masanobu, Honsa Roku, in Vol.3 of Takimoto Seiichi, Nihon kei-
zai taiten (Tokyo, 1928), p.21. In the statement attributed to 
teyasu, iiyakusho is used instead of tami. 
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latter's order instructed the Intendants to ensure that the boundaries 
of farmers' fields were clearly marked and that the farmers retained 
barely enough rice for consu:mption and be charged with corvee to the ex-
tent that they retained just enough energy to produce good crops. For 
Ieyasu the farmers were the machinery to produce revenue, to whom suste-
nance need only he given to a degree necessary for maximum production. 
Tsunayoshi, too, insisted on frugality, but there was a difference. 
His injunction against luxury does not imply that th.e farmers must sur-
vive at the very barest level of existence, as Ieyasu had stipulated. 
Significant also is Tsunayoshi's exhortation that the Intendants them-
selves must set an example to the people in the practice of frugality, 
an attack on their hitherto privileged style of living.54 
The lofty status the Intendants claimed for themselves similarly 
came under attack with Tsunayoshi' s injunction that they should not im-
pose great social distance between themselves and the people they 
governed. On the contrary, the. Intendants were to be familiar with the 
daily work of the farmers and win their trust by exemplary behaviour. 
They were to act as officials and not as feudal lords enriching.them-
. 55 Selves at the expense of their subjects. 
Since appointments of Intendants had been made under Ieyasu, the 
office had frequently tended to become hereditary. T'ney in fact did oc-
cupy a position akin to that of a local feudal lord, ruling their dist-
rict with a minimum of interference from the domain government. After 
the collection of tax rice, Intendants retained part of it as salary and 
expenses and often were slow in forwarding the remainder to the domain 
54. Totman, pp.65-66. 
55. TJ, 42:369, 16D 8M Empo 8, notes an order which accuses the inten-
dants even more directly of enriching themselves; 
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government. Profits could be obtained by various schemes, such as by 
making high-interest loans on the tax rice while it was awaiting ship-
ment to Edo or by declaring that bad harvests had resulted in lower tax 
yields for the government. The districts, supposedly under direct con-
trol of the shogun, were exhibiting characteristics of economic feuda-
lism. 56 Efforts to stop the Intendants from enriching themselves at the 
. 57 . 
expense of the government had been made in the past, but Tsunayoshi's 
aims went further. He not merely attempted to curb their undue profits, 
but to turn these would-be local magnates back into officials at the 
service of the government. During the next decades over half of all 
Intendants would be sentenced to death or suspended from office for mis-
management of the offices that had been entrusted to them. The remain-
der would. be transferred to new districts, effectively cutting them off 
from an environment where ties of tradition had supported their assumed 
position of power. Alien to the area to which they were dispatched, 
they henceforth had to execute their duties depending solely on the 
58 
authority the bakufu vested in them. 
Also in the central administration officials with more than mili-
tary training and a perfunctory knowledge of their duties were required 
to direct the shogun's new policies. Tsunayoshi, consequently, took the 
unprecedented step of making one of his Senior Councillors, Hatta Masa-
toshi, solely responsible for the administration of farmers, replacing 
the traditional system where duties were shared in monthly rotation 
56. Tsuji, Kyoho kaikaku, pp.68-69, Totman, pp.65-66. For economic 
feudalism, see John Hicks, A Theory of Economic History (Oxford, 
1969), p.18. 
57. Kitajima, Nihon shi gaisetsu, 2:145. 
58. Tsuji, Kyoho kaikaku, pp.65-67 1 Kitajima, Eda bakufu no kenryoku 
kozo, pp.350-51. 
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59 
among several men of this rank. This unheard of measure could well be 
justified in the name of tradition, for it had come to Tsunayoshi's ears 
that the farmers in his domains were suffering. His personal order to 
Masatoshi to govern the people with benevolence, was in line with the 
behaviour attributed to the sage kings by the Chinese classics. 60 
Another unprecedented step, which could similarly be justified by 
his concern for the people, was the replacement upon his accession of 
the Superintendents of Temples and Shrines, Edo City Magistrates and 
Superintendents of Finance, with men of his personal choice. To further 
underline his deep interest in the performance of their duties, he took 
the unusual step of making their appointments in person. 61 In addition, 
Inspectors (metsuke) and Inspectors General (ometsuke) were personally 
selected and appointed by the shogun to ensure due execution of his 
policies. 62 
As a model Confucian ruler, it was Tsunayoshi's sacred duty to 
amend any faults in the behaviour of his officials. Hotta Masatoshi in 
his own record noted that after three years of Tsunayoshi • s rule many 
evil habits had been successfully eliminated. Officials, for instance, 
had been stopped from illegally selling their official residences and 
uselessly frequenting the homes of important ministers. Moreover, a 
number of powerful aristocrats and officials had successfully been 
taught to stop obstructing the policies and teachings of the govern-
63 
rnent. 
59. TJ, 42:368, SD BM Empo 8. 
60. TJ, 42:368, 7D BM Empo 81 e • g. The Works of Mencius, Book 4, Part 1, 
Chapters 1, 2, 3, etc. 
61. TJ, 42:366, 26D 7M Empo 8: Oishi, Genroku jidai, p.86. 
62. TJ, 42:366, 250 7M Empo 8; Oishi, Genroku jidai, p.87. 
63. Yogenroku, p.34. 
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Neither was indulgence in luxury pennitted to the shogun's officials 
and a stop was put to such unnecessary expenditure as incurred by the 
use of pleasure boats, ·frequent performances of tlle tea ceremony and 
everyday feasting. Although historians claim the opposite, Tsunayoshi -
according to Hotta Masatoshi, at any rate - was a model of frugality. 
The mother of his son felt impelled to pull out the golden threads of 
the child's clothing,. forcing her reluctant entourage to wear similarly 
plain garments, while the shogun himself, embarrassed his ministers by 
refusing to change his worn and soiled robes. 64 
Tsunayoshi' s early initiatives for the strict control of the samu-
rai, especially in their capacity as officials, foreshadowed a trend 
that was to continue throughout the three decades of his reign. !t 
could all be justified in the name of benevolent government as advocated 
by the classics, but it entailed some unfortunate consequences especially 
for the upper military aristocracy. Not only the Intendants of the sho-
gunal domains, but also the daii:nyo were punished and had their fiefs 
confiscated for mismanagement and inappropriate treatment of the farmers. 
Benevolence towards the people was often incompatible with benevolence 
towards the military aristocracy; even the leisure villas at the out-
skirts of Edo were demolished by shogunal command so that the plots 
might be returned to the farmers for cultivation. 65 On a more personal 
level the daimyo were trailed by shogunal spies in the hope that expo-
sure and punishment of their vices - such as their visits to the 
66 disreputable Yoshiwara quarter - might turn them into worthy models 
for the people • 
64. ibid. 
65. Gotodaiki, p.11, lD 7M Tenna 2. 
66. Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p.119. 
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Tsunayoshi's early reforms of the administration, the so-called 
Tenna reforms, are generally seen as a measure aimed at increasing sho-
gunal revenue. The financial aspect, no doubt, was important, but does 
not, for instance, explain the different attitude towards the farmers 
between the first and fifth shogun. An explanation must be sought in 
the socio-economic changes that had taken place since the beginning of 
the sixteenth century. The non-samurai section of the community had 
gained in importance and in the interest of efficient government, ac-
count had to be taken of this fact. The fifth shogun, conditioned by an 
upbringing outside the traditional military ethos, was able to perceive 
the changes that had taken place in society more clearly than his prede-
cessors or the contemporary military aristocracy. 
Tsunayoshi's emphasis on the welfare of the people then, was 
neither hypocrisy nor messianic fervour to improve the lot of the under-
privileged. It was the natural response of a man with his education to 
the conditions of the times. To carry out his policies, he required men 
with a Weltanschauung similar to his own, free from self-interest that 
might lead them to oppose change. 
6. FUDA! DAIMYO IN TSUNAYOSHI' S EARLY GOVERNMENT 
During the first four years of Tstu1ayoshi's reign, Hotta Masatoshi 
served as the shogun's right-hand man. The question of whether Mas a to-
shi was a forerunner of the Chamberlains, acting under the personal dir-
ection of the shogun, or served as an independent administrator similar 
to Sakai Tadakiyo, is a debated one and indicates how little historians 
know about h.is political activities. 67 
67. Tsuji, Kyoho kaikaku, pp.57-58 who is opposed by Ito Tasabur6, 
Nihon kinsei shi {Tokyo, ·1952), 2:109, and Fujino Tamotsu, Bakuhan 
taisei, p. 416. 
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Traditionally Masatoshi is seen as a model minister, whose uncomp-
romising sense of righteousness and duty did not stop short of admonish-
ing the shogun. Under his stern but just administration the country pro-
spered, but - historians frequently suggest - his demands for frugality 
and high moral conduct were eventually resented by the pleasure-loving 
shogun. 68 This image of Masatoshi is based on Tokugawa jikki which dis-
misses any rumours of Masatoshi's wilful and self-indulgent,behaviour as 
well as aspirations to gain power beyond his station, and praises him at 
length as a most able administrator. 69 
The response Masatoshi's assassination'evoked in the contemporary 
writer, Toda Mosui, however, is very different. His diary elaborates in 
some detail on Masatoshi 's debauched lifestyle, which, the scholar claims, 
reached excesses unheard of in previous reigns. The description of his 
wild affairs with every pretty girl in sight resembles the behaviour 
later attributed to Tsunayoshi. Worse than Masatoshi's immoral conduct 
was, according to Toda Mosui, the fact that his arrogance, political in-
trigues, and extensive preparations to 'fortify his villa - ostensibly 
against fire - led people to suspect that he was planning to dispose of 
the shogun and rule the country as the Hojo had done in Kamakura times. 
His influence, however, had reached a point where even the shogun was 
under his sway, making any complaints and warnings about him useless and 
dangerous. The only way to deliver the country from this tyrant was to 
kill him and then commit suicide, even though some might condenm such an 
act as treachery. Masatoshi's assassin was - in Toda Mosui's eyes - a 
70 
man of unparalleled loyalty to the shogun. 
68. E.g. Tokutomi Iichiro, Genroku jidai, 17:52-53, 64, and Kurita, Edo 
jidai, 1:440. 
69. TJ, 42:521. 
70. Gotodaiki, pp.29-32. 
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In his own writing Masatoshi describes his relationship with the 
shogun in terms very different from both of the above accounts. In his 
rogenroku, which he started to compose one. year before his death, Tsuna-
yoshi takes the place of the sage king and Masatoshi is the humble offi-
cial always willing to learn from the wise judgement of his lord.· Cont-
rary to the traditional image, it is Tsunayoshi here who cautions Masa-
toshi against becoming attached to u.seless and frivolous objects. Also 
the Tenna reforms, which are generally attributed to Masatoshi's initia-
tive,. were based on the express wish of the shogun to improve the lot of 
the common people, and Masatoshi, according to his own testimony, was 
merely the official who carried out orders. 71 
It is difficult to reconcile these widely diverging images of Masa-
toshi. However, both Tokugawa jikki and Gotodaiki agree that he was 
short tempered and arrogant and that during his four years in office un-
der Tsunayoshi, he had advanced to a position of considerable power. 
Even if Masatoshi had not been assassinated, in the long run these 
characteristics would not have made him the ideal man to administer the 
sho.gun' s new policies. 
Also the Senior Councillors soon proved unsuitable for Tsunayoshi's 
designs. Amongst the four Senior Councillors three had been chosen and 
appointed by Tsunayoshi himself. But although t.~ey had some personal 
commitment to the shogun, it became evident that with their traditional 
samurai upbringing they were totally unable to follow his thoughts and 
grasp the intentions behind his commands. On the contrary, they obstru-
cted his plans, for they saw it as their duty to correct the shogun in 
what they considered unreasonable behaviour. 
71. Yogenrok~, e.g. pp.29-32. 
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An example is Tsunayoshi's order for the registration of dogs in 
JOky!5 4 (1687). It was issued to reduce the large number of abandoned 
animals, but the final proclamation as it reached the people contained 
the rather amazing concession that if a dog could not be found, undue 
trouble to locate it need not be taken, and instead any other stray ani-
mal could be presented for registration. The reason for this strange 
directive became apparent ten days later when the following proclamation 
was made: 
The recent order dealing with dogs is re-issued be-
cause of a misunderstanding by the Senior Councillors. 
Rumour has it that the colour of fur and other de-
tails of each pet dog are well recorded, but that if a 
dog cannot be found any odd dog is brought along to make 
up numbers. The order was issued because it is the sho-
gun's august wish that people become compassionate, but 
instead, falsehood is practised. Henceforth, if a pet 
dog cannot be found, thorough inquiries must be made to 
locate it. If there is cruelty towards dogs, the Deputy 
Magistrate (shihai) must be informed. Stray dogs are 
not to be treated unkindly and must be returned as soon 
as the owner is known.72 
· TSunayoshi was not inclined to tolerate the Senior Councillors' in-
terference and punished them by temporary dismissal. In the meantime 
their traditional cerell1Dnial function of visiting the grave of the sho-
gun's predecessor was taken over by the Grand Chamberlain Makino 
. d 73 Narisa a. Their replacement by the Grand Chamberlain on this occasion 
was ominous of future developments. 
Hotta Masatoshi had spoken of powerful aristocrats and officials 
who had attempted to obstruct the policies and teachings of the 
72. Kinsei shiry5 kenkyu kai, Sh5ho jiroku (Tokyo, 1965), 1:254, order 
715 (henceforth cited as SJ) • 
73 •. TJ, 42:595, 24D 2M Joky!5 4. 
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. government. He claimed that by the third year of Tsunayoshi's reign they 
had amended their ways, 74 but the above episode suggests otherwise. It 
could also be possible that Masatoshi, himself a fudai daimyo and senior 
Councillor before being promoted, had been able to curb the criticism of 
his colleagues and that now, three years after his death, the conflict 
between shogun and fudai broke out with renewed force. The incident of 
the faulty dog order is singular in its public admission of differences 
between the shogun and his Senior Councillors. More detailed informa-
tion of this conflict is lacking, but one may assume that there must 
have been many skirmishes before the Senior Councillors' insubordination 
to the shogunal wishes was made public to the whole nation. For there 
could be no doubt in the minds of contemporaries that their "misunder-
standing" was in fact insubordination when it was followed by their tem-
porary dismissal. 
The Senior Councillors, it appears, had few qualities to recommend 
them as administrators. Yoshiyasu • s retainer maintained that they were 
unable to speak up independently and act individually and that for this 
reason Tsunayoshi had to look for someone more qualified to direct the 
government of the country. Tsunayoshi, he wrote, considered them vague 
and hopeless in government affairs. 75 Both Arai Hakuseki and Ogyi1 Sorai 
at times alluded to their lack of education and ignorance, marking per-
haps the only point of aqreement between the two rival scholars. 
The judgements of men seeking office themselves might well have been 
biased, but various incidents confirm b~at b~ere was some truth in these 
statements. The debates preceding the monetary reform are an example 
74~ YC5genroku, p.34 and above. 
75 •. Eibyl5, haru; HJ, pp.48, 63, 
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of how the process of decision-making passed into the hands of lower but 
more skilled officials due to the ignorance of the Senior Councillors. 
At a time when the financial problems of the bakufu could be solved no 
longer with reference to precedents, the Senior Councillors were unable 
to suggest a solution. Their ignorance of government finance forced 
them to accept the advice of Superintendent of Finance (kanjo bugyo) 
Ogiwara Shigehide, without even having the knowledge to question the 
issue. 76 Even Shigehide's enemies had to admit that he was hardworking 
77 
and highly skilled, qualities which the Senior Councillors seemed to 
be lacking. 
In Tsunayoshi's government men like Ogiwara Shigehide posed a cons-
tant threat to the less skilled traditional officials. Even earlier in 
his career he had been given wide powers by the shogun to inspect the 
workings of the finance ministry, and as a consequence three Superinten-
dents .of Finance (kanjo gashira) 78 and their assistant (sashizoe/ 
sashizoi) had been dismissed and Shigehide promoted accordingly. 79 
The Superintendents of Finance were an essential part of Tsunayo-
shi' s government and so every attempt was made to replace them with men 
of ability. With the Senior Councillors the case was different. When 
the shogun was a minor or incapacitated they were of great importance as 
leaders of the bakufu, but under a determined and energetic ruler like 
Tsunayoshi they were less essential. Moreover, one of their main func-
tions - the administration of the daimyo - was decreasing in importance. 
76. See above Chapter IV, Section 1. 
77. Ori taku shiba no ki, p. 305. 
78. From Genroku onwards, kanjo gashira were known as kanjo bugyo. 
79. TJ, 42: 610, lOD 9M Ji5kyo 4 and Gotodaiki, p. 58 of the same date. 
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Tsunayoshi's choice of senior Councillors was greatly restricted by the 
stipulation that only descendants of established fudai were eligible to 
hold this rank. Consequently while Tsunayoshi replaced other officials 
who displeased him, he ignored the senior Councillors. Their influence 
and some of their duties gradually passed into the hands of the shogun's 
new men, at times occupying offices such as Ogiwara Shigehide, but mostly 
serving the shogun under the title of Grand Chamberlain. 
7. THE SHOGUN'S NEW MEN: THE CHAMBERLAINS 
Hotta Masatoshi's assassination in JOkyo 4 (168~) opened the door 
to influence by the Grand Chamberlains. The Senior Councillors were un-
able to supply a suitable candidate to replace Masatoshi and the removal 
of their office away from the shogunal chambers forced them to rely on 
the Grand Chamberlains for all communication with Tsunayoshi. A year 
later Toda Mosui noted in his diary: 
On the twenty-first, Matsudaira Iga no Kami entered 
the shogun's inner chambers having been commanded to 
observe and learn the duties of Makino [Narisada] 
Bingo no Kami. He is neither a Junior Councillor 
(wakadoshigori) nor a Chamberlain (sobashu). The 
three men Makino Bingo no Kami, Matsudaira Iga no 
Kami and Kitami Wakasa no Kami serve the shogun in a 
manner unheard of in previous reigns. They are below 
the Senior Councillors, but above the Junior Council-
lors. The authority of Makino Bingo no Kami, however, 
is greater than that of a Senior Councillor.BO 
Mosui's entry leaves no doubt about the unheard-of role Tsunayoshi's 
new men played in the government. A foreign visitor, the German doctor 
Kaempfer, confirmed Narisada's important position, describing him as the 
shogun's "chief favourite and the only person whom he absolutely confides 
ao. Gotoilaiki, p.41, 210 7M Jokyo 2. 
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in." In addition, unlike Hatta Masatoshi, he had the advantage of being 
... . amb' . ,,81 in no way given to ition. 
Narisada to all intents and purposes was the right man to adminis-
ter the shogun's unconventional policies, but to find men suitable to 
"observe and learn his duties" and to provide the infrastructure to his 
demanding office, proved to be a difficult task. 
Tsunayoshi' s chamberlains are traditionally seen as the shogun's 
homosexual partners, or at least his favourites, appointed and dismissed 
at his whim. The office, consequently, is pictured as one where talent 
in flattering and amusing the shogun rather than political expertise 
were considered essential. Homosexual relationships Tsunayoshi might 
have had, but it is doubtful whether they determined the employment of 
those who were to assist him in the government of the country. Some 
scrutiny of the office of Grand Chamberlain as well as the background of 
those who were entrusted with its duties, reveals the exacting nature of 
this office and the arduous path men had to tread before they could con-
sider themselves eligible for appointment. 
One problem encountered in mapping out the career of Tsunayoshi's 
personal staff is the discrepancy of information supplied by various 
sources. With other positions also differences about such matters as 
length of service and reason for termination exist, but nowhere are the 
variations as marked as with these positions, an indication, perhaps, of 
the fluidity and experimental character of the offices Tsunayoshi used 
to surround himself with men of talent. 
A case in hand is the appointment of Makino Narisada. According to 
two records Narisada was first appointed as the shogun's Chamberlain 
81. Kaempfer, History, 3:84. 
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(sobashu) and only one year later was given the title Grand Chamberlain 
(sobayonin), 82 while a third one notes him as becoming Grand Chamberlain 
83 
soon after Tsunayoshi's proclamation as shogun. 
Similarly, there is some difference of opinion as to whether Makino 
Narisada was the first Grand Chamberlain or not. There is no doubt that 
he was the first man to receive this title, but Arai Hakuseki maintained 
that the first Grand Chamberlain was in fact Hotta Masamori, who had 
risen from Page (kosho) to Senior Councillor, finally expressing his 
personal devotion to the third shogun by following him in death (jun'-
' ') 84 SIU. • Scholars such as Tsuji Tatsuya argue that Hakuseki's theory was 
no more than an atten;pt to furnish the much criticised office of Grand 
Chamberlain with a respectable past. Throughout his life Hakuseki was 
opposed to Tsunayoshi and his officials and it would have been painful 
for him to admit that his mentor, Manabe Akifusa was occupying his posi-
tion of influence due to the groundwork Tsunayoshi and his personal 
staff had laid. Tsuji points out that the term kinju shutt~nin - gener-
ally believed to denote the forerunners of the Chamberlains - had been 
used for all officials in direct contact with the shogun before the 
bakufu was structured along more rigid lines. Once the system of sepa-
rate official positions had been established the kinju shuttonin filled 
offices such as those of Senior and Junior Councillor. Consequently 
they were not the forerunners of the Grand Chamberlains, but those of 
' .th ff. 85 various o er o ices. 
82. TJ, 42:363, 9D 7M Empo Band 42;432, llD 12M Tenna l; KCS, 6:277. 
83. Ryuei bunin, 1:22. Arai Eiji, Nihon kinsei shiryo (Tokyo, 1974), p. 
272, notes that this work does not a]ways conform with other sources. 
84. Oritaku shiba no ki, p.424-25. 
85. Tsuji, Kyoho kaikaku, pp.60-61 fn.l. 
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The argument whether the office of Grand Chamberlain was in exis-
tence under a different name previously or not is a theoretical one. 
Like Tsunayoshi the first three shogun all had their personal advisers 
and favourite ministers. Due to the still fluid structure of the bakufu, 
they encountered no problems in creating new offices for their new men, 
and in this sense the kinju shutt5nin as well as the original Senior and 
Junior Councillors were all forerunners of Tsunayoshi's Grand Chamber-
lains.86 These offices, however, had become the preserve of the families 
for whom they had been created, families whq had now become "established" 
and strong enough to oppose both the admission of newcomers to their 
high offices and the creation of new ones. Tsunayoshi, consequently, 
had to be more cautious than his predecessors in introducing his new men 
into the bakufu hierarchy; skilfully he used an office already in exis-
tence to eventually by-pass the unbending structure of officialdom. 
The office of Chamberlain {sobashul of which Toda Mosui spoke with 
familiarity had been created some thirty years before under the fourth 
shogun. Tsunayoshi used this office, which apparently had not yet as-
sumed the rigidity bf other bakufu appointments, in two ways. Firstly, 
he upgraded it. With widened duties and powers it gave rise to the of-
fice of Grand Chamberlain, the official base of operation for the sho-
gun's right-hand men. Secondly, it served as a sorting-ground for men 
in whom the shogun saw some talent. Especially during the initial de-
cades of Tsunayoshi's reign, it was here that officials had to prove 
themselves before being considered for promotion to Grand Chamberlain. 
Also under the fourth shogun successful performance in the position 
of Chamberlain had led to higher appointment. Of the first twelve 
86. See above Section 4 of this chapter. 
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appointees, four men resigned and one was put under house arrest. The 
remainder, however, all proceeded to relatively important positions, in-
eluding one appointee as Kyoto Deputy (Kyoto shoshidai) and three promo-
. . . 87 tions to Junior Councillor. 
What differed under Tsunayoshi was the background of those men who 
were initially appointed Chamberlains. In Ietsuna's case they had with 
one exception held positions in the shogunal entourage such as Senior 
Page (kosho gumi gashira) or performed various guard duties (goshoin ban 
gaShira, oban gashira). Under Tsunayoshi the majority of appointees 
came from a much wider background of off ices outside the shogunal en-
tourage ranging from Inspector General (ometsuke) to Superintendent of 
Finance (kanjo bugyo). This change of background in appointees reflected 
Tsunayoshi's much wider interests in the government of the country. His 
Chamberlains were all men with specialised experience in various fields 
of bakufu administration, well qualified to put their technical know-how 
at the disposal of the shogun. 
Another difference between the appointees of the fourth and those 
of the fifth shogun was that a much smaller percentage of the latter 
were to proceed to higher office. In Ietsuna's case eighty-three per-
cent of all Chamberlains were promoted, while in Tsunayoshi's case it 
was only forty-two percent of those who had served in this office. Of 
the nineteen men who had been appointed as Chamberlain during the ini-
tial decade of Tsunayoshi's reign, nine were either dismissed or re-
signed, two died and only four men were promoted to the post of Grand 
Chamberlain. Three others became Junior Councillors and one man was 
87. The information on the promotion and background of Chamberlains and 
Grand Chamberlains has been taken from Ryuei bunin, 1:96-99 and 
1:22-24, respectively. 
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promoted to Master of Shogunal Ceremony (soshaban). 
In Genroku 2 (1689) Tsunayoshi created the office of Personal Ad-
viser (okuzume) and from that time onwards it was largely here that fu-
ture Grand Chamberlains had to prove themselves. Relatively little is 
known of this position, which was abolished at Tsunayoshi's death. Its 
functions are described as "answering the shogun's questions" and it ap-
pears that initially they largely overlapped with those of the Chamber-
lains. Ryuei bunin gives only sparse information on the termination of 
service and future career of occupants of this office, 88 but the turn-
over of men appears to have been similar to that of the Chamberlains. 
At times, sources such as Tokugawa jikki and Kansei choshu shokafu do 
not differentiate between the two offices, indicating the close connec-
tion that existed between them. 
A third office on which Tsunayoshi initially drew for his Grand 
Chamberlains was that of Junior Councillor (wakadoshiyori). This of-
fice, like that of Senior Councillor, was by tradition limited to men of 
fudai status, but here Tsunayoshi did not observe the restriction rigid-
ly, with some appointees even of tozama status. The office was less 
prestigious than that of Senior Councillor and also the fact that it did 
not directly concern itself with the affairs of the daimyo, and there-
fore was not involved in the power struggle between the latter and the 
shogun, might have been the reason for this greater flexibility. Nearly 
half of Tsunayoshi's Junior Councillors had proved themselves under the 
shogun's watchful eye as either Chamberlain (sobashu) or Personal Advi.ser 
(okuzume), while another third had served successfully in the position of 
Superintendent of Temples and Shrines (jishabugyo) . 89 
88. Ryiiei bunin, 1:65-68. 
89. Ryuei bunin, 1:26-27. 
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An analysis of the careers of Junior Councillors demonstrates the 
close connection of what one 'might term "traditional" bakufu offices 
versus those created for Tsunayoshi's new men. It disproves the general 
assumption that the shogun's entourage consisted of professional light-
weights, while those staffing the traditional positions were altogether 
different, hard-working and sober men, trying to cope with the shogun's 
erratic policies. 
The three· above-mentioned offices - those of Chamberlain (sobashu), 
Personal Adviser (okuzume) and Junior Councillor (wakadoshiyori) -
account for the background of all but one of Tsunayoshi's fourteen Grand 
Chamberlains. It was an elite the shogun had personally chosen: all 
men who had proved themselves both in senior offices in the bakufu and 
under the shogun's own supervision. Yet, in the majority of cases the 
career of Tsunayoshi's Grand Chamberlains was short-lived. In several 
instances the reason for termination of appointment cannot be traced, 
making it difficult to define a pattern. Conspicuous, however, is the 
fact that a relatively large number of resignations are due to ill 
health. Omitting those cases where the reason for termination is un-
known or where it occurred at the end of Tsunayoshi's reign after his 
death, six out of ten resignations were made on account of illness. Of 
the rest, three were terminated due to "unsuitability" which at least 
in one case was on account of insufficient devotion to duties. Only one 
man was sacked and his domain confiscated for going against the shogun's 
. 90 
will. 
Traditionally resignation due to poor health was a way of politely 
shedding uncomfortable duties, but not so under Tsunayoshi. The pcint 
90. See table of Tsunayoshi's Grand Chamberlains. 
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is well made by the case of two men who were appointed as Tsunayoshi's 
Pages (kosho), but feigning illness declined to serve, fearing that they 
would soon displease the shogun. 'Nie shogun's displeasure, however, 
they incurred all the same when investigations revealed the true state 
of their health. 91 
It is unlikely that after this incident anybody serving in Tsunayo-
shi • s proximity would have attempted to resign with a similar false ·ex-
cuse. Unless, therefore, one makes the rather absurd assumption that 
the shogun preferred men of delicate health as his officials, the high. 
percentage of resignations due to illness can only suggest that the 
duties of Grand Chamberlain were so demanding that few people had the 
stamina to withstand the pace of work. '.t'hose who did not totally exert 
themselves were presumably considered "unsuitable." 
Tsunayoshi's own devotion to work is reflected in the pages of 
Matsukage nikki. His interest in·government affairs apparently domina-
ted his life, driving him to rise early "even on nornings of fog and 
deep snow" and to work until late into the night. 92 It is easy to dis-
miss such statements as hagiography, but they do accord well with the 
facts furnished by the careers of his Grand Chamberlains. Even the 
aging Makino Narisada was not spared. Being twelve years the shogun's 
senior he could not keep up with the pace of work demanded from him and 
in his later years in office was progressively hampered by bouts of 
illness. Finally, in his sixtieth year, after a particularly bad spell 
of ill health, he petitioned the shogun to retire. But his petition was 
91. Gotodaiki, p.52, 18D SM Genroku 1, p.64, date not specified. Goto-
daiki records the appointments as sobashu while TJ as kosho. TJ, 
43:13, 18D SM Genroku 1. See also Oishi, Genroku j:idai, p.19. 
92. MK, p.285 and above Chapter II, Section 5. 
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refused and it took another two years until the ailing Narisada was per-
. d . 93 nutte to resign. Rare was the official who had both the devotion and 
stamina to satisfy the shogun's relentless demands. Out of Tsunayoshi's 
fourteen Grand Chamberlains, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was the only man who 
could successfully bear the heavy load of work over many years. 
8. YOSHIYASU'S POLITICAL CAREER 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu's career did not conform to the pattern of 
Tsunayoshi's other Grand Chamberlains. Unlike his colleagues he did not 
gather experience in one of the three offices qualifying other officials 
for appointment. Yet the reason was not that his career advanced so 
rapidly as to prevent him from receiving the training of other appoin-
tees. On the contrary, promotion in terms of bakufu hierarchy was mark-
edly slow in Yoshiyasu's case. 
After five years of service as Page (kosho) at the Tatebayashi 
residence, Yoshiyasu.becarr~ a bakufu official on Tsunayoshi's accession 
to the shogunate. His new rank was that of Attendant (konando), one of 
the lowest official positions in the shogunal entourage. His rank was 
now below that of Page (kosho), and his new office was only a promotion 
in the sense that he was serving the shogun and not merely a relative of 
the ruler, as he had done previously. Eight years later, in Genroku 1 
(1688), before Yoshiyasu was finally promoted to Grand Chall'herlain, his 
position was still that of Attendant, albeit a senior one (konando joza). 
Ryuei bunin records that from J5ky6 1 (1684) onwards Yoshiyasu was 
performing additional duties as jikkin, or what might be termed "aide" 
in English. The appointment apparently was a semi-official one, for it 
93. TJ, 43;244-45, 29D llM Genroku 8. 
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finds no mention in otherwise detailed records such as Rakushido nenroka 
or Tokugawa jikki. 
The office of jikkin had been in use since Ieyasu, but appointments 
had been few, the position apparently being reserved for men in whom the 
shogun placed his special trust. It was collllllOnly held concurrently with 
other duties and all those who had held this position had had higher 
94 
ranks than Yoshiyasu. 
It is somewhat of a mystery why Yoshiyasu during the first thirteen 
years he served Tsunayoshi - eight of which.were spent at Edo castle -
never proceeded beyond the rank of Attendant, especially in light of the 
fact that previously ofricials performing duties as jikkin all had held 
more senior ranks. AS Attendant Yoshiyasu was merely one of around 
hundred men serving in a variety of relatively menial jobs such as 
dressing the shogun's hair and serving his food. 95 Maybe Tsunayoshi 
wanted to keep him close at his side as his disciple sharing his inter-
est in the Confucian classics, or perhaps he did have a homosexual rela-
tionship with Yoshiyasu, or both. One could even suspect that initially 
the shogun. did not consider him clever enough to deal with the intrica-
cies of government business in competition with the experienced offi~ 
cials employed as Chamberlains (sobashu). Eibyo gojitsuroku, citing 
Yoshiyasu's account of his appointment as Grand Chamberlain, makes much 
of the intellectual abilities of his colleagues: 
When Nambu TOtomi no Kami and I were appointed to-
gether the order of seniority was first Totomi no 
Kami and then myself. When we offered our expres-
sions of gratitude for this appointment in the sho-
gunal chambers, Totomi no Kami stood up to proceed 
94. Ryuei bunin, p.1:119-20. 
95. Sasama, Edo bakufu yakushoku, p.368. 
first, according to the order of seating. However, 
the shogun commanded "Dewa96 first" and I proceeded 
first and offered my gratitude. From then on we 
sat in this new order. Al though TOt5mi. no Kami was 
exceedingly bright, after some time he did not mea-
sure up to the shogun's expectations and was dis-
i~ssed. The Master of Court Ceremony (koke) 
Hatakeyama Mimbu no Taifu was ordered to serve at 
the shogun's side,97 but again, he was old anyway 
and soon suspended from office. Kitami Wakasa no 
Kami and Saito Hida no Kami were both employed be-
fore me at the shogun's side and although both were 
of outstanding intelligence, they disobeyed the sho-
gun's commands. Hida no Kami was suspended from 
office in disgrace and Wakasa no Kami was ordered 
under house arrest in the care of Matsudaira EtchU 
no Kami Sadashige, lord of Kuwana castle. It is the 
shogun's intention that men, whether of high or low 
rank, will not succeed unless they apply themselves 
with sincerity to their work.98 
Yoshiyasu took up his appointment of Grand Chamberlain together 
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with Nambu Naomasa who had successfully served as Tsunayoshi's Chamber-
lain and was thus Yoshiyasu's senior. The shogun, however, placed Yosh-
iyasu ahead of him and one may only guess whether it was on account of 
Yoshiyasu's long years of service, better performance, or some personal 
reason. Barely three months after his appointment, Nambu Naomasa was 
suspended from office. The above passage claims .that it was due to dis-
obedience, but other sources state that it was on account of illness. 
Gotodaiki specified it as a small boil on Naomasa's hand, adding that he 
would be permitted to return to his office as soon as the illness was 
cured. But although Naomasa lived for another ten years he never did 
96. Dewa no Kami - Yoshiyasu. 
97. Osoba osetsukerare soraedomo is arr~iguous as asoba could be trans-
lated either as an abbreviation of osobayonin or sobashu. Yet later 
in the text this phrase is also used for Saito Hida no Kami who 
only served as kosho and it has therefore been translated literally 
as "serving at the. shogun's side. n 
98. Eibyo, natsu; HJ, p.102. 
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return to his office, nor was he appointed to any other post. 
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It was, consequently, neither high birth, nor superior intellect, 
that qualified men for the position of Grand Chamberlain, but untiring 
devotion to duty. And that Yoshiyasu had. "He diligently worked night 
and day without a break," "served without a minute's rest," "generally 
came home only every second night." He was too busy to visit his 
father's grave and could not afford the time to finish the latter's 
temple. Even to arrange his daughter's wedding he could not take time 
off from work. Yoshiyasu • s pace never slackened until finally, he too, 
100 
succumbed and fell sick in the heat of summer. If Matsukage is given 
any credence at all, then this constant theme, which is echoed also in 
101 
other sources, cannot be ignored. Yoshiyasu, one may assume, was an 
official whom the shogun never had occasion to reprimand for lack of 
devotion to his duties. 
The picture that emerges of Yoshiyasu. is that of a man not particu-
larly brilliant, but ambitious and hard-working. And although he him-
self was perhaps not overly gifted, he had a talent for recognising 
superior intellect in others and having them work under his leadership. 
It can hardly be a coincidence that Yoshiyasu employed not only Ogyu 
Sorai long before he had produced the works that were to earn him fame, 
but also scholars like Hosoi K<5taku (1658-1735) and Hattori Nankaku 
(1683-1759) who spent their early years in the Yanagisawa mansion. 
99. TJ, 43:34, 26D lM Genroku 2; Toda Mosui, Gotodaiki, p. 71, 6D urn lM 
Genroku 2, KCS, 4:113. Perhaps Naomasa was found to have syphilis 
- the same ideo.gram being used for "boil" and that illness - and 
that therefore he was not employed again. The statement that "he 
did not measure up to the shogun's expectations" could presumably 
mean that he was frequenting the forbidden Yoshiwara quarters, 
rather than attending to his work. 
100. MK, pp.121, 125, 126, 132-33, 136, 162, 172. 
101. E.g. Nenroku, Vol. 7, 260 3M Genroku 4. 
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Other men employed by Yoshiyasu are not as well remembered by posterity, 
but in their day must have been just as .remarkable scholars, such as the 
mathematician Kaneko Gonshichi, who besides Shibukawa Shunkai was the 
only man in Japan able to calculate the new calendar adopted by Tsunayo-
shi. in Jokyo 1 (1684). 102 
Taking his cue from the fifth shogun, Yoshiyasu followed the policy 
of promoting men according to talent and not status. His behaviour·was 
in contrast to that of other newcomers who - although originally of hum-
ble status themselves - attempted to engage for their entourage men 
103 boasting of an illustrious ancestry. 
Nor did Yoshiyasu fall for the temptation of publicly taking advan-
tage of his new status or permitting his retainers the boisterous beha-
104 
viour the servants of other powerful men would frequently adopt. As 
a newcomer, elevated far above the rank he would traditionally be per-
mitted to attain, he was well aware of the vulnerability of his position 
and one may well believe Machiko when she wrote: 
••• My lord did not boast. He was very reticent. No 
matter how much power he held in his hands, his constant 
and profound concern was only that he not err in t.~e 
discharge of the affairs of state. Therefore he thought 
it most inappropriate if his retainers were excessively 
boastful like Yan Ying's stupid charioteer.105 "Under 
no circumstances are you to take advantage of your 
102. Nenroku, Vol.SO, 3D llM Genroku 10. The Senmyo calendar which had 
been in use for over 800 years showed considerable discrepancy with 
the natural seasons. Shibukawa Shunkai calculated the appropriate 
adjustments and his calendar was known as Jokyo calendar. See also 
Shively "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p.121. · 
103. Eibyo, natsu; HJ, p.84. 
104. ibid. 
105. Yan Ying, Jap: Anei, was prime minister during the Spring and 
Autumn period in China. His charioteer, proud of his master's pos-
ition, handled his horses with such exuberance that his wife re-
quested a divorce. 
influence, ridicule people or behave impolitely. 
It should be repugnant to you to think that merely 
because you are a member of an influential house you 
can always behave as you please," he frequently cau-
tioned his retainers. Consequently everybody was 
convinced that there could be no better man to whom 
the well-being of the people might be entrusted.106 
126 
Yoshiyasu had to be more careful than other men in establishing his 
position. He lacked a powerful network of relatives to back him, should 
he in any way incur the shogun's displeasure. On the contrary, he had 
constantly to be heedful that those jealous of his powerful position 
would find no reason to accuse him. Consequently when two guards of his 
residence were rumoured to have accepted bribes, he promptly suspended 
107 them from duty and despatched them to his castle at Kawagoe. 
Other members of his household, however, proved to be more of an 
asset. Not just Ogyii Sarai, but also less scholarly retainers found 
favour in the shogun's eyes. Frequently they were requested to attend 
108 Tsunayoshi at Eda castle and on his visits to the Yanagisawa mansion 
they were also accorded honours and gifts far in excess of their status. 
On one occasion a senior retainer was particularly singled out with 
praise for the speedy construction of new buildings in the Yanagisawa 
compound and in recognition was awarded the shogun's aoi crest. Tradi-
tionally this honour had been reserved for members of the shogunal 
farr~ly, and there had, apparently, been no precedent of a lower official 
109 being bestowed with the crest. Such unusual favours could not go 
unnoticed and - Machiko wrote - men soon considered it more advantageous 
106. MK, pp.215-16. 
107. Gotodaiki, p.133, llD 7M Genroku 9. 
108. E.g. Nenroku, Vol.4, lD lOM Genroku 2; Vol.6, lOD and 29D 7M Gen-
roku 3. 
109. MK, pp.134-35; TJ, 43:123, 3D lOM Genroku 4. 
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to be personally known by Yoshiyasu than to be attached to the entourage 
f th . h . 110 o e most mig ty daimyo. 
Step by step Yoshiyasu succeeded in placing some of his own loyal 
retainers in bakufu positions, and even when a rather distant relative 
in straightened circumstances appealed to him for help, he soon secured 
him a place in the administration. 111 
Also in his office as Grand Chamberlain Yoshiyasu carefully estiib-
lished a following. 
Except for Makino Narisada the careers of his colleagues had been 
short-lived112 and he had little to fear from their competition. More-
over, after Yoshiyasu had acted for several years as Grand Chamberlain, 
Narisada himself was starting to suffer from ill health and was keen to 
resign his duties. With the shogun's extremely critical assessment of 
his Grand Chamberlains, Yoshiyasu, consequently, had to worry less about 
rivals than how to himself find an assistant so that he would be able to 
execute his increasingly heavy duties to the shogun's satisfaction. 
In Genroku 6 (1693), the year of Narisada's unsuccessful request 
for resignation, he found a suitable assistant in Matsudaira Terusada, 
h . . l 113 is own son-in- aw. 
Unlike Yoshiyasu, Matsudaira Terusada was no newcomer. His grand-
father, Matsudaira Nobutsuna had stood high in favour with the third 
shogun and together with men like Hotta Masamori, Abe Shigetsugu and Abe 
114 Tadaaki he had played a vital role in the government of the c-0untry. 
110. MK, p.218. 
111. MK, pp.176-77; Nenroku, Vol.77, 27D 12M Genroku 13. 
112. See table of Tsunayoshi's Grand Chamberlains. 
113. TJ, 43:161, 7D lM Genroku 6. 
114. KCS, 4:401-406; Bolitho, Treasures, pp.162-63. 
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Terusada had started his career as Tsunayoshi's Page (kosho) and was 
eventually promoted to Chamberlain (sobashu). He distinguished himself 
in this office by supervising to the shogun's entire satisfaction the 
construction of the Confucian temple at Yushima. In Genroku 4 (1691) he 
had been granted permission to inherit his uncle's fief and apparently 
resigned his.position as Chamberlain for this reason.115 It was at the 
end of this same year that he had received the shogunal command to wed 
116 Yoshiyasu's adopted daughter and barely two years after this event 
had been promoted to Grand Chamberlain to aE;sist Yoshiyasu. 
Makino Narisada was reluctantly to remain in office for another two 
years after Terusada's appointment, but there could be no doubt that 
Yoshiyasu and his son-in-law were poised to move up in the ladder of re-
sponsibilities as soon as Narisada retired. 
Tsunayoshi continued to appoint Grand Chamberlains but for various 
117 
reasons none of them remained in office for very long. Finally, ano-
ther of Yoshiyasu's sons-in-law joined his team. He was Kuroda Naokuni 
with whom - Machiko noted - "the shogun had been friendly for some years." 
Like Yoshiyasu, Naokuni had started his career as the shogun's Attendant 
(konando), but had then been promoted to Page (kosho). His betrothal to 
one of Yoshiyasu's adopted daughters had been announced soon after Teru-
sada's betrothal, and although it took some time until the marriage fin-
ally took place, he became part of the Yanagisawa household and from then 
ff . . 11 tt d d . 1 d . h h ' . . 118 .on o 1c1a y a en e as son-in- aw uring t e s ogun s visits. 
Apparently Naokuni was never officially promoted to either the position 
115. KCS, 5:4-6; Ryuei bunin, 1:97. 
116. TJ, 43:128, llD 12M Genroku 4; MK, p.136. 
117. See table of Tsunayoshi's Grand Chamberlains. 
118. E.G. TJ, 43:103, 22D 3M Genroku 4. MK, p.145. 
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of Grand Chamberlain or Chamberlain, for he is not noted as such in the 
official records. Got~daiki, however, states that he received the sho-
gunal command "to observe and learn the duties" of Grand Chamberlain 
Matsudaira Terusada, 119 an o.rder usually indicating promotion to that 
office. It is difficult to know why Naokuni's appointment was not 
otherwise recorded and one may only assume that his assistance to Yoshi-
yasu was of a more personal nature and therefore not noted in official 
documents. 
The position of Yoshiyasu' s son-in-law, however, was not invariably 
a guarantee of success. Yamana Yasutoyo had also served as Tsunayoshi's 
Page and at the same time as Kuroda Naokuni been promised to yet another 
one of Yoshiyasu's adopted daughters. Previously he had already dis-
pleased the shogun - apparently with his refusal to be adopted by Makino 
Narisada - and put under house arrest in the Yanagisawa mansion. Either 
the matter had not been very serious, or Yoshiyasu • s pleading had been 
. 120 
extremely effective, for only two days later he was already pardoned. 
Subsequent increases in stipend and the order to become Yoshiyasu's son-
in-law would indicate that he had been completely rehabilitated, but 
three years after his promise of marriage he displeased the shogun 
again, this time for not devoting himself sufficiently to his duties. 121 
For the shogun such lack of enthusiasm was a grave matter. Therefore, 
perhaps, Yoshiyasu considered it wiser not to intervene this time and 
the engagement between Yasutoyo and his adopted daughter was broken off. 
Yoshiyasu, one might conclude, was in no position to patronise men who 
119. Gotodaiki, p.178, 12M Genroku 13, day not specified. 
120. ibid., 14D and 16D 4M Genroku 4; TJ, 43: 72 same date. 
121. TJ, 43:189, 4D 2M Genroku 7. 
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had fallen out with the shogun; those who wanted to benefit from his in-
fluence also had to win the approval of Tsunayoshi. 
At the same time as Yoshiyasu was cautiously establishing his own 
base of power, his political duties widened. 
In Genroku 7 (1694) he was assigned for the first time to the Sup-
reme Court {hyojosho). 122 . Traditionally members of the shogun's entou-
rage did not attend at the sessions of this highest organ of justice and 
it was only under Tsunayoshi that Makino Narisada, when still merely 
123 Chamberlain, was ordered to do so. Yoshiyasu was now following in 
Narisada's footsteps. 
The next year was that of Narisada's retirement, making Yoshiyasu 
indisputably the shogun's most trusted and most senior adviser. 
Some months afterwards Yoshiyasu's control of political issues in-
creased further when a shogunal order stipulated that henceforth pre-
sents to the Great Interior (ooku), the residen.ce of the shogun's mother, 
wives and daughters, had to be channelled either through him or his ass-
. 124 ' istant Terusada. The importance of these ladies has already been 
. d 125 pointe out. From early on Yoshiyasu had tal;en care to establish 
good relationships with them, but valuable presents from men antagonis-
tic to him could conceivably sway their opinion. The fact that control 
of gifts to the shogunal ladies was considered necessary presuniably in-
dicates that attempts had been made subtly to influence Tsunayoshi's 
opinion in this way. 
122. TJ, 43:214, 250 llM Genroku 7. For composition of hyi3ji3sho see 
Sasama, Edo bakufu yakushoku shusei, p.224. 
123. TJ, 42:376, 6D uru 8M Emp6 8. 
124. Kanroso (manuscript, see Bibliography), Vol.3, lOD 7M Genroku 9; 
Naito Chiso, Tokugawa jUgoaaishi (Tokyo, 1893), 6:120. 
125. See above Chapter II, Section 2. 
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With Yoshiyasu's increasing control over all access to the shogun 
it became necessary even for some of the most powerful daimyo to peti-
tion him for help. Machiko later recalled: 
I need hardly say that virtually everyone of every 
rank, who had a petition to present or grievance to 
protest, ·the mighty as well as the lowly, flocked to 
his gate to seek an audience with him. Even the lords 
of provinces puffed up with conceit, grand gentlemen 
of noble descent, had limits to their powers and found 
themselves in distress when they had personal problems 
they could not solve. Some would return again and 
again and ask when his lordship were free. Some would 
call with introductions from influential friends and 
some would learn when he would be leaving the house and 
implore him to grant them even a moment's interview. 
His lordship was now dealing with hundreds of matters 
and still, as before, was attending the shogun personally 
every day. Although he did not want to close his eyes 
and ears to people's complaints, if he were to follow 
his own inclinations and take trouble to deal personally 
with each and every case presented to him there would 
have been no end to it. Moreover, since it was against 
his principles to give special treatment to some people, 
he generally would not see even important men personally. 
When on rare occasions he could not avoid seeing someone 
he would behave as if he were presiding over formal court 
proceedings and his conduct would make people hesitate to 
voice too personal requests in his presence •••• 126 
In Genroku 11 (1698) Yoshiyasu was granted the imperial title of 
Lesser Commander of the Guards (sakon'e no shoshoJ, 127 a rank generally 
reserved for lords of provinces, the great daimyo of whom Machiko had 
spoken so disparagingly. 
Yoshiyasu's increasing dominance - not just in matters of everyday 
government, but also in the important sphere of solemn ceremonial pro-
ceedings - was further emphasised the following year. On the occasion 
of the shogunal procession to the ancestral temples at Momijiyama in· the 
126. MK, p.218. 
127. See above Chapter II, Section 3. 
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seventh month of Genroku 12 (1699) Yoshiyasu for the first time was 
given the honour of acting as the shogunal herald (sendo). This func-
tion had previously been carried out by men like Sakai Tadakiyo and 
Hotta Masatoshi and after their death had been shared by the families of 
hi d . 128 Hos na an Ii. For one of the shogun's new men, like Yoshiyasu, to 
take over this solemn and prestigious duty, was an unheard of break with 
tradition. It dem6nstrated to the whole country the neglect with which 
Tsunayoshi treated the old established families. 
Yoshiyasu's advancement did not stop here. Two years later the 
name of Matsudaira was bestowed upon him and his sons, and the shogun's 
declaration that from now on he considered him like one of his family, 
must have been painful to other members of the Tokugawa clan. Yoshiyasu 
- the shogun declared - was a model official, praise no doubt resented 
by those officials who considered Yoshiyasu's position of influence to 
be rightfully theirs. 129 
A shogunal directive shortly afterwards declared that in future 
Yoshiyasu was to take his seat in order of seniority with men sharing 
his rank of Lesser Commander of the Guards; 130 he, the upstart, was to 
be treated no differently from the families which had established their 
supremacy for generations. 
No other man received such favours from the fifth shogun. Never-
theless, the position of the fudai daimyo as senior administrators of 
the country was not just threatened by Yoshiyasu alone. Indications 
that promotion according to talent and not family background was part of 
128. E.g. for Sakai Tadakiyo, TJ, 42:15, 17D 4M Kambun 8; for Hotta 
Masatoshi, 42:469, 8D lM Tenna 3; for Ii, 42:535, 17D lM J5kyo 2; 
for Hoshina, 52:551, SD lM Jokyo 2. 
129. See above, Chapter III, Section 4. 
130. Nenroku, Vol.93, 21D 12M Genroku 14; TJ, 43:458 same date. 
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the shogunal policy could no longer be ignored. On a visit to the Yana-
gisawa mansion in Genroku 15 (1702) Tsunayoshi found occasion greatly to 
praise one of Yoshiyasu's retainers for the speedy reconstruction of 
buildings after fire. Presenting him with a sword the shogun ventured 
the rhetorical question, "Should we make a difference between low and 
high ranking when it comes to the way of the officials?" and concluded 
that "everyone ought to serve like this man • .,l 3l 
With Yoshiyasu's position increasingly encroaching upon the privi-
leges of the fudai and the shogun's policy indicating that also other 
men would be promoted without consideration of status, it is not SUrPri-
sing that gradually protest came to be heard. 
9. SIGNS OF PROTEST 
Signs of protest against shogunal policy are not easy to detect in 
contemporary sources. The shogun's decisions were infallible and to ex-
press doubt about this would have amounted to treason. Open criticism 
of shogunal decisions, therefore, was a serious breach of loyalty and 
thus especially unbecoming to the fudai, whose claim to privileges 
rested on their display of this same virtue. Consequently disagreement 
with Tsunayoshi's policy of advancing men of talent and permitting a 
newcomer to usurp a position of influence occupied by the fudai in the 
past, finds no direct expression in the official sources. That such 
protest did exist, however, is indicated at times by less official 
chrbnicles or subtly suggested by a somewhat puzzling progression of 
events, inviting historians to draw their own conclusions. 
131. MK, p.202. 
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An early indication of protest was the resignation of Tsunayoshi's 
Great Councillor (tairo) Ii Kamon no Kami Naomori. According to Toku-
... 132 
gawa jikki Naomori terminated his duties on account of illness. Toda 
Mosui, however T not;.ed: 
The Great Councillor Ii Kaman no Kami has been 
granted permission to resign. Apparently he made 
a submission to the shogun, stating that according 
to Iemitsu's code the court rank appropriate for a 
Senior Councillor is Gentleman-in-waiting (jijil) and 
the fief should be no more than 100,000 koku. There-
fore the appointment last year of Yanagisawa Dewa no 
Kami to Lesser Commander (shosho) was against the 
code. It is rumoured that this is the reason [for 
the Grand Councillor's resianation]. I heard this 
from an unreliable source.133 
Yoshiyasu's stipend at that time did not exceed the limit set for 
S . · 11 134 enior Counci ors. Yet his rank did, a breach of tradition all the 
more serious in view of the fact that as Grand Chamberlain he was offi-
cially placed below the Senior Councillors. Toda Mosui's statement, 
however, is incorrect in so far as Yoshiyasu had not received his new 
rank the previous year, but already two years ago. During the previous 
year though, Yoshiyasu - as mentioned above - had been granted the un-
precedented privilege of acting as the shogun's herald to Momijiyama, an 
honour previously enjoyed by the Ii family. For once Ii Naomori as 
Great Councillor would hav-e been intolerant of a newcomer decorated with 
the same court rank as himself, .but the timing would suggest that Yoshi-
yasu' s encroachment upon the office of herald to the sacred ancestral 
temples of the Tokugawa family ~ight have been the final impetus for his 
132. TJ, 43:397, 20 3M Genroku 13. 
133. Gotodaiki, p. l 74, 3M Genroku 13. 
134. His last increment had been on 26D 7M Genroku 10, bringing his sti-
pend to a total of 92,030 koku; TJ, 43:303. 
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protest and resignation. For Naomori, who as Great Councillor ought to 
have been the most influential man next to the shogun, it was a great 
loss of face. As his remonstrances with t.~e shogun obviously went un-
heeded, he saw no alternative but to resign. 
Any differences that might have existed between the shogun and his 
Great Councillor were handled with the utmost discretion. No such dif-
ferences appear in the official sources and in the years to come Ii'Nao-
mori still maintained cordial relations with rnewbers of the shogunal 
. h . h . di 135 family, as t e continual exc ange of presents appears to in cate. 
It was perhaps no coincidence that Naomori was re-installed as Great 
Councillor when the sixth shogun Ienobu lay on his death bed, at t.~e 
same time when the only man of influence from Tsunayoshi's days, Super-
intendent of Finance Dgiwara Shigehide, was finally discredited.136 
With Ii Naomori having left the political arena no protest can be 
detected when Yoshiyasu was publicly praised by the shogun and rewarded 
with the name of Matsudaira. In addition Naomori's resignation left 
Yoshiyasu free to handle "internal and external matters" without inter-
ference and to initiate such unorthodox requests to the emperor as the 
137 highest court rank for the shogun's mother. This in turn brought 
further praise and the unusual shogunal concession that he was to select 
the best rice fields in the fertile kam.igata plains. 138 Only Machiko's 
reference to the "lords puffed up with conceit" gives some indication 
that with these unusual privileges the seeds of discord had been 
135. KCS, 12:299. 
136. See above Chapter II, Section 6. 
137. MK, 192; Nenroku, Vol.95, 9D 3M Genroku 15, and above Chapter II, 
Section 4. 
138. Nenroku, Vol.96, 13D 3M Genroku 15. Kam.igata is the area around 
present-day Kyoto and Osaka. 
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firmly planted between Yoshiyasu and the established daimyo. 
In the wake of such antagonism, Yoshiyasu apparently was becoming 
somewhat reluctant to accept further favours from the shogun. Conse-
quently when Tsunayoshi at the end of that year suggested that Yoshiyasu 
and his son enjoy the honour of sharing the first shogunal cup of sake 
• t. h N Y h' f d 139 in e ew ear, Yos iyasu re use ~ 
The Genroku era ended with Ienobu's instatement as shogunal succes-
sor. Tsunayoshi had consulted with Yoshiyasu alone in making this grave 
decision of national importance, and Yoshiyasu, in turn, without seeking 
the opinion of other senior officials, had determined the solemn proce-
dures appropriate for the occasion. The low priority accorded to the 
traditional holders of power was indicated by the fact that the mcnk 
Rytiko became party to these decisions of state before the Senior Council-' 
lors and the Three Related Houses were informed. 140 
On this occasion Tsunayoshi's praise of Yoshiyasu's role in 
"cementing the foundations of the country" culminated in his enfeoffment 
wit.1; estates in Kai and Suruga, part of Ienobu's former domain. As 
lands of utmost strategic importance for the shogunate they had always 
been restr{cted to the Tokugawa clan. Tsunayoshi justified his unprece-
dented decision to bestow them on an outsider by declaring that in his 
eyes Yoshiyasu was like a member of his own family. The official value 
of Yoshiyasu's new domain was recorded as just over 150,000 koku, but 
the real yield amounted to well over 200,000 koku, bringing it close to 
th 1 f d . d . 141 e argest u ai oma1n. Under these circumstances it is not sur-
prising that some signs of protest can be detected. 
139. Nenroku, Vol.111, 15D 12M Genroku 15. 
140. Ryiiko so jo nikki, 2: 290, and above Chapter III, Section 4. 
141. TJ, 43:559, 21D 12M Hoei 1. 
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To begin with, an event related in Eibyo gojitsuroku suggests that 
the shogun did not altogether have a free hand in making enfeoffments 
which - like this one - surpassed the accepted norms. The event took 
place after the announcement of Yoshiyasu's new domain had been made. 
The shogun went to call on her ladyship his motherl42 
together with b.~e Lady of the Second Citadel.143 Lord 
Eikeijil44 was also in attendance. On this occasion 
her ladyship the shogun's mother voiced her thoughts 
saying "Why was Mino no Kamil45 not enfeoffed with the 
whole province of Kai? During your august reign mat-
ters ought to be handled according to your wish." 
When the shogun heard this he was troubled. · Apparently 
he sat there ·and laughed. Lord Eikeiji thought the 
situation to be extremely awkward. I believe his hands 
trembled and the perspiration ran down him in streams. 
"There are many occasions on which even the shogun can- · 
not act according to the dictates of his heart," the 
shogun exclaimed. "Lord Gyobu no Shi5yi1 and Lord Shikibu 
no Shoyu146 were given 20,000 koku in the east of Kail4? 
and at that time even the Keepers of Castles heard that 
there was public protest! 0 148 
This animated event finds no-mention in other records. Yet this 
fact need not detract from its credibility. It took place in the apart-
ments of the shogun's mother and except for the privileged Grand Chamber-
lain, no other officials were present. The shogun would hardly admit so 
frankly the limits of his power except in the most intimate company, nor 
presumably would his mother have questioned his decision if a wider 
142. San no maru. 
143. Ni no maru. 
144. Yoshiyasu's posthumous name. 
145. Yoshiyasu. 
146. Lit. Deputy Vice Minister of Law and Deputy Vice Minister of Cere-
monies; imperial titles which did not imply the holding of office. 
They designate here Yoshiyasu's second and third sons. 
147. Gunnai - coloquial name for the eastern part of present-day 
Yarr.anashi, formerly Kai. 
148. Eibyo, haru 1 HJ, p.46. 
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audience had been present. Consequently there would have been no one to 
record this event except for Yoshiyasu who, it appears, later described 
it to his senior retainer Yabuta Shigemori, the author of Eibyo 
gojitsuroku. Quite understandably this emotionally charged event, ad-
mitting the weakness of the shogunate, did not find a place in the 
terse, semi-official Rakushido nenroku. Nearly half a century later, 
however, when all the participants in this scene had died, it made sense 
to include the event in a work which tried to correct some of the gossip 
current at the time. The fact that both Tsunayoshi and Yoshiyasu cut a 
somewhat awkward figure suggests that it was not invented in an effort 
to show the hero in a better light. In fact, if the author had been 
more concerned with appearances, he could have restyled the !\tory in a. 
way Machiko appears to have done. She merely noted the shogun's mother 
as saying that however large a fief Yoshiyasu had received, it would be 
insufficient to reward his services. 149 Under her skilled pen the awk-
ward scene was pruned to suit her poetical description of the harmonious 
world she lived in. 
After Yoshiyasu's enfeoffment with Kai the customary congratula-
tions were slow in coming. Again Machiko's peace of mind was not dis-
turbed by this fact. The enfeoffment had taken place on the twenty-
* first day of the twelfth month and she persuaded herself that just as 
her own household was engaged in preparations for the New Year, others 
similarly were too busy to pay the respects appropriate on this felici-
taus occasion. She argued that it would have taJrnn some time before 
messengers would have spread the news to distant parts of the country 
* Hoei l (1704) 
149. MK, p.238, 
139 
150 
and well-wishers could respond. . Machiko could have been right, yet 
the events that followed suggest the opposite. 
Three months after his initial enfeoffment, Yoshiyasu returned his 
domains in Suruga to the bakufu. Instead he was granted further lands 
in the province of Kai to an equal value~ The reason for this unusual 
step is carefully explained in a document drafted by Yoshiyasu for his 
descendants. After the details of Ienobu's instatement as shogunal ·sue-
cessor, Yoshiyasu's initial enfeoffment and a ve.rbatim report of the 
shogun's praise virtually identical to the one recorded in Matsukage 
ikk . 151 h . n i, t e doctmient continues: 
The shogun had several days before especially ordered 
Honda lloki no Kami Masanao to make an inventory of 
r,ord Ienobu' s old domain. On this dayl5 2 the two 
cities of Kofu and Sumpu were cut out and granted to 
me. Later, on the twelfth day of the third month, 
in the spring of this year, I was granted the three 
districts of Yamanashi, Koma and Yatsuhiro and re-
turned the land in Suruga province because it was 
stony. The favours of our lordship are like those of 
heaven 153 
For Yashiyasu the shogun's favours might have been like those of 
heaven, but other men who considered it their right to have 
a say in how the shogunal lands were distributed - apparently felt dif-
ferently about the matter. The explanation that the area around Sumpu 
castle, Ieyasu's chosen seat of retirement, was too poor to be worth 
enfeoffment, is difficult to accept. For once, one may assume that the 
shogun, or at least his officials, would have been well acquainted with 
* in Hoei 2 (1705) 
150. MK, p.239. 
151. See above, Chapter II, Section 4. 
152. 210 12M lloei 1. 
153. nenroku, Vol.163, appended to entry of 9D 4M Hoei 2. 
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the condition of these lands of deep significance to the Tokugawa re-
gillie, especially as the domain had just been surveyed. 
Quite apart from this fact, the productivity of Yoshiyasu's origi-
nal enfeoffment was well above average, the actual yield being about 
twenty-five percent above the official value. It is possible, of course, 
that the actual yield of his new domain was even higher. Nevertheless, 
the prestige of being lord of Sumpu castle would have counted far much 
and the shogun could simply have added to Yoshiyasu's holdings without 
going to the length of designating these lands steeped in sacred tradi-
tion as "stony." Ih short, Yoshiyasu's return of Sumpu castle in ex-
change for lands in the province of Kai sounds very much like sour grapes. 
From the viewpoint of the shogunal clan and the traditional farni-
lies, protest against t.he conferring of Sumpu castle to a man like 
Yoshiyasu was understandable. In spite of the shogun's assertions to 
the contrary, for 'them he was not a member of the clan. Sumpu, on the 
other hand, was sacred to the family tradition. Here Ieyasu had spent 
his childhood as hostage; he had virtually ruled the country from here 
during the eleven years of his so-called retirement and had finally died 
there. Moreover, when he first had tried to establish himself in the 
Kan to these lands had been captured from Takeda Shingen 's son Katsu-
yori 154 and returning them now to a declared heir of Shingen might have 
been regarded as an unfortunate yielding of Tokugawa power to a former 
enemy. 
Finally the controversy about the wording of Yoshiyasu's new patent 
gives indication of the jealous watch his critics kept. Rakushido nen-
xoku notes: 
154. Nakamura Koya, Ieyasu den (Tokyo, 1965), pp.71-90, 198-202, 399-
407, 677. 
On the twenty-ninth day of the previous month* 
Hayashi Daigaku Nobuatsu was charged with the 
wording of the customary patent. Upon reading it 
the shogun thought that "for service in the gov-· 
ernment" was the usual wording, but that "for 
truly loyal service" would be more appropriate. 
After detailed investigations he decided on the 
latter wording.155 
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Arai Hakuseld,however, suggested that t.~e request for the unusual 
wording of the patent·had come from Yoshiyasu himself and that this 
break with tradition had caused a great deal of resentment. 156 
Years later, after Tsunayoshi's death when Yoshisato had inherited 
the domain and the patent had to be renewed, the old resentment flared 
up again. According to Yoshiyasu's retainer the Senior Councillors de-
layed the matter for two years, employing every tactic within their 
reach to stall the necessary proceedings, presumably in the hope that 
Ienobu would tire of pursuing the matter. The shogun, he noted, twice 
informed his Senior Councillors that he wished to renew the patent, but 
the latter could reach no agreement on the matter. He then issued the 
order again and as this time there was no reply, further action seemed 
difficult to pursue. Finally, Yoshisato was advised to send his request 
directly to the Senior Councillors, for in this case - knowing that the 
shogun was waiting for the petition - they could no longer ignore the 
157 
matter. 
One method, then, the Senior Councillors could employ to show their 
muscle was that of delay. Another avenue open to them was to challenge 
any new measure on the grounds that it did not conform to traditional 
• [4M Hoei 2 (1705)]. 
155. Nenroku, Vol.165, 150 uru 4M Hoei 2. 
156. Oritaku Shiba no ki, p.252. For further details see Morita, p.141. 
157. Eibyo, haru; HJ, p.49. 
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etiquette. This tactic was employed when Yoshisato requested that the 
official value of his domain should be raised to the level of the actual 
yield, 158 a petition which led to a fierce argument amongst the Senior 
Councillors. 
During the years of Hi'5eil59 the Senior Councillor 
Okubo Kaga no Kami Tadamasa told Ichi no Kami160 the 
following. "I consider the request for a raise in 
value most appropriate. However, when this matter 
was tabled recently in t.he conference chamber of the 
Senior Councillors, Lord Abe Bungo no Kami Masataka, 
without understanding anything about it, said that 
l.t would be against the rules of etiquette. When I 
myself heard that I a.~swered: 'Since the amount 
yielded by three districts in one province has been 
conferred by shogunal order there is no problem with 
that at all.' Thereupon Lord Tsuchiya, Sagami no 
Kami Masanaol6lsaid that there would be problems when 
the fief was changed to a different location and I 
replied that since a sealed patent exists, the shogun 
would only order a change of fief if Kai no Kamil62 
were to commit a serious crime. A copy of the sealed 
document was requested from the scribes and read, and 
since the wording was seen to be as I had said neither 
Lord Sagami nor a.~ybody else had a word to say. I 
urged them to carry out further investigations on any-
thing they wished. nl63 
This skirmish between the Senior Councillors gives various insights. 
Okubo. Tadamasa' s son had married one of Yoshiyasu' s daughters and this 
connection here worked in favour of the Yanagisawa family. Moreover it 
158. T"ne text simply states taka age, but unless this is interpreted to 
mean "raise of the official value to the actual value" as suggested 
by Sakata and Morita, the passage makes no sense. Morita, p.141. 
159. The event must have taken place between Yoshiyasu's resignation in 
HOei 6 (1709) and the beginning of Shotoku (1711). 
160. Supervisor of Commerce, the title of Yabuta Shigemori, the writer 
of this passage. 
161. The text of HJ (p.46) differs here from Eibyo (haru) and is mis-
leading. 
162. Yoshiyasu's heir Yoshisato. 
163. Eibyo, haru; HJ, pp.46-47. 
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shows that the Senior Councillors, even after Ienobu's express renewal 
of Yoshisato's patent, were still not reconciled to the fact that this 
strategic and large domain was to remain in the hands of the Yanagisawa 
family. Hope apparently still existed that now after Tsunayoshi' s death 
they could try to persuade the sixth shogun to transfer Yoshisato to a 
less prominent and perhaps smaller fief. 
The relationship.between the shogun and his Senior Councillors ·that 
* emerges from the above two incidents is an uneasy one. At times one or 
perhaps even several members might be won over to the shogun's side, hut 
in general they played a watchdog's role over any initiatives the shogun 
might take. Their argument that a certain measure was contrary to trad-
itional etiquette was a powerful one. Strong support from other.members 
of the upper military aristocracy could always be expected, for untradi-
tional measures - such as the ones above - generally were detrimental to 
their hitherto privileged status. The Senior Councillors perhaps did 
not have the power completely to stop the shogun from carrying out his 
own wishes, but they did, apparently, have the means to make life extre-
rnely difficult for him and the man whose duties it was to transmit and 
supervise the execution of shogunal orders. When Hakuseki said of Yosh-
iyasu, "affairs of state were conducted as he wished and all the Senior 
Councillors did was to relay what he told them"164 he was most probably 
correct. Yet the effort Yoshiyasu had to exert to have the Senior Coun-
cillor.s act according to his wishes was - no doubt - considerable. 
** Yoshiyasu's request for retirement only one month after the Senior 
Councillors finally had signed the patent of his new domain must be 
looked at in this light. True, on a personal level the previous months 
*which took place after Tsunayoshi's deat,~ 
164. Oritaku shiba no ki, p.425. 
** in Hoei 2 (1705) 
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had been tragic ones, when death had robbed him of many people dear to 
him. But not just friendships had been lost; two weeks prior to his re-
quest for resignation one of his staunchest supporters, the shogun's 
mother, had died. Yoshiyasu's own health was weakening. How mµch of 
this was caused by the constant strain of holding his own against·hos-
tile officials and daimyo, one cannot tell. 
It is revealing that of the three duties Yoshiyasu requested tO re-
linquish on his partial retirement, two dealt directly with the daimyo. 
To the outsider they appear unobnoxious enough: Yoshiyasu petitioned 
that he no longer would have to handle correspondence with the daimyo 
when during their absence from Edo they inquired after the shogun's 
health. The other request was that he no longer wished to receive gifts 
from the daimyo when they paid obeisance to the shogun on special occa-
sions .165 Neither of these duties appears to be exceedingly burdensome, 
yet for Yoshiyasu they obviously were uncomfortable and required great 
effort. He had achieved his ambitions and - in accordance with Lao-
' . 166 . . . th h. tzu s saying - it was time to retire. It appears at Yos 1yasu· 
gradually became afraid of tempting his fortune any further. The diffi-
culties surrounding his enfeoffment of Kai illustrated only too well the 
antagonism of his opponents. Further provocation of those whose place 
he had taken in the administration of the country might only be to his 
own detriment. By avoiding any situations where the daimyo were forced 
to pay respect to him, he might have hoped to somewhat appease their 
opposition. 
165. Nenroku, Vol.169, 130 7M Hoei 2; TJ, 43:587-88, 14D 7M Hoei 2. 
166. See above, Chapter II, Section 4. 
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Faced with the above situation it is understandable that two years 
later (1707) when the shogun announced that Yoshiyasu and his eldest son 
would be granted the rare honour of displaying the halberd in their pro-
cessions, Yoshiyasu protested. His request that only his son and not he 
himself should accept this new privilege went unheeded by the shogun. 
Yoshiyasu's initial refusal is documented both in Matsakage nikki and 
Rakushido nenroku, and the verbatim report of the shogun's reply to 
J67 Yoshiyasu's petition in the latter work lends credibility to the event. 
Nearly two decades later, however, Arai Hakuseki's disciple, Muro Kyuso 
maintained that Yoshiyasu himself had requested the honour of displaying 
the halberd. The passage continues: 
Representation was made to the shogun saying "Since 
the halberd is so prestigeous that evert amongst the re-
lated houses. and the various daimyo there are a number 
of people who have not been granted it, this request 
ought to be unacceptable." This was not heeded by the 
shogun and, Mino no Kamil68 received permission to dis-
play the halberd as he had requestea.169 
Muro Kyuso leaves no doubt that the military aristocracy had become 
vocal in their protest over Yoshiyasu's continued pr-0motions. He was 
now receiving favours exceeding those granted to even the most senior 
daimyo and it is not difficult to see where the version originated that 
Yoshiyasu was pushing for such honours rather than that they were freely 
given by the shogun. It was more acceptable for the daimyo to believe 
that the shogun was acting under the evil influence of his Grand Chamber-
lain than to admit that he might have been genuinely convinced that 
167. See above, Chapter II, Section 5. 
168. Yoshiyasu. 
169. Muro Kyuso, Kenzan hisaku, Vol.6 in Takimoto Seiichi, Nihon keizai 
taiten (Tokyo, 1928), p.612. 
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Yoshiyasu was more deserving than they. In addition, at the time of 
Muro Kyiiso's writing, it was easier to blame a former official than the 
dead ruler himself for such unacceptable behaviour. 
The assumption that at this stage of his life Yoshiyasu was eager to 
relinquish the struggle with his political opponents to finally enjoy the 
fruits of his labours is also suggested by his behaviour on Tsunayoshi's 
death. Here again some controversy exists about the true state of events. 
Rumours, such as those quoted by Arai Hakuseki, had it that the new sho-
gun was· making every effort to rid himself of his predecessor's favourite, 
. 170 
while other, more substantial evidence points to the contrary. If one 
may believe Eibyo gojitsuroku, Ienobu's main objective of having Yoshi-
yasu continue his duties was to give Manabe Akifusa time to learn the 
G d Ch mb l . 171 ropes as ran a er ain. Yoshiyasu 's immediate retirement would 
have permitted the Senior Councillors to regain the ground they had lost 
under Tsunayoshi and make it a very much harder task for Ienobu to ins-
tall his personal adviser as de facto leader of the government. With 
this in mind, the gossip surrounding Yoshiyasu' s retirement, which Ienobu 
correctly anticipated, makes sense. If the Senior Councillors wanted to 
win wider support for Yoshiyasu's early retirement, then it was in their 
interest to spread the rumour that "something was perhaps amiss" betwe<;m 
the new shogun and Yoshiyasu. Hearing that Yoshiyasu had fallen from 
grace and lost his influence, men would cease to support him; a situation 
from which the Senior Councillors would profit. 
Yoshiyasu, on the other hand, had little to gain from continuing to 
serve under Ienobu. Firstly, as he himself argued, he might be 
170. See above. Chapter II, Section 6. 
171. Eibyo, haru1 HJ, p.48. 
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criticised for disloyalty to his previous master• Secondly, his battle 
with traditional officials in the government was likely to grow in 
fierceness, his opponents being well aware that his ties with Ienobu 
were much weaker than those with Tsunayoshi. He was running the risk of 
being discredited in the new shogun's eyes and finally of losing the 
material benefits and status he had gained through his life's work. 
Contrary to traditional opinion, it appears to have been Ienobu who 
pressed for Yoshiyasu's continued service. Rather than condemning both 
his predecessor's policies and the men chosen to execute them, he was 
eager to take advantage of the gains Tsunayoshi had made at the expense 
of the traditional holders of authority. Although soon a~ter Tsunayo-
shi's death Ienobu personally informed the Senior Councillors that hence-
forth matters would no longer be solely handled by Yoshiyasu and that he, 
the shogun himself, would take an active interest in government af-
f · 172 · d'd · d' th h · d d th f airs, it i not in 1cate at e 1nten e to restore e power o 
the Senior Councillors nor that he opposed charrberlain government. 
Yoshiyasu was determined to retire and Ienobu had no choice but to take 
over the reins himself until Manabe Akifusa had grown into the position 
Yoshiyasu had achieved in three decades of hard work: 
Lord Eikeijil73 was in a position equal to Grand 
Councillor (tair3) and since he attended to business 
much weightier than the Senior Councillors, the Three 
Related Houses, Matsudaira Kaga no Kamil74 and various 
other daimyo made requests to him.175 
172. TJ, 44:5, 14D lM Hoei 6. 
173. Ybshiyasu. 
174. Maeda. 
175. Eibyo, aki. 
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. Due to his low samurai origin Yoshiyasu could not officially be 
appointed to the position of Grand Councillor or even Senior councillor. 
Yet it was this humble odgin which enabled Yoshiyasu to achieve his 
unique position of influence under the autocratic fifth shogun. Yoshi-
yasu's loyalties were undivided, and there was no danger that this would 
change even after he himself was enfeoffed with domains. The higher he, 
the upstart, was promoted by the shogun, the deeper would be the antago-
nism of the daimyo, and the growth of this antagonism would in turn spur 
Yoshiyasu's efforts to increase the authority of the shogunate. However 
much power the shogun vested in Yoshiyasu, the latter's controversial 
position did not permit him to abuse it. This made him also in Ienobu's 
eyes a highly desirable minister. 
Previous shogun also had had their advisers from hunible samurai 
background, but a newcomer had never reached a comparable position of 
influence. Yoshiyasu was a new breed of man, the product of unpreceden-
ted changes that were taking place in the government of the country. 
10. YOSHIYASU, JAPAN'S FIRST "PROFESSIONAL POLITICIAN?" 
Niccolo Macchiavelli advised his prince to choose advisers from 
amongst men who were unable to develop their own base of power. The 
prince or sovereign, moreover, ought to honour and enrich his servant, 
making him in his new-found position and wealth completely dependent 
upon his master so that - motivated by self-interest - he might vigour-
176 
ously oppose any change. Harold Bolitho in his Treasures Amongst Men 
suggests that if the Tokugawa had followed such a policy and "kept re-
cruiting their officials from modest backgrounds, rewarded them 
176. Niccolo Macchiavelli, The Prince, Chapter 22. 
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generously, given them domains in the Kanta, close to the centre of 
Tokugawa influence, and made clear to them that continued tenure of 
those domains depended upon their participation in Bakufu administrative 
duties," centralisation of governmant powers would have been likely .177 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu's career - which Bolitho lists as an exception -
followed the suggested path. Tsunayoshi to all intents and purposes 
adopted the policies of Macchiavelli by recruiting men without powerful 
frunily connections and rewarding them highly and placing them into a po~ 
sition where their total subsistence depended upon his personal favours. 
Max Weber saw this pattern of recruitmant as one of the basic re-
quirements for the functioning of the centralised state. 
In his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft he himself poses the question of 
how the politically dominant authorities assert their control and dis-
tinguishes between two fundamental mathods. Presupposing that the essen-
tial.s of political domination are control over both manpower and material 
goods, he differentiates between the state where the material goods are 
partly or totally owned by the individuals who administer them and that 
where the material goods are owned by the central authority and are ad-
ministered by agents on behalf of it. 
The former, his "'staendisch' gegliederter Verband" (association 
based on estate holders) is not termed feudal, but shares many features 
with the feudal pattern inasmuch as his Staende (estate holders) are de-
fined as private owners of military and other administrative means, fre-
quently using their position to better their own status and only selec-
tively and not permanently carrying on functions in the central adminis-
tration. Here the ruler divides his authority with the estate holders, 
177. Bolitho, Treasures, p.150. 
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who independently administer parts of his realm. The ruler's authority 
depends upon their loyalty and his usefulness to the estate holders in 
legitimising their own claim to power. 
In the second type of state the ruler uses agents solely dependent 
upon himself - with no outside source of power and no division of. inter-
ests - to administer material goods totally owned by himself. This form 
of political domination is seen as characteristic of all types of patr-
iarchal, patrimonial, despotic and modern bureaucratic states. 178 . 
According to Weber the initial impetus towards the development of 
the modern state arises from the ruler's attempt to strengthen his autho-
rity by acquiring for himself the material goods hitherto owned and ad-
ministered by the estate holders. This process makes it essential for 
the ruler to rely on the services of what Weber terms Berufspolitiker 
(professional politicians). lie notes: 
In the course of political expropriation, whi.ch took place 
in all countries of the world with varying degrees of suc-
cess, there appeared the first category of professional 
politicians in the second sense in the service of the sov-
ereign. 'l'hey were people who did not strive to become 
rulers themselves, like the charismatic leaders, but took 
service under political masters. They were at the dispo-
sition of the sovereign to fight his cause and the handling 
of political affairs provided them with material sustenance 
on the one hand and a psychological raison d'~tre on the 
other •..• In the past these professional politicians deve-
loped in the service of the sovereign in his fight with the 
estate holders; they functioned as his most important tool 
in his struggle for power and political ex;propriation.179 
Weber's term "professional politician in the second sense" requires 
some investigation, especially as he does not specify the meaning of 
"second sense. 11 
178. WG, pp.823-24, 827. 
179. WG, pp.826-27. 
He uses the word "politician" as a generic term, describing both 
the man who lives for politics in the idealistic sense, in.the past 
often furnishing his own means of support, and the man who lives off 
. 180 
politics in the material sense, such as the bureaucrat (Beamter). 
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The specification in the above-cited passage that the "professional poli-
tician in the second sense" is not interested in acquiring political 
power for himself, but prepared to serve and moreover considers this 
service as the ·basis of his livelihood, brings the meaning close to that 
of bureaucrat. Weber's definition of bureaucrat, however, is a strict 
one. It excludes, for instance, the early American civil servant, 
whoes career was terminated with each change of presidency. Neverthe- · 
less, in a different passage he concedes that such men could be called 
l . t. 1 b ( 1 . . h ) 181 po i ica ureaucrats po itisc e Beamte • The men the sovereign re-
cruited to aid him in his power struggle against the estate holders, no 
doubt similarly did not enjoy such security of service after the ruler's 
abdication or death and it appears justified to see Weber's "first cate-
gory of professional politician in the second sense" as early political 
bureaucrats. 
With the appearance of the professional politicians and the conse-
quent development of the bureaucratic machinery, the stage is set for 
the "leading politician." Weber sees him as a world-wide phenomenon. 
In the Near East he is the grand vizier, shouldering the responsibility 
for the sultan's goverrn:nent. In Europe he is the early diplomat, a man 
mostly of classical education who, inspired by the writings of Macchia-
velli, discussed politics as an art in the select company of his 
180. WG, p.830. 
181. WG, pp.830-32. 
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colleagues. In the Far East the Chinese statesman with classical train-
182 ing of the final period of division is cited as an example. 
Analysing the background of these politicians, Weber comes to the 
conclusion that universally they were drawn from outside the estate-
holding class. In India, Buddhist China, Lamaistic Mongolia, and also 
Japan, he considers the clergy an important element. Their education 
qualified them for political service and they usually had no ambitions 
to establish their descendants as rival political power. A second group 
were the literati to whom, however, Weber only assigns a significant 
role in the context of the scholar-officials of China. Further catego-
ries comprise the in;poverished aristocracy, the gentry particularly of 
the English model and the jurist, in his pure .form solely a European 
183 phenomenon. 
Does Weber's model have any significance for the period under re-
view? Did the newcomers under Tsunayoshi share any similarities with 
Weber's "professional politicians" and can Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu be con-
side red Japan's version of the "leading politician"? 
The fifth Tokugawa shogun also employed men outside the estate 
holding class - men not of daimyo status - in his quest for centralised 
authority. There was the clergy, as Weber mentioned, but also his lit-
erati find some equivalent in Tsunayoshi 's Confucian scholars. With the 
importance the shogun attached to the Chinese classics, their function 
as advisers gained in importance. In case of conflict, precedents cited 
in the Confucian writings served as guiding principle, and the scholars, 
by virtue of their intimate knowledge of the classics, thus even assumed 
182. WG, p.831; the period referred to is presumably that of the Northern 
and Southern Dynasty (nan-pei ch'ao). 
183. WG, p.826-27. 
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1 1 f . 184 some ega unction. The difference between occidental and Japanese 
law does not permit a comparison between the Confucian scholar and 
Weber's jurist, but the fact remains that both types of men were valu-
able to the ruler due to their ability to expertly argue a case. that re-
quired judgement. 
The impoverished aristocracy - which in Japan occupied a very dif-
ferent place due to the peculiar state of dual sovereignty of emperor 
and shogun - found no place in the government of the fifth shogun. Nor 
was there a group which could profitably be compared to Weber's gentry. 
In Tokugawa Japan their place as men of some education but often slender 
means was taken by the bannerrnan (hatamoto), the samurai directly emp-
loyed by the bakufu, Although strictly speaking some of them received 
their income like the daimyo, directly from landholdings, they did not 
share in the interests of the latter. Any loss of authority and decline 
in prosperity by the shogunate, signified deterioration of their living 
standards. Their fortunes were irrevocably tied to the central govern-
ment. 
The bannermen's background of dependence upon the ruler made them 
most eligible for the position of professional politician as described 
above. In line with Weber's theory, it was amongst this section of the 
samurai that Tsunayoshi was most successful in finding men suitable and 
willing to assist him in his struggle for central authority. 
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was of bannerman origin. His upbringing had 
conditioned him to serve and not to rule. From an early age he was 
aware of his dependence upon the favours of his master, and all his 
actions were shaped by this fact. His total energies were devoted to 
184. See below, Chapter IV, Section 3. 
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understanding his master's thought and perceiving his every wish, even 
before it was uttered. His upbringing in the shogun's household together 
with his somewhat reticent and serious nature and his great capacity for 
hard work, singled him out amongst his colleagues and eventually placed 
him in a leading position. However, even after Yoshiyasu reached great 
power, he remained content to serve the shogun and did not aspire to 
rule himself. His continued dependence upon the shogun was guaranteed 
by his humble origins and the animosity his promotion to high office had 
caused amongst the daimyo. He was, ideally suited and acted well in the 
role of Tsunayoshi' s "leading politician." 
Already before Yoshiyasu came to dominate the administration of the 
country the policies of the fifth shogun gave clear indication of the 
trend towards autocratic government. The so-called Tenna reforms, dis-
185 
cussed above, are an example of the shogun's efforts to centralise 
authority and also well demonstrate how - in line with Weber's theory -
the bureaucratisation of the government was an inevitable by-product of 
this process. To prevent the local Intendants from controlling and en-, 
riching themselves by the collection of tax, the shogun for the first 
time, ordered one of his senior ministers to specialise and be solely 
responsible for the collection of tax, paid in the form of rice, and the 
people who produced it. This was a break with tradition and a diversion 
from the traditional Chinese model on which Japan's bureaucracy had been 
based. Following, the Confucian thought that specialisation was not becoming 
186 to the superior gentleman, it had been assumed in the past that gen-
eral training in the classics and the practice of virtue were sufficient 
185. See above, Section 5. 
186. Confucian Analects, Book 2, Chapter 12; WG, p.610; Econoll\Y and 
Society, 3:1049. 
155 
for a senior minister to meet the challenges of government. It is indi-
cative of Tsunayoshi's pragmatic approach to the classics that he did 
not adhere to this principle, but instead made the rational decision 
that specialisation was essential for the efficient operation of a cen-
tral government. It is this early form of specialisation and this trend 
towards rational decision-making which distinguishes the developments in 
the bureaucracy of this period from what Weber calls the "patrimonial" 
bureaucracy of traditional China. 
In accordance with Weber's theory, Tsunayoshi's early attempts to 
centralise authority gave impetus to the development of a bureaucracy 
showing early signs of specialisation and rationalisation". In Yanagi-
sawa Yoshiyasu he eventually found a man who was well qualified to act 
as his "leading politician." It now remains to be seen whether - in 
line with Weber's theory - Yoshiyasu and the new officials wit-~ special-
ised experience in the bureaucracy became the shogun• s most important 
tool to gain power and succeed in political expropriation. To deal with 
this issue it is necessary to look at the major political policies and 
events of Tsunayoshi's so-called chamberlain government. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POLICIES OF CHAMBERLAIN GOVERNMENT 
Traditionally the policies of the three decades under the fifth 
Tokugawa shogun are seen in two distinct periods: the beneficial govern-
ment of Hotta Masatoshi, and the evil and corrupt administration of the 
Grand Chamberlains. This view implies that the responsibility for the 
policies of the latter period must rest at least partially on Yanagisawa 
Yoshiyasu's shoulders. A reappraisal of Yoshiyasu must therefore deal 
with two questions. Firstly, one must ask whether the much criticised 
policies of Tsunayoshi's later reign would have been put into practice if 
Yoshiyasu had not headed the administration during this period. If this 
question is answered in the negative, one must, secondly, look a.t these 
policies and consider whether they were in fact as evil and arbitrary as 
commonly asserted. 
The part Yoshiyasu played in Tsunayoshi' s government is controversi-
al. For historians writing during the Tokugawa period it was natural to 
lay the blame for the policies they so strongly criticised on the Grand 
Chamberlain rather than on the shogun himself, an ancestor of the present 
ruler and descendant of the great Ieyasu. When after the Meiji Restora-
tion writers were no longer obliged to keep the memory of the fifteen 
Tokugawa shogun sacred, some came to doubt whether this view was justi-
fied, a question which might have inspired Sakata to commence on the 
thirty years research for his monumental Kai shosho ason jikki. Some-
times historians argue that Yoshiyasu had no chance to win against the 
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headstrong and eccentric shogun and had no choice but to acquiesce if he 
wanted to keep his job; at least one writer suggests that he had no pol-
1 itical power whatsoever. Nevertheless, in spite of these suggestions 
the general view still prevails that Yoshiyasu must bear at least par-
tial blame for Tsunayoshi's later government. 
The sources furnish comparatively little evidence about the exact 
part Yoshiyasu played in policy making. What can be ascertained, though, 
is that the basic political trends were already present in Tsunayoshi's 
early years. Not only do the policies of that period spell out this 
fact, but also a work such as Hatta Masatoshi's YOgenroku makes it clear 
that such unorthodox tendencies as discarding the precedents set by pre-
vious shogun, harsh censorship of lax officials and daimyo, and some 
commitment to improve society were basic to the shogun's political thin-
king before the Grand Chamberlain came to power. 2 In fact the very rea-
son that Yoshiyasu came to head the administration of the country was 
' 
that he was willing to follow unconditionally the shogun's directives. 
In Tsunayoshi's own words, Yoshiyasu conducted the government as if he, 
the shogun, had given the orders himself. 3 
Yoshiyasu, consequently, cannot be regarded as the initiator of the 
political measures that characterised the latter half of Tsunayoshi 's 
reign. One must question, however, whether Tsunayoshi would have been 
able to put his unorthodox ideas into practice, if it had not been for a 
man like Yoshiyasu to administer them. In the previous chapter it has 
been shown that traditional officials were unwilling to execute t.~e sho-
gun's orders and that amongst the newcomers few men were able to meet 
1. Gomi Yasuke in Kodama Kota, Jimbutsu Nihon no rekishi, 13:19. 
2. See above Chapter III, Section 5. 
3. See above Chapter II, section 4. 
Tsunayoshi' s exacting standards. Yoshiyasu not only had an unusual 
capacity for hard work, able to satisfy the shogun's demands, but was 
also finely attuned to his thoughts as his attendant and disciple for 
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many years. His commitmant to the shogunate was a total one and Tsuna-
yoshi • s efforts to centralise authority found his ready support. Looking 
at the policies of Tsunayoshi's later reign, therefore, the hypothesis 
will be examined that Yoshiyasu was responsible for the political rnea-
sures inasmuch as he was the essential tool for their execution. 
The second question to be answered is whether the traditional as-
sumption that the pclicies of so-called chamberlain government were the 
manifestations of an evil and arbitrary administration. 
The fundamental contradictions inherent in the literature covering 
the period have already been mentioned. 4 While on one hand Tsunayoshi's 
government apparently brought great suffering to the people, the Genroku 
period - stretching over the central part of his reign - has always been 
known as a "golden age." Saikaku' s novels spell out clearly the eupho-
ric mood amongst the common people created by an economic boom unprece-
dented in Japanese history. The economic historian Oishi Shinzabur5 
confirmed by his study of village documents that, although condemned for 
misgovernment, the Genroku period was one of upward development and 
economic expansion. 5 Severe criticism of Tsunayoshi's reign also stands 
in stark contrast to the observations of a foreigner, who, writing back 
in his native countcy, had no reason to praise the shogunate. The 
German physician Kaempfer maintained not only that Tsunayoshi was "a 
Prince of great prudence and conduct," but also that he was "eminent for 
4. See above Chapter I, Section 1 and Chapter III, Section 3. 
5. Oishi, Genroku jidai, pp.2-3. 
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his singular clemency and mildness, though a strict maintainer of the 
Laws of the Country. Bred up in the Philosophy of Confutius, he governs 
the Empire, as the state of the Country and the good of his people re-
quire. Happy and flourishing is the condition of his subjects under his 
reign. 06 And yet Kaempfer was in no way ignorant of the everyday life 
of the common people. His detailed descriptions of customs, beliefs and 
laws as well as his reports of conversations with commoners, can leave 
no doubt that his judgement of Tsunayoshi was not based merely on the 
propaganda of high Japanese officials. 
The three most controversial issues of Tsunayoshi's later govern-
ment were the monetary reform, the Laws of Compassion and the judgement 
of the Forty-seven ronin incident. Generally they are seen as unconnec-
ted events resulting from the shogun's immoral behaviour: his spend-
thrift habits, fanatical love of animals and low regard for samurai 
values. Viewed from another angle, however, these three policies cover 
the fundamental issues involved in the establishment of central author-
ity. In Weber's terms the monetary reform was the expropriation of 
financial means, while both the Laws of Compassion and the judgement of 
the Forty-seven ronin represent different aspects of the expropriation 
of authority traditionally held by the samurai and especially the daimyo. 
With all three measures the military aristocracy stood to lose and their 
severe criticism of the policies might well have been motivated by this 
fact. 
This chapter, therefore, will examine the three major political 
issues of Tsunayoshi's later government in the context of the hypothesis 
that these issues typified the struggle for authority between the shogun 
6. Kaempfer, History, 3:336. 
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and the military aristocracy and that Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu acted as the 
essential tool to make the execution of these policies possible. 
1. THE MONETARY REFORM 
The monetary reform vies only with the Laws of Compassion for the 
distinction of being the worst law in Tokugawa history. 7 Yet examining 
in some detail the background of this controversial measure. it is at 
first difficult to understand why it caused such singular outrage 
amcngst contemporary writers and later historians alike. Especially in 
view of the fact that the major debasement of coinage took place under 
the sixth shogun and that this financial stratagem was repeated some ten 
times during the remaining part of the Tokugawa period, it is not easy 
to appreciate why the fifth shogun and his Grand Chamberlain Yanagi-
sawa Yoshiyasu, are even today so harshly censured by historians for 
adopting this policy to solve the government's monetary crisis. 8 
The official reasons for the debasement of the coinage were announ-
ced in an order of the eighth month of Genroku 8 (1695). The public was 
told that the minting of new coins had become necessary because the of-
ficial imprint on the old coins had worn off with age and that, due to 
the decreasing output of mines, available bullion was insufficient to 
9 
mint enough new coins to meet the increasing need for currency. 
Although not the whole story, these were certainly valid reasons. 
The original coinage minted in Ieyasu's time had been in circulation for 
7. E.g. Naito, Tokugawa jugodaishi, 6: 106. 
8. Ito, Nihon kinseishi, 2:134t Sakudo Yotaro, Kinsei Nihon kaheishi 
(Tokyo, 1958), p.120. 
9. Okurasho, Nihon zaisei keizai shiryo (Tokyo, 1922-1923), 2:568-69 
(henceforth cited as NZKS), translated by Bqlitho, "The Dog Shogun," 
p .135. 
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nearly one hu.~dred years and it is plausible that with its high purity 
10 the official imprint had worn off. In addition there could be no dis-
pute about an acute shortage of coinage in circulation. Expanding trade 
patterns, especially in the Genroku period, had brought the use of coin-
age to the remoter parts of the country. An increasing populatioh and 
11 growing urban centres further accentuated the need for legal tender. 
Moreover, factors such as the excessive export of coinage and the dest-
ruction of both bullion and coins stored in Edo castle during the great 
fire of Meireki had considerably reduced the amount of legal tender 
available. Such deficits hadpreviously been met by minting new coins 
at the old standard from the bullion produced by government mines~ Yet 
the decreasing output of the mines had made bullion so scarce that 
minting houses were out of business and petitioning the government to 
remint the old coinage to guarantee them their livelihood.12 The govern-
ment had already made attempts to remedy this shortage in bullion by re-
stricting foreign trade to a barter basis, thus preventing any further 
fl f . 1 13 out ow o precious meta s. All the same such measures did not suf-
fice and in the face of insufficient bullion and an increasing demand 
for legal tender the debasement of the coinage became an essential fin-
ancial measure. However, the fact which made the matter urgent was not 
so much the lack of currency throughout the country in general, but the 
10. The purity of the gold coins was 84.29 and those of the silver 
coins eighty percent. Oishi, Genrokl1 jidai, p.159. 
lL Honjo Eijiro, K.insei no Nihon (Tokyo, 1954), p.41; Sa.kudo, p.95; 
Oishi, Genroku jidai, p.159. 
12. Kurita, Edo jidai, 1:231-34; Muro Kyilso, Kenzan hisaku, pp.246-49; 
Taya, pp.155-56, 159, 162-64. 
13. E.S. Crawcour and Kozo Yamamura, "The Tokugawa Monetary System 
1787-1868," Economic Developm!!nt and Cultural Change, 18.4, Pt.l 
(1970), p.491. 
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financial plight of the shogunal purse in particular. Sakata in his Kai 
shBsho ason jikki writes: 
The shogun had informed his Senior Councillors, such 
as Okubo [Tadatorno] Kaga no Ka~i, of his desire to 
make a pilgrimage to Nikko. When they received this 
order they were in serious difficulties. Especially 
Tadatomo - though officer in charge of government fi-
nance - had no idea of restricting expenditure to the 
amount of income. since he had nei+.her calculated the 
income nor restricted expenditure, a heavy deficit had 
been accumulating year after year. At that time the 
government's yearly receipts amounted to approximately 
4,000,000 odd koku. Besides that, the income in cur-
rency came to 760,000 or 770,000 rgo. At any rate, a 
deficit could not be prevented. The shogunal order to 
prepare the pilgrimage was received at a time when the 
government treasury had reached a state of poverty and 
was in severe financial difficulties. It was impossible 
to conceal the situation. Tadatomo remonstrated with the 
shogun: "How can we suddenly produce 100,000 rgo for the 
unnecessary expense of a pilgrimage to Nikko in the mid-
dle of these difficulties, where due to the present heavy 
expenditure and lack of funds the reserves of previous 
reigns are nearly exhausted? In brief, your retainers 
can do no more than tender their apologies for being so 
careless.14 
It is impossible to determine on which dccumentation Sakata - who 
had access to the Yanagisawa archives in early Meiji - bases this 
account. At any rate, the tenacious relationship of interdependence be-
tween Tsunayoshi and his Senior Councillors described in this scene ac-
cords well with other examples of the Senior Councillor's behaviour.15 
It does not support, however, the traditional image of the spendthrift, 
completely autocratic shogun who, unlike his virtuous predecessors, 
squandered away the riches of the empire with his love for luxury, thea-
t · 1 f d t · t f l bu'lding. 16 It 's rica per ormances an vas proJec s o temp e ~ ~ 
14. Ason jikki, Vol.19, llD SM Genroku 8. 
15. See above Chapter III, Section 9. 
16. E.g. as described by Honjo, Kinsei no nihon, p.52. 
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doubtful whether the fifth shogun ever had the legendary vast stu-ns to 
waste. 
Previous shogun had escaped Tsunayoshi • s financial predicamant by 
making use of the enormous amounts of gold and silver stored in Ieyasu's 
time. The spoils of successful wars, profits from overseas trade.and 
the expanding output of government mines had made it possible for the 
founder of the TOkugawa line to cement his political ambitions for his 
descendants with huge reserves of bullion. 17 These reserves permitted 
the third shogun, Iemitsu, to finance such grandiose projects as the 
mausoleum at Nikko, eleven shogunal pilgrimages to the new sanctuary 
and his legendary parade to Kyoto with 300,000 men on which occasion he 
also distributed 10,000 kan of silver to the citizens of Edo and Kyoto.18 
Iemitsu, accustomed to affluence, obviously did not recognise the need 
to hand down some of the riches stored by Ieyasu to his descendants. 
In the reign of the fourth shogun the great.fire of Meireki taxed 
government resources still further. Reserves stored at Osaka and Sumpu 
had to be drawn upon to meet the enormous expense of rebuilding the 
castle and providing loans and cash payments to dairnyo and lower samurai 
as well as to the citizens of Eda for reconstruction.19 
Not even in years where no special events required additional out-
lay did the government's income balance its expenses. By Hoei 4 (1706) 
the yearly deficit amounted to above 200,000 rya. 20 Tsunayoshi's so-
called extravagances were minor compared with the expenditure of his 
father Iernitsu. Yet, however much he might have reduced his own 
17. Kurita, Edo dai , 1: 22 3- 2 4 • 
18. ibid., p.230; 1 kan = 8. 72 lb. 
19. ibid., pp. 620-23. 
20. Ason jikki, Vol.19, llD SM Genroku 8. 
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expenditure, government outlay could not be balanced by the income 
from shogunal tax rice and other various small levies. Once the gold·. 
and silver mines and Ieyasu's reserves had dried up, the bakufu was un-
able to follow the traditional pattern of financing the adminis.tration 
of the whole country from the proceeds of its own domain. 
I ' ' 21 d h' rt' eyasu, as pximus inter pares, expecte to cover is propo iona-
tely greater share of administration by his proportionately larger do-
main. Funds other than taxes had made it possible to adhere to this 
principle for nearly one hundred years in spite of a growing administra-
tive machinery. At the point whe.re these additional funds were exhaus-
ted, the bakufu was forced to match the changing conditions of national 
government with changes in its financial policy. 
Sakata describes in detail Tsunayoshi's plight at the point of time 
where tradition could no longer supply the answers to problems posed by 
rapidly changing circumstances. The Senior Councillors with their trad-
itional, non-specialised training were unable to cope with this unprece-
dented problem. "They were silent as if dumb." It was left to a man of 
much lower office but years of experience in government finance to work 
out a solution to this dilemma. Ogiwara Shigehide, at that time still 
Comptroller of Finance (kan.]o giramiyaku), 22 finally spoke up in the com-
pany of his seniors and argued that the government had no choice but to 
melt down the gold and silver coinage. By alloying it the government 
would be able to increase the coinage and not only solve its own finan-
cial problems, but also remedy the shortage of coinage in circulation. 
Apparently Shigehide's suggestion won unanimous approval. The decision 
21. See Eibyo, haxu; HJ, p.63. 
22. Ogiwara Shigehide was promoted to Superintendent of Finance in Gen-
roku 9, one year after this event. 
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to rernint was formally adopted by the Senior Councillors and subrni tted 
23 to the shogun. As a result the gold coins of Keicho (Keicho koban) 
which had contained 84.29 percent of gold were reduced to 57.37 percent, 
while in the silver coins the proportion of silver was decreased from 
eighty percent to sixty-four percent. Finally in Hoei 5 (1708) the 
copper coins were debased by minting the large toju sen. 24 
The debasement of the coinage resulted in considerable profits.for 
the government covering the deficit occurring each year. But the accu-
mulated profits were again soon exhausted. According to Ogiwara Shige-
hide this was not d\:!e te Tsunayoshi's spendthrift habits, but to a chain 
of natural disasters at the opening of the eighteenth century. Shige-
hide explained the situation to the sixth shogun, Ienobu, when the 
latter was faced with the decision of whether to further debase the 
coinage: 
In the reign of the previous shogun [Tsunayoshi] 
the yearly expenditure had been twice the income. 
With national finances having already taken a down-
ward turn, gold and silver coins were reminted from 
the ninth month of C,enroku 8 (1695). Frcm then on, 
the yearly public profit amounted to a total of ap-
proximately 5,000,000 ryo. This always covered the 
deficit. In the winter of Genroku 16 (1703), the 
damage caused by the great earthquake had to be re-
paired and the profits accumulated over the years were 
immediately exhausted. After that, government finances 
again showed a deficit. They were in the same state as 
before and therefore in the ,seventh month of Hoei 3 
(1706) the silver coinage was again rerninted. In spite 
of that the yearly deficit could not be covered and in 
the following spring a proposal of Tsushima no Kami 
Shigetorni25 was adopted and the toju daisen issued. 
23. Ason jikki, Vol.19, llD SM Genroku 8. 
24. Oishi, Genroku jidai, p.150. The toju sen was a large coin repre-
senting the value of ten individual sen, but containing much. less 
copper. 
25. Inagaki Shigetomi, Junior Councillor. 
(It is said that 5mi no Kami did not approve of 
this daisen.)26 Now, that the situation has to be 
quickly remedied, there is no other way but to re-
mint the coinage.27 
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Shigehide was well aware that his efforts to solve the government's 
unprecedented financial crisis with unprecedented measures was regarded 
with deep suspicion by many of the shogun's traditionally-minded offi-
cials. He tried to justify himself: 
Apparently people have been saying all sorts of 
things in private. Yet if we had not taken these 
measures, how, for instance, would we have been able 
to give relief in the case of an unforeseen disaster 
like that in the winter of Genroku 16 (1703)? In 
this way we can meet the needs of the times and when 
in future years the harvest is plenty and government 
finances show a surplus, it will be very easy to res-
tore t.'ie coinage to its old state. 28 
Also under the sixth shogun, Shigehide's proposal to debase the 
coinage found approval with officials; approval not given because it was 
felt that changing conditions justified "breaking the laws of the fore-
fathers," but simply because no one present had the technical knowledge 
to discuss any of the finer points, let alone to suggest an alternative 
solution. only the shogun, apparently, objected strongly. "Who knows, 
if in the first place the coinage had not been rerninted, there might not 
have been one natural disaster after another?" he questioned, and voiced 
the fear that continued debasement of the coinage was tantamount to in-
viting further calamities on the heads of the hapless population and 
might even lead to the end of the illustrious Tokugawa line. 29 
26. Note added by Arai Hakuseki. Omi no Kami = Ogiwara Shigehide. 
27. Ori taku shiba no ki, p. 233. 
28. ibid., p.234. 
29. ibid., pp.234-35. 
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It is debatable whether the sixth shogun really had such apprehen-
sions or whether Hakuseki later considered it his duty to add this pas-
sage so as to demonstrate that the sixth shogun was opposed to further 
debasement of the coinage. At any rate, such argument could net longer 
stop the rational decision that further devaluation was essential to 
save the government's finances. 1\nd although Hakuseki would have paste-
rity believe that it happened without Ienobu's knowledge, it is more 
likely that the shogun - if he did not approve - simply turned a blind 
eye to the devaluation, which not only provided funds for the running of 
the country, but also for the construction of ~plendid new shogunal 
30 quarters. Three times Ienobu rejected Hakuseki's pleas to remove 
Shigehide, pointing out that there was no one else qualified to run the 
financial affairs of the countcy. Only when Ienobu was approaching 
death, after several months of incapacitating illness, did Hakuseki fi-
31 
nally succeed in having Shigehide sacked and the reminting stopped. 
The official order to repeal t.'oe reminting was drafted by Hakuseki him-
32 
self mere than a year after Ienobu's death. By then Ogiwara Shigehide 
too, was no longer alive, having died a mysterious death. Only at this 
point did Hakuseki manage to have him, his fiercest opponent, denounced 
as a criminal, guilty of one of the greatest crimes: that of violating 
the laws of the forefathers. 33 
As a last service to his master, Hakuseki strove to convince the 
world that the base act of recoinage had never been sanctioned by the 
30. Oritaku shiba no ki, pp.300, 305. 
31. ibid., pp.300, 308; TJ, 44:245, 110 9M Shotoku 2. 
32. ibid., p.361; TJ, 44:378-79, 15D SM Shotoku 4. See also Orita.ku 
shiba no ki, p.319-20, for ru.~ours that Hakuseki was responsible 
for stopping th.e minting. 
33. ibid., pp.360-63, 
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sixth shogun, but was carried out by Ogiwara Shigehide in secret. Pre-
viously he had already decided that Ienobu's shame in dancing ni5 was not 
t d 1. n h · t · 34 o go own 1s ory. Now he similarly saw to it that the shame of 
recoinage did not rest with his dead master and that its repeal was seen 
as Ienobu's last wish. 35 His efforts were successful. Historians even 
today maintain that the sixth shogun, while enjoying the profits of the 
monetary reform and repeatedly rejecting Hakuseki's proposals for sacking 
ogiwara Shigehide, was not aware that the coinage was reminted. 
Why was the monetary reform a political measure which earned the 
fifth shogun the harshest criticism and provoked a man like Hakuseki to 
such desperate attempts to deny the sixth shogun• s knowledge of it? 
When the eighth shogun, Yoshirnune - who contrary to Tsunayoshi has 
been greatly praised for his wise government - encountered financial 
difficulties, he attempted to solve this crisis by asking for special 
contributions from the daimyo. Like any government's efforts to obtain 
funds, it was not a popular measure, but neither did it attract the cri-
ticism of being immoral, a crime. Yoshimune 's measures conformed to the 
old feudal pattern where a lord had the right to call for assistance 
from his vassals. The daimyo's contributions to the shogunal purse were 
not voluntary. The fact, however, that the matter was only concluded 
after ample discussion with all concerned, and that the shogun himself 
made concessions to :make up for the levy, shows that here the daimyo had 
36 
some control over financial arrangements. 
34. See above Chapter I, Section 3. 
35. See oritaku shiba no ki, pp.226-27, and next section where Hakuseki 
claims that this procedure had been adopted with the repeal of the 
Laws of Compassion. 
36. The contribution was called agemai and was levied in Kyoho 7 (1722). 
It called for 100 koku for each 10,000 koku of a daimyo's revenue. 
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The debasement of the coinage was no more than a similar demand up-
on the shogun's subjects to contribute to national finance. The way this 
contribution was levied, however, made it compulsory, not negotiable. 
Any decision of how much to contribute was firmly taken out of the hands 
of the daimyo. It was in fact a first claim to the right of taxation. 
In some way akin to modern tax, it was in the first instance a charge 
37 proportionate to the individual's monetary wealth. It was revolution-
ary because .it implied that people - regardless whether they lived in 
the shogunal domain or in a han - were all directly the subjects of the 
shogun upon whose weal th he could draw, should the need arise. The dai-
myo, traditionally the intermediary between the people and the ruler, 
had been cut out. As never before in Tokugawa history, they were given 
to understand that matters of currency and national finance were being 
handled by the central government without their interference. 
"Producing currency is a matter for the state. It would not make 
38 the slightest difference if rubbish were substituted for currency." 
In re.turn the period of residence required under the sank.in kotai 
system was shortened by half. Daimyo whose presence was required 
at Edo, only had to pay one-third of the above amount. Ito, Nihon 
kinseishi, 2:122-23. 
37. No thorough study has as yet been done on how the debasement effec-
ted the financial position of the various strata of society. The 
often-made claim that people and samurai alike suffered because of 
the resulting rise in prices is based on works like those of Arai 
Hakuseki which suffer from the bias with which their authors regar-
ded the debasement. Prices of rice rose much quicker than those of 
other consumer goods, giving both samurai and farmers higher incomes 
without greatly increased e:xpenditure. A complicating factor in de-
termining the economic effects of the debasement is also the chain 
of natural disasters occurring at the end of the Genroku period, de-
stroying several harvests. In spite of these occurrences, however, 
peasants and samurai alike were financially in a better position 
during the years of Genroku and H6ei than during the years of Kyoho 
(1716-1736) when the price of rice fell, reducing their income sig-
nificantly (see Yamamura, p.43). 
38. Sanno gaiki, p.11. 
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These words appear in Sanno ga.i.ki as those spoken by Ogiwara Shigehide. 
The work was written to mock Tsunayoshi' s government and also this quo-
tation must be regarded as fictitious. The author was attempting to 
show to what absurd extremes Tsunayoshi's financial policy could have 
led. Absurd though these financial policies were to a man living· in the 
early eighteenth century, the statement attributed to Ogiwara Shigehide 
more or less accurately describes the situation today, indicating how 
Tsunayoshi' s financial policies foreshadowed later developments. 
The measures Yoshimune adopted to solve his financial problems had, 
on the contrary, feudal characteristics. Maruyama Masao wrote on this 
subject: 
One of the major characteristics of a feudal society 
is the preservation of the ordered unity of the total 
structure by linking together in layers closed, self-
contained social spheres ••.• Politically, this takes 
t.'le form of the principle o.f indirect control . The 
economic basis for the politics corresponding to this 
indirect control is distributed separately inside each 
social layer. What we have here is a typical case of 
what Max Weber called a combination of der personliche 
[sic] Verwaltungsstab (personal administrative staff) 
and das sachliche Verwaltungsmittel (material adminis-
trative means). 
Maruyama explains further: 
Thus the basic principle here is that the head of each 
closed social sphere defrays his own political expenses. 
The spirit of this practice is seen in Shogun Yoshimune's 
pronouncement, issued to the daimyo when, unable to pay 
his housemen's stipends, he was compelled to ask them for 
rice contributions (agemai), which said: "This request 
is made regardless of shame • .,39 
39. Masao Maruyama, Studies in the .rntellectual History of Tokugawa 
Japan (Tokyo, 1974), p.243. 
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It is curious that Maruyama does not here take the next logical 
step of identifying Tsunayoshi's financial policies - which were the op-
posite of Yoshimune's - with the contrasting situation in Weber's model. 
The.situation where the ruler, without any shame, attempts to gain con-
trol of the financial means of his vassals and has them administered by 
his own staff, resulting in a separation between administrator and admi-
. t . 40 nis rat1ve means. 
Yoshimune kept to feudal etiquette in his attempts to balance the 
government's deficit. By admitting shame in asking the daimyo for their 
contributions he further weakened his position as feudal overlord; for 
there was no question that in the latter position he traditionally had 
the right of asking his vassals for contributions, although in the past 
such tribute was commonly paid in the form of labour or raw materials 
41 
rather than money. Yoshimune placed himself in a position of primus 
inter pares with the dairnyo, implying by his "shameful" request that the 
shogunate, like the daimyo, ought to be able to defray its own expenses •. 
Tsunayoshi, on the contrary, saw himself as the abs.elute ruler of 
the whole country. He was t.he central authority who had the right to 
receive contributions not just from t.~e shogunal domains, but from 
every one of his subjects. It is not surprising then, that the daimyo 
objected strongly to this interference in their hitherto "closed social 
sphere." All the more so as other policies accompanying the monetary 
reform further emphasised this political trend. 
Under the fourth shogun Ietsuna, a number of dorrains had been given 
permission to issue their own paper currency and by the time Tsunayoshi 
40. See above, Chapter III, Section 10. 
41. E.g. under Iemitsu there were "massive daimyo levies." Totman, p.77. 
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succeeded as shogun, fifteen han were producing their own money. A 
lesser number of permits was still issued during the first years of 
Tsunayoshi's rule, but by Hoei 2 (1704) the matter came under investiga-
tion and no further permits were issued. 42 The han were forced to use 
the new coinage, and the daimyo had to relinquish one of their privil-
eges. For they, apparently, even earlier than the bakufu, had had the 
idea of boosting their ailing finances by issuing more currency than the 
bullion in their possession. This became evident in Hoei 1 (1704) when 
at the confiscation of Ako han of Forty-seven ronin fame, the local 
. . . . . d 43 
authorities lacked the bullion to exchange the paper money issue • 
It was not until Kyoho 15 (1730) under the eighth shogun that per-
missions for the issue of han satsu were again given by the bakufu. 
After the revaluation, that had taken place during the early years of 
Kyoho to restore the currency to its original purity, the country was 
faced with an acute shortage of coinage in circulation. By permitting 
the han to issue their own paper money, Yoshimune hoped to remedy this 
situation. 44 The paper money of the han - not possessing its worth in 
bullion - was akin to Tsunayoshi's debased coinage. Sanna gaiki had 
mocked the issue of "rubbish" as legal tender, but in this case the dai-
myo rather than the central government, stood to profit, and no criti-
cism was heard. 
Deprived by Tsunayoshi of their privilege of issuing their own ten-
der, the daimyo were not even permitted the freedom to stipulate whether 
42. Nihon ginko chosa kyoku, Hansatsu gaiyo (Tokyo, 1964), pp.21, 23-4; 
Taya, p .184. 
43. Kodama Kota, Genroku jidai, Vol .16 in Nihon no rekishi (Tokyo, 1966), 
p. 348. 
44. Kitajima, Eda bakufu no kenryoku kozo, p.624. 
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on sale of their tax rice they were to receive credit in silver or gold 
units. Orders that both silver and gold were to be accepted were issued 
on a national scale and neither individual daimyo nor the area under 
. 45 
their jurisdiction could claim exemption from these laws. Bakufu in-
terference was again felt when an attempt was made to fix officially the 
exchange rate between gold, silver and copper coins. 46 
The decline of daimyo influence in matters of finance further be-
came apparent with orders like that of Genroku 11 (1698), which stipula-
ted that any difficulties en=untered in enforcing the official monetary 
policies, either in shogunal or daimyo domains, should be reported to 
Ogiwara Shigehide. 47 And while t.~e new laws were strictly policed by 
one of the new men of lowly origin, another of the so-called upstarts 
was enfeoffed with a domain which by virtue of its tradition was exemp-
ted from the rules of centralisation and permitted to continue minting 
its own currency: in Hoei 4 (1707) Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was authorised 
by the shogun to mint gold coins in his domain of Kai. 48 
The monetary reform and related policies not only threatened 
the financial independence of the daimyo, but also, as never before, 
showed up the weakness of their representatives in the bakufu in rela-
tion to the new men. Ogiwara Shigehide's position, first as Comptroller 
of Finance (kanjo gimmiyaku) and later as Superintendent of Finance 
(kanji5 bugyo) was a lowly one in the hierarchical order of the adminis-
tration compared with those of the Senior Councillors. Yet when faced 
45. Tokutomi, Genroku jidai, 17': 282-83, 291; NZKS, 2: 574, 12M Genroku 
14. 
46. WZKS 2:573, llM Genroku 13; 2:581 urii lM Haei 5. 
47. NZKS, 2:571, lM Genroku 11. 
48. NZKS, 2:575-80. 
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with the bakufu's financial crisis, the latter were forced to accept 
Shigehide's proposals which went against their own interests. It was an 
example of what Weber terms "domination through knowledge" (Herrschaft 
49 kraft Wissen), characteristic also of the modern bureaucracy. 
Historians have argued at length whether Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was 
responsible for the recoinage under Tsunayoshi 'Which, officially, was 
carried out under the direction of the Senior Councillor Okubo Tada-
so tomo. Arai Hakuseki noted in Oritaku shiba no ki: 
It is said that in the previous reign [Tsunayoshi's] 
Kaga no Kami Tadatomo administered national expendi-
ture. However, as in reality it was entrusted solely 
to Omi.no Kami Shigehide, he, in conjunction with Mino 
no Kami Yoshiyasu and Tsushima no Kami Shigetomi, did 
the planning and thus Kaga no Kami was unacquainted 
with the details.51 
Sakata in his thorough reappraisal of Yoshiyasu takes iss.ue with 
Hakuseki's statement that Tsunayoshi's new men, like Yoshiyasu, were re-
sponsible for the recoinage. He points out that besides Okubo Tadatomo, 
Abe Masatake, also a Senior Councillor, was named General Superintendent 
(sobugyo) in charge of the recoinage and that the Junior Councillor, 
K.ato P..kihide, was made his deputy. Referring to Hakuseki 's above-cited 
passage, he writes: 
The statement that other people took no interest: [in 
the monetary reform] is a lie. Can anyone imagine 
that the authority of the General Superintendent and 
his deputy was ignored in favour of that of the diame-
trically opposed Grand Chamberlain?52 
49. WG, pp.128-29; Economy and Society, 1:225. 
50. E.g. Tsuji, Nihon bunka shi, betsuroku, 3, pp.746-47. 
51. Oritaku shiba no ki, p.232. 
52. Ason jikkJ., Vol.19, llD BM Genroku 8. 
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Sakata is wrong. 'l'he l!K)netary reform was one occasion when the new 
men - such as Shigehide and Yoshiyasu - could demonstrate par excellence 
the power they had achieved by virtue of their specialised knowledge and 
total commitment to their duties. Although the upper military aristo-
cracy still occupied what was traditionally regarded as the most senior 
offices in the bakufu, their influence was on the decline, especially 
when on a technical issue, such as the monetary reform, the new men co-
operated on several levels of the administration. 
It is not surprising, then, that the upper military aristocracy in 
future decades was to look back with loathing at the policies which sig-
nified for them perhaps the lowest point of their declining authority 
under Tsunayoshi, and that furthermore, they would unanimously condemn 
the men - Ogiwara Shigehide and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu - whose co-opera-
tion had made it possible for the shogunate to place them in this posi-
tion. In Weber's terms these two officials had become tools in the 
ruler's efforts of political expropriation. The monetary reform signi-
fied expropriation on both the material level and in more abstract terms 
of political authority. 
It is more difficult to explain Arai Hakuseki's violent opposition 
to these policies which would strengthen the authority of the sixth sho-
gun and his Grand Chamberlain, Manabe Akifusa, with whose fortunes his 
own career was intrinsically linked. Certainly there would have been 
the factors of his personal opposition to, and rivalry with Shigehide 
and Yoshiyasu, the men who stood for these financial policies and his 
frustration when Shigehide remained in office after Ienobu became shogun. 
Secondly, one must wonder whether Hakuseki's total admiration for 
samurai values and Tokugawa tradition did not perhaps blind him to the 
political measures required by the changing social conditions. 
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Apparently Hakuseki, like Yoshiyasu, was hated by many of the con-
d . 53 temporary aimyo. But in spite of this animosity, his reputation, un-
like that of Yoshiyasu, remained unscathed. No slanderous documents ap-
peared after he relinquished his position on Yoshimune's accession, and 
Japanese and Western historians alike have always praised his scholarly 
accomplishments and political foresight. The question whether his trad-
itional political views were altogether appropriate for the period he 
lived in and whether his scholarship was indeed so superior to that of 
his contemporary colleagues, needs careful investigation. With the dis-
torting influence traditional prejudice can exercise upon the writing of 
history, it would be worthwhile to examine whether Hakuseki 's political 
judgement and scholarly works deserve the high praise they have been ac-
corded, or whether the same forces which blackened Yoshiyasu's name as-
sured Hakuseki's lasting fame, once his position as staunch supporter of 
traditional samurai values was established. 
2. "THE LAWS OF COMPASSION" AND BENEVOLENCE 
There is only one policy for which Tsu.~ayoshi and his Grand Chamber-
lains are even more severely criticised than the monetary reform: that 
of the so-called Laws of Compassion. Debasing the coinage is one matter 
and the effects on the economy are open to debate, but - it appears -
little can be said in excuse when historians vividly recount how men 
were executed in the name of benevolence for cruelty to dogs and how 
54 prisons overflowed with thousands awaiting trial for similar offences. 
53 .. E.g .. Hakuseki was nicknamed oni, "devil.u Muro KyUsO, Kenzan 
hisaku, p.412. 
54. This claim is made by Hakuseki, Ori taku shiba no ki, p. 226. 
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So strong was the impact of Tsunayoshi's unprecedented orders for 
the protection of dogs and other animals that he went down in history as 
the "Dog Shogun" (inu kubo). 55 It is true, Tsunayoshi was born in the 
Year of the Dog (1646) according to the twelve-year cycle of the Chinese 
calendar, and so were his two favourite ministers, Makino Narisada 
(b. 1634) and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (b. 1658), the fonner being twelve 
years his senior and the latter twelve years his junior. However, it 
was not simply this historical coincidence which earned TSunayoshi this 
unflattering nickname and prompted historians to refer irreverently to 
the ruler and his two Grand Chamberlains as "the three dogs," but the 
utter moral indignation at the so-called Laws of Compassion promulgated 
during their government. 
A re-examination of the sources reveals that this emotional subject 
led to a luxurious growth of fabrications. 
The story goes that the fifth shogun, on the death of his only son, 
turned to the Buddhist priesthood for their prayers in his intense desire 
for an heir. He was encouraged in his religious devotions by his mother, 
Keisha-in, apparently a fanatically religious, but uneducated woman. Her 
favourite priest, the Shingon monk, RyUk5, took advantage of Tsunayoshi's 
desperate situation and managed to obtain a great amount of favours. 
h'hen the prayers did not produce the desired result, the crafty, sly 
monk blamed Tsunayoshi, suggesting that the reason for not being blessed 
with an heir, was that he, the shogun, had taken many a life in his pre-
vious existence. The only way to lift this curse would be to cherish 
and protect all animals, but especially dogs, as he had been born in the 
Year of the Dog. Spurred on by his pious mother, the shogun promulgated 
55. Bolitho, "The Dog Shogun," p.128. 
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a great number of laws for the protection of animals, severely punishing 
any transgressions, "so that in the end animals became m::ire important 
56 than humans . 11 
To this day some historians still maintain that the Laws of Compas-
sion resulted from Ryilko 's false counsel, although already in 1917 the 
scholar Miyazaki Eiga, after a thorough examination of the monk's diary, 
wrote: 
The thing I find m::ist extraordinary is that in the 
whole of RyUko's diary there is not a single entry 
referring to the Laws of Compassion or laws protec-
ting dogs. It seems to be common for people who des-
cribe the relationship between Ryiiko and the bakufu 
to pay attention to the. matter of "compassion," but 
in RyUko's diary there is not a single allusion to 
this topic.57 
Miyazaki points out that the first of the laws were promulgated 
some years before Ryilko came to Edo and had any dealings with the bakufu 
and that thus the monk could not possibly have been the instigator of 
these orders. 
While there is no mention of compassion towards dogs or other ani-
mals in the diary, it does, however, indicate that the monk at times was 
better informed about matters of state than either the Senior Councillors 
or the Three Related Houses, such as in the matter of Ienobu's 
56. Furuta RyOichi, "ShOrui awaremi no rei ni tsui te, n Nihon rekishi, 
20:22 (1949). T'nere is a great amcunt of literature on this sub-
ject such as Shinshi Yoshimoto, "O inu sama," Nihon rekishi, 260 
(1970); Takayanagi Mitsunaga, "Shorui o awaremi," Chuo shidan, 10:6 
(1925) i Takigawa Masajiro, "Inu ni kansuru ritsuryo no hosei," Nihon 
rekishi, 260 (1970); Kuwata Tadachika, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi to Gen-
roku jidai (Tokyo, 1975), pp.94-150; Shigeno Yasutsugu, "Tokugawa 
Tsunayoshi (Joken' in) jiseki," in Shigeno Hakase sh.igaku rombun sh ii 
(Tokyo, 1939), 3:34-35, etc. 
57. Miyazaki Eiga, "Gojiin Rytiko sojo no nikki ni tsuite," Rekishi 
chiri, 30.3 (1917), p.46. 
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succession.58 This shows not only that the diary was of private nature 
and that any secret discussions with the shogun concerning cottq:>assion to-
wards animals was likely to have been recorded, but also that Ryi'iko would 
have earned the deep resentment of traditional officials and senior dai-
myo for sharing the shogun's confidence in matters to which they were not 
made party. Non-violence towards all living creatures is a Buddhist con-
cept, and it was natural for the military aristocracy tc lay the blame for 
these much hated laws at the feet of the equally despised Buddhist monk. 
The story that RyUko was the instigator of the Laws of Compassion 
and that their promulgation was due to the shogun's misguided religious 
fervour rather than true compassion is based on Sanno gaiki and Gokoku 
'h 'k. 59 k . f h . ' onna ~ai ei 1, two wor s notorious or t eir spuriousness~ More reli-
able sources - such as Kaempfer's diary - merely indicate that people 
were aware of the rather obvious connection between the shogun's year of 
60 birth and the unaccustomed protection of dogs, but do not mention th.at 
the Laws of Compassion were brought about by Eyiiko's guileful advice to 
Tsunayoshi. 
Historians have frequently been extremely indiscriminating when 
looking for evidence to substantiate the horrors resulting from t.qese 
laws. Thus an article in the 1970 edition of Nihon rekishi claims that 
with Tsunayoshi's consent, over three hundred people were executed daily 
for offences against dogs. 'rhe author makes no comment on the credibi-
61 ' lity of his source, the eighteenth century Kora chawa. He also fails 
58. See above, Chapter III, Section 4. 
59. Sanna gaiki, p.3; Gokoku onna taiheiki, pp.53-54. 
60. Kaempfer, History, 1:196-200. 
61. Shinshi, "O inu sama," pp.172-73, citing Koro chawa, Vol.6 in Nihon 
zuih.itsu taise.i (Tokyo, 1927-1931), pp. 72-73. 
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to point out that no mention is made of such horrors in any contemporary 
source. A keen critic of Tsunayoshi's government, like for instance 
Arai Hakuseki, would surely not have failed to mention such sensational 
injustice. 
Murdoch's editor, Longford, similarly failed to check his sources 
in his enthusiasm for describing the evils of Tsunayoshi' s reign. He 
quotes the English translation of Kaempfer 's travelogue as "Nobody may, 
under severe penalties, insult or abuse these dogs, and to kill them is 
a capital crime, whatever mischief they do. 062 The text cited, however, 
continues in Kaempfer's History of Japan: "In this case notice of their 
misdemeanours must be given to their keepers, who are alone empower'd to 
chastise and to punish them. 063 An exact translation of the original 
German text would be: "By punishment of death nobody may maltreat or 
kill them, except for the bailiff, when the dogs themselves have commit-, 
ted a crime and deserve to be killed.'064 Kaempfer's original report 
that dogs could only be killed under special circumstances differs con-
siderably from Longford's suggestion that they could never be killed. 
In a somewhat similar vein the translation of Kaempfer's travelogue 
states that all pet dogs had to be fed and cared for at the expense of 
local communities, while the German original indicates that only stray 
d d f . h 65 ogs were care or in sue a way. 
In the face of such uncritical acceptance of the. horrors that appa-
rently resulted from Tsunayoshi' s Laws of Compassion, it is essential to 
re-e.xrunine. the subject. 
62. Murdoch, 3:196, fn.l. 
63. Kaempfer, History, 1:198. 
64. Engelbert Kaempfer, Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan (Stutt-
gart, 1964), 1:141-42. 
65. ibid., and Kaempfer, History, 1:197. 
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To begin with the so-called Laws of Compassion are not laws in the 
modern sense of the word. They are a set of orders to officials and the 
people informing them of the shogun's wishes and explaining his motives, 
frequently spiced with exhortations to do their best. On various occa-
sions the "laws 11 do no more than correct, amplify, and ex.plain previous 
instructions when these had not resulted in the kind of behaviour hoped 
for by the shogun. Consequently when the nature of these orders is'exa-
mined, the conclusion of one modern historian, Kimura Motoi, that issuing 
th . . . . 1 "1 " . . . h dn 66 l . 1rty-s1x sinu ar aws in nine years is s eer ma ess oses consi~ 
derable weight. 
Secondly, and closely connected with Kimura• s statement, is the 
problem of establishing the actual numbers of the Laws of Compassion and 
placing them in their context. There are a number of collections of 
such official orders, but none is complete. Comparing these collections 
it is frequently difficult to define whether a certain order is merely 
differently worded or presents an addition not recorded elsewhere •. Con-
sequently it is virtually impossible to determine the total number of 
orders issued by t.~e bakufu on this topic. 
Perhaps in an effort to overcome this problem,Kimura, in his exami-
nation of the Laws of Compassion, limited himself to those orders recor-
ded in Tokugawa jikki. 
The drawback is that this work is a compilation of various sources 
representing facts which the compiler deemed worthy to record, and not a 
complete body of official orders. A flaw in Kimura's evaluation of this 
material is also the fact that he did not compare his "thirty-six laws 
in .nine years" to other orders. If he had, he might have come to the 
66. Kimura Motoi, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," Kitajima Masamoto, Tokugawa 
shogun retten (Tokyo, 1974), p.169. 
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conclusion that other regulations, ranging from the hire of palanquins to 
the prevention of fires, required similar or even more frequent repeti-
tion. 
The eclectic nature of Tokugawa jikki combined with eclectic usage 
of the material leads to a distortion of facts. Kimura summarises an 
. 67 
order of Genroku 6 (1693) as "do not fish, fishing boats are forbidden." 
The actual order is recorded in Tokugawa jikki as follows: 
At a time when the concept of compassion towards all 
animate creation is supposed to flourish, it is ex-
tremely unreasonable to trail hooks behind boats and 
kill carelessly. A recent inquiry has shown that the 
number of delinquents would be great. Therefore, to 
begin with, the City Magistrate (machi bugyo) is in-
structed to forbid small fishing boats. Henceforth 
violators must be arrested.68 
The above order outlines the reasons for this prohibition. Never-
the less, it still leaves the historian puzzled as to how - under these 
circumstances - the shogun could frequently include fish in his presents 
to his retainers and why orders fixing the price of fish were issued.69 
Similarly, orders regulating the brightness of fishing lights are diffi-
cult to explain. This puzzle can only be solved when one looks at orders 
in other sources which limit fishing and the use of fishing boats to pro-
fessional fishermen (ryoshiJ. 70 The above-cited order obviously at some 
stage presupposed this knowledge and could reasonably be interpreted as 
referring to fishing for pleasure. 
To gain some idea of the relative frequency of orders I have ana-
lysed the Laws of Compassion in the limited context of Shoho jiroku. 
67. Kimura, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p.168. 
68, TJ, 43:175, 16D BM Genroku 6. 
69. SJ, 1:288-89, No.797. 
70. Arai Eiji, Kinsei no gyoson (Tokyo, 1970), p.11. 
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Compiled in 1778 by an anonY!OC)US City Headman (machi nanushi) it con-
tains official orders issued by the City Magistrate (machi bugyo) of Edo 
to the City Councillors (znachidoshiyori) for proclamation to the people, 
covering the years 1648-1775. 
For the thirty years of Tsunayoshi' s reign a total of 624 orders 
are recorded of which sixty-six mention animals. Some refer to animals 
in general: sick animals must not be abandoned, animals dying a natural 
dh bb . h . 71 eat must e uried and not sold, unters only may shoot animals, etc. 
Other orders concern certain species in particular, stipulating, for in-
stance, that live or barbecued water lizards are not to be sold, snakes 
not be used for medicine, and that bears, wild boars and wolves are to 
b h t l h k . d h . b . 72 e s o on y w en attac 1ng, an ot erwise to e driven away. 
The majority of regulations concern those animals most closely con-
nected with eve:cyday life: dogs, horses, birds and fish. Some orders 
treat s.everal animals together and others dwell at length on one species, 
making it difficult to determine the relative frequency with which, for 
instance, dcgs are mentioned. Some attempt has been made all the same: 
Number of orders 
Species 
concerning mainly concerning several 
one animal animals 
Dogs 23 5 
Birds 13 6 
Horses 7 2 
Fish 4 5 
71. SJ, 1:253, No.713; 1:286, No.790, 1:324, No.885. 
72. SJ, 1:257, No.723; 1:284, No.783; 1:302, No.821. 
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The above table shows that there were significantly more orders 
concerning dogs than any other animal. It does not necessarily imply, 
however, that the dog was the animal most dear to the heart of the sho-
gun. In a system where orders were repeated when not adequately obser-
ved, it may simply demonstrate that the enforcement of the regulations 
concerning the protection of dogs was fraught with special problems. 
Already in JOkyo 3 (1686), only twelve months after the first order 
concerning dogs had been. issued, it became evident that the shogun's 
plan to teach benevolence to his people by forcing,tbem: to care for ani-
rnals would be difficult to realise. On the contrary, the shogun's un-
precedented directives appear to have had just the opposite effect, as 
the order quoted below indicates: 
Although previously there have been detailed 
instructions, now, when a rnasterless dog comes along, 
people do not feed it. Further, we have heard that 
people no longer exchange dogs with each other. It 
looks as if people have misunderstood what has been 
ordered concerning compassion towards living beings. 
It is vital that the intention to be compassionate 
towards living beings permeates everything ••. 73 
In the next year {1687) it became apparent that the problems of re-
educating the people in the way Tsunayoshi had envisaged would be com-
pounded by a lack of cooperation and understanding on the part of his 
ministers. The Senior Councillors' so-called "misunderstanding" of the 
74 
shogun's directives was an indication of this fact. They obviously 
could see no point in Tsunayoshi's efforts to change the traditional va-
lues of society and they would not lend him the support their pcsition 
required of them. 
73. SJ, 1:250, No.704. 
74. See above Chapter III, Section 6. 
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More junior officials were similarly reluctant to execute the sho-
gun's orders. There being no precedent of shogunal directives to teach 
"benevolence" to the people, they were at a loss of how to handle the 
situation. With local officials being uncertain about the new policy, 
enforcement of the laws was often arbitrary, and the people, whom the 
officials were Sl'.\PPOSed to instruct, were left in even greater uncer-
tainty. 
This situation made it necessary for the Edo City Magistrate (Edo 
machi bugyo} to pass on the following lengthy proclamation to his sub-
ordinates: 
We have issued orders concerning compassion towards 
living beings, but you have not understood them well 
and are acting in a way which apparently ma.~es the 
exchange of live animals awkward. Generally when a 
healthy dog comes along you have it fed, but when a 
sick dog appears, it is not fed at all. Both the 
above ways of acting are due to misunderstandings. 
The shogun issued these orders because he wished 
feelings of benevolence to arise in people. To all 
appearances you have made people follow the orders, 
but deep down in their hearts there is very little 
trace of compassion, and this is bad. We have heard 
that according to some people if there is someone 
really compassionate towards living beings in the end 
he is likely to be considered a nuisance by the local 
officials. You must observe the instructions issued 
from time to time and administer them so that feelings 
of charity arise in people's hearts •.. 75 
For the next eight years only three orders make any mention of dogs. 
Nevertheless, they indicate that the shog1Jnal wishes on this matter were 
still not treated with the appropriate diligence and seriousness. 76 
The shogunate finally had to recognise that the orders regulating 
the treatment of dogs had failed to achieve their purpose. Quite to the 
75. SJ, 1:257-58, No.726. 
76. SJ, 1:284, No.783; 1:302, No.821; 1:296, No.804. 
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contrary, people now did not feed dogs at all, fearing that they might 
be made responsible for the daily upkeep of the animal, have to care for 
its young, nurse it in sickness and finally be charged with the odious 
task of burying it._ The result was that more and irore hungry dogs were 
roaming the streets, especially in Edo, eventually attacking people in 
their desperate search for food. In addition, as dogs could not be 
killed unless they committed a serious "crime," they multi plied freely, 
making it increasingly difficult to feed them. 
In the face of this situation the shogunate devised a measure which 
for ever after was to provoke the strongest criticism in even the most 
kindly disposed historian: the public dog pounds. While certain dairnyo 
were selected to construct the dog pounds, a tax calculated on house-
frontage was levied from the city people to pay for the upkeep of the 
77 dogs. It is true - and historians frequently neglect to mention this 
fact - that the levy was suspended in years when earthquakes and fires 
created considerable hardship-to the inhabitants of Edo. 78 All the same, 
the dogs had to be fed, and by Genroku 10 (1697) there were 40,000 of 
them being cared for in t.~e public pounds. 79 Nine orders pertain to 
matters connected with these pounds, making the nmrber of orders dealing 
with dogs considerably higher than those regulating the protection of 
other animals. 
Did Tsunayoshi have a predilection for dogs and consider them more 
important than human beings - as historians frequently imply - or was he 
motivated merely by the concept of non-violence as inherent in the Bud-
hist teachings? 
77. SJ, 1:308, No.838. 
78. SJ, 1:361, No.1014. 
79. SJ, 1:313, No.854. 
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There is no evidence, neither in primary nor secondary sources, 
suggesting that the fifth shogun cared for dogs as pets, in the way, for 
instance, that George III of England did. If dogs were permitted within 
the shogunal chambers and accorded special treatment, critics which made 
much of Tsunayoshi's other weaknesses would surely not have failed to 
elaborate on this point. Unlike the.case of George III, nothing is 
known of officials designated to care for shogunal dogs, nor are there 
any other regulations indicating that this animal was kept as a pet for. 
the shogun in Edo castle. It is unlikely, therefore, that Tsunayoshi 
had any personal sympathies for dogs, except for his recognition of the 
fact that he was born in the Year of the Dog. 
A brief examination of orders dealing with other animals shows that 
it was the plight of the horse, and not that of the dog, which first 
caught Tsunayoshi's attention. Barely four months after his accession 
in Empo 8 (1680) it was ordered that the practice of cutting the horse's 
sinews - to make their gait w~re sprightly - should be discontinued.so 
It appears that at the same time the traditional cutting of the horse's 
tail muscles was abolished in the shogun's stables and eventually an 
order was issued instructing the townspeople to similarly abstain from 
this practice. 81 Several orders were required to stop people from 
abandoning sick and dead horses and overloading them. 82 Yet with the 
horse being a much more valued, <:Ind much less numerous animal than the 
dog, the problem of determining ownership and feeding did not arise. 
80. TJ, 42: 379 following entry far 30D urii 8!1, Hoei 8. 
of this practice see Yamaoka Myoami, Ruiju meibutsu 
1974), 3:521 and Bolitho, "The Dog Shogun," p.133. 
For explanation 
ko (Tokyo, 
81. Sasama, Edo bakufu yakushoku shiisei, p.299. SJ, 1:245, No.697, p.299. 
82. SJ,. 1:256, No. 720; 1:261, No. 731; 1:353, No.986, etc. 
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Compas.sion towards fish and birds - both animals being part of the 
Japanese diet - required different regulations. It was forbidden to 
sell live fish and birds83 and fishing and hunting was limited to pro-
84 fessional fishermen and hunters only. 
The kite eagle, a bird of prey, presented an altogether different 
challenge to Tsunayoshi's policy of non-violence. Obviously it would 
neither do to kill.it nor let it carry on in its uncompassionate ways. 
Officials and the people were t.~erefore instructed to prevent the bird 
f t . d h d' 85 . 1 . h h rom nes ing an ree 1ng, a less expensive so ution t an t at re-
quired for dogs. 
Amongst all domestic animals the dog - of rather limited use in an 
urban environment such as Edo - apparently had been treated worst and 
was most difficult to protect. Already under Tsunayoshi's predecessor, 
Ietsuna, there had been instances where the bakufu had felt it necessary 
86 to mete out severe punishment for killing dogs, a fact that finds no 
mention by historians. 
Tsunayoshi, one may conclude, had no particular personal affection 
for dogs and out of necessity showed proportionately similar concern for 
the compassionate treatment of other animals. Consequently one must 
examine whether the Laws of Compassion - in accordance with the shogun's 
own statements - arose from his desire to turn the world into a less 
violent one. 
The topic of the shogun's desire for non-violence finds frequent 
and relatively elaborate treatment in his orders. An example is the 
83. SJ, 1:254, No.716; 1:255, No.717, 718; 1:272, No.753, etc. 
84. SJ, 1:406, No.1174; 1:379, No.1085; 1:278-79, No.770. 
85. SJ, 1:300, No.815; 1:301, No.819; 1:303-304, No.826, etc. 
86. E.g. O shioki saikyo ch~, Vol.l in Kinsei hosei shiryo sosho, 
pp.284, 285, Nos.668, 669, 670, 671, etc. 
following directive issued to his officials in Genroku 7 (1694), 
You should keep in mind that [the laws of] compassion 
for living things are only due to the mercy of the 
shogun. But beyond this mercy, the shogun has more 
profound intention. Even if he were not to issue 
orders concerning compassion, you officials should 
have in mind that people should become benevolent and 
that their intentions should become gentle. You should 
tell this to those under your command and those in your 
units, and you should pass it on so that it will be 
known by everyone down to the servants.87 
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Tsunayoshi's professed motive for issuing the Laws of Compassion is 
credible, for the theme of benevolence and compassion is a recurring 
88 
one. He did not limit the practice of these virtues to the treatnent 
of animals. While Japanese historians have always made much of Tsunayo-
shi's concern for dogs in particular, they have frequently failed to 
elaborate on the fact that the same care was shown towards men, especi-
ally those at the lower end of the social scale, .unable to protect them-
selves. Already in 1920 Kurita Mototsugu published a study of these 
89 
orders, and the neglect with which this side of Tsunayoshi's character 
is treated in Japanese history books, is indicative of the bias which 
even today exists against this ruler. 
Tsunayoshi, for instance, issued new orders for the protection of 
minors. Previously the bakufu had already prohibited abandonment of 
children, but now, for the first time, provisions for their upkeep was 
90 
made when the parents did not have the means. To effectively 
87. Gotoke reijo, p.248, No.508, translated by Shively, "Tokugawa Tsun-
ayoshi", p.113. 
88. See above Chapter III, Section 5. 
89. Kurita, 11 Inu kubO ron .. 11 
90. SJ, 1:255, No.719; l,zso, No.775; 1:298-99, No.813; 1:310-11, Nos. 
846, 847, etc. 
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counteract the widespread practice of infanticide, it was ordered that 
pregnant women and children under the age of seven be registered. 91 
Beggars and outcasts were provided with food and shelter. 92 In an un-
precedented fashion the shogun even turned his attention to the inmates 
of prisons and to improve their wretched state he ordered the erection 
of better ventilated buildings, provisions for five monthly baths and 
additional sets of clothing in the cold months. 93 Several declarations 
of general pardons expressed the shogun's mercy, such as in Genroku 13 
(1690) when in two months altogether 267 offenders were released. 94 
Street gangs engaging in robbery and murder - a threat to the common 
people rather than the well-armed samurai - were severely punished and 
effectively eliminated. 95 Sick travellers, who in the past had commonly 
been turned out on the street when they could no longer afford their 
board or when their illness was deemed infectious, also now enjoyed the 
protection of the state. It was ordered that they must be given proper 
care and if they died, provisions were made for the appropriate funeral 
96 
arrangements. 
This unprecedented concern for the welfare of the most vulnerable 
sections of the community led Kurita to conclude that Tsunayoshi was not 
the most cruel of the Tokugawa rulers, as commonly asserted, but that he 
was the shogun who cared for human life most seriously. 97 
91. SJ, 1:281, No.776. 
92. NZKS, 4:202-203, 1218-19. 
93. Gotoke reijo, p.194, No.338; TJ, 43:15, 19D 6M Genroku L 
94. TJ, 43:402, 20D 4M; p.404, BD SM; p.407, 20D SM. 
95. TJ, 42:586, 27D 9M JOkyo 3. 
96. SJ, 1:245, No.698. 
97., Kurita, 1".rnu kubO i::on, n p.13. 
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Tsunayoshi' s concern for the benevolent behaviour of his people was 
neither limited to nor started with the i.nfamous orders protecting ani-
mals. Already during the early years of his government, he had been 
preoccupied with the behaviour of his people, and he had instructed his 
officials that when pronouncing judgements and issuing orders to pay 
closer attention to the effects upon the behaviour of society rather 
h h . 98 t an to t e purely legal aspects. 
The Laws of Compassion were simply a further development of this. 
Their purpose, initially, was to improve the behaviour of the people. 
Offences were looked upon not from the aspect of how much wrong an indi-
vidual had committed, but how the morals of society would suffer if 
people saw that such uncompassionate acts were tolerated. Thus when a 
man was severely punished for killing a dog, the sentence imposed upon 
him was not merely in retribution for the crime he had committed, but 
designed to deter other people from contemplating such an act. 
The Laws of Compassion originated from Tsunayoshi's desire to im-
prove society. Very soon, however, their e.nforcement also became a test 
of shogunal authority, and it is at this stage that the shogunate had no 
choice but to pursue the matter to the point of absurdity. 
First evidence of this battle for authority is furnished by the 
Senior Councillors' faulty transmission of the shogun's order concerning 
the registration of dogs. When their so-called "misunderstanding" of 
his instructions indicated their lack of support in this matter, Tsuna-
yoshi did not capitulate. On the contrary, he punished t.'1ern. From that 
time on the enforcement of the Laws of Compassion turned into a conflict 
98 YOgenroku, p.32. 
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between the shogun's personal will and that of traditional officialdom. 
Eibyo gojitsuroku states plainly: 
When someone disobeys the Laws of Compassion, re-
gardless whether t.~ey are of high or low birth, it 
is equal to harbouring revolt in their hearts 
against the shogun's orders.99 
Amongst the officialdom the Laws of Compassion separated the sheep 
from the goats; a man's attitude towards them indicated whether he was 
willing to serve the shogun in total obedience or whether he would,limit 
his loyalty to measures of which he himself approved. 
Further, the Laws of Compassion demonstrated the shogun's authority. 
Their promulgation was an unprecedented interference with the samurai's 
conduct and their enforcement showed that the shogun had the power to 
impose his, personal moral standards t;lpon all his subjects, including the 
samurai. Previously the latter had been accorded relatively great free-
dom in the treatment of their inferi()rs. Now they, just as the common 
man in the street, were bound by laws governing not only their conduct 
towards other men, but even towards animals. 
The Laws of Compassion meant that - in theory at least - anybody, 
even a common man, could accuse a daimyo of lacking cow~assion towards 
some inferior living being. In practice, it appears, no daimyo was ever 
accused of this crime, but instances of daimyo retainers being severely 
100 punished for such behaviour were not rare. 
In fact, when historians point their finger accusingly at cases 
where a man was condemned to death for cruelty towards an animal, it is 
frequently a member of the samurai class who received such extreme 
99. Eibyo, haru; HJ, p.53. 
100. E.g. Gotodaiki, p.52. 
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punishment. One example is that of the shogunal veterinarian in charge 
of horses (hakuraku) who, in Genroku 15 (1702), was ordered to commit 
ceremonial suicide (seppuku) for harming a dog. A man in his position 
would have been fully aware of the shogunal policy towards animals, 
which had been in existence for nearly two decades, and his violation 
must be regarded as an act of disobedience . "People both of high and 
101 low standing must practise benevolence and love" stated the proclama-
tion announcing the veterinarian 1 s sentence, stressing once again that 
the shogunal orders applied without differentiation to all the shogun's 
subjects. 
Historians frequently justify their complete condemnation of the 
Laws of Compassion by the fact that they led to a situation where ani-
102 
mals were considered more important than men. The great preoccupa-
tion with the punishment of samurai for offences against animals, makes 
one wonder, however, whether it is not principally the enforcement of 
the orders upon the military class that is being so strongly objected 
to. Naturally historians can only cite what their sources provide and 
in the context of the Genroku period the capital punishment of a commoner 
would not have been as noteworthy as that of a samurai. But this is the 
important point. The life of a commoner had never counted for much and 
consequently one would not expect great protest when it was taken in 
punishment for disobeying the shogun's commands. 
How very little a commoner's life counted for is demonstrated by 
Arai Hakuseki's recollections of his own youth. Without any shame or 
101. SJ, 1:357, No.994; TJ, 43:487, 15D lOM Genroku 15. See also Goto-
daiki, p.51 and TJ, 42:594, 4D 2M Jokyo 4 for the case of the Head 
of the Shogunal Kitchens (daidokoro gashira) who was banished for 
drowning two cats in a well of the main citadel (honmaru). 
102. E.g. Furuta, "Sh5rui awaremi no rei ni tsuite," p.22; Tokutomi, 
Genroku jidai, 17:48. 
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regret this scholar, who was so quick to condenm others, recounts how on 
one occasion, to save his military honour, he was about to cut down the 
103 commoners guarding him under house arrest. Such violence had been 
part of the military ethos and not been severely punished in the past. 
Under Tsunayoshi the samurai to some extent lost the freedom to 
subject society to the dictates of their military honour, for now they 
hd ,· 1 .·hm f k'll' 104 a to expect capita punis ent or i ing commcners. The common 
man could also forfeit his life for violating the Laws of Compassion, 
but on the other hand he was not as likely to meet this fate for getting 
in the way of a samurai; he both lost and gained by the unprecedented 
orders. The samurai, on the other hand, lost on both accounts: the 
obligation to practise compassion towards men and animals severely 
curbed his traditional freedom. 
The position of the daimyo towards the Laws of Compassion is not 
altogether clear. The story of how Mito Mitsukuni presented Yanagisawa 
Yoshiyasu with a blanket of dog skins "to keep him warm in his old 
age, ,.lOS seems to indicate the defiance of the mightiest of them. The 
fact remains, however, that it is merely an anecdote and that in Mitsu-
kuni 1 s own domain 11new 0 orders were proclaimed concerning hunting in 
Jokyo 4 (1687). 106 The source does not state the contents of these 
"new" orders, but their timing coinciding with t.'1e period when the sho-
gunate's orders for the protection of animals increased in frequency, 
seems significant. Furthermore, in Genroku 6 (1693) the Mito domain 
103. Knox, p.110. 
104. E.g. TJ, 43:305, l3D SM Genroku 10. 
105. Ikeda Koen, Tokugawa jidaishi (Tokyo, 1927), pp.50-51. 
106. Ibaraki kenshi hensan iinkai, Ibaraki ken shiryo, Kinsei seiji hen 
(Mito, 1957), 1:477. 
196 
returned its hunting grounds to the bakufu "because Lord Jl5ken [Tsunayo-
shi] greatly dislikes the taking of life, .,l07 indicating that they did 
not wish to ignore the shogun's wishes. 
The Laws of Compassion were promulgated for the whole country and 
even if they were not as strictly enforced in domains outside Tsunayo-
shi's direct control, they still infringed upon the independence the 
daimyo had traditionally enjoyed in the management of their domains. 
More than that, however, the Laws of Compassion were a massive on-
slaught against the military tradition whic.'1 provided not just the dai-
myo but the whole of the military class with their raison d'~tre. The 
shogunate went beyond merely criticising the samurai's "valor" as 
"brutality" and their so-called "good conduct" as "high spirits • .,lOa 
With the Laws of Compassion it attempted to coerce them into abandoning 
the values which in their fathers' and grandfathers' days had been ins-
trumental in securing their privileged position. A society which had 
operated on the principle of the survival of and domination by the fit-
test was now asked to turn its attention to the care of orphans, beggars, 
prison inmates and even sick and starving animals. A proud samurai 
might in the course of his official duties have to concern himself with 
food and shelter for the outcasts of society. Those who had enjoyed the 
honour of caring for the shogunal hawks now had to preoccupy thenselves 
with the welfare of stray dogs, not to mention the junior officials who 
were jeered at by the crowds when chasing dogs for the public dog 
109 pounds. 
107. ibid., 1:482. 
108. See translation Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p .113, quoted above 
Chapter III, Section 1. 
109. SJ, 1:337, No.933. 
In Genroku 3 (1690) the shogunate decreed: 
.•. In the use of both civil and military elements 
lies the established and true way of government. 
From now on more attention must be paid to the 
civil element ••. 110 
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Tsunayoshi did not deny the military aspect of his government. To 
do so would have rocked the very foundations of the shogunate. The 
civil el~ment, however, he saw of increasing importance, a view well 
justified by the developments which had taken place since the beginning 
of the Tokugawa regime. Demographic changes which had turned a village 
into perhaps the largest city in the world in the space of a century re-
quired new rules and methods to cope with the unprecedented urbanisation. 
New modes of behaviour were essential when large numbers of people lived 
at close quarters and care for the sick and the dead was imperative, 
even from a sanitary point of view. 
The shogunate's attack on military values, then, was not arbitrary. 
It arose from Tsunayoshi 's deep convictions, shaped by both his training 
and the changes that had taken place in society. Nevertheless it meant 
that the military, which had dominated the country, were increasingly 
forced to serve their government in a civil capacity. Slowly soldiers 
who carried out civil functions turned into civil servants with military 
background. 
With the enforcement of the Laws of Compassion having such far-
reaching implications, it is small wonder that they could not be revoked 
when their ineffectiveness became obvious. By the time dogs had multi-
plied to the extent that they threatened the inhabitants of Edo, there 
was no other solution but to keep them in pounds. And though the numbers 
110. TJ, 43:84, 21D 9M Genroku 3. 
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of animals kept at the citizens' and the government's expense reached 
absurd numbers, when the shogunate had insisted so vehemently on their 
protection, it could hardly permit them to be exterminated. 
At the end of Kembyo jitsuroku Yoshiyasu explains how this problem-
atic situation developed without any fault of the shogun's: 
The policy of the Laws of Compassion initially arose 
solely out of the shogun's desire to admonish even 
the slightest lack of benevolence and to perfect the 
spirit of the common people. It was not supposed to 
be such a severe law, but - possibly because Yoshiyasu, 
Terusada and others failed to administer it correctly 
- when it came down to the rank and file there weX?, I 
believe, many instances completely against the shogun's 
intentions .111 
The eighth shogun, Yoshimune, later corrected this passage, main-
taining that the Laws of Compassion were based on Tsunayoshi's deep con-
victions and that his Grand Chamberlains could not be blamed. 112 This 
. . l d t d b h. t . 113 b th id f th view is a so a op e y some is orians, ut on e ev ence o e 
words that follow, one must doubt whether either the shogun, or his 
Grand Chamberlains, are to be held solely responsible. 
When r think back reverently, I remember how I, Yoshi-
yasu, received the shoglln's great favours and was en-
trusted with duties of great importance. Although 1 
worked diligently day and night and illustrious virtue 
was promulgated throughout the country, there was ob-
struction on all levels, and it was impossible to suc-
ceed. Without correcting old evils, new evils arose. 
During the thirty years of governing the people, the 
shogun wanted to make the world like that of Yao and 
Shun. The intentions of his early government were not 
rewarded. Now, who is to bear the blame for this? 
"There was a lord worthy to be called a lord, but he 
111. Kembyo jitsuroku, Vol.30 (corrected in MS to Vol.34). Also quoted 
by Tokutomi, Genroku ji da.i, 1 7: 240. 
112. TJ, 43:752. 
113. Kurita, Edo jidai, 1:606; Tokutomi, Genroku jidai, 17:241. 
had no ministers worthy of that name" the ancients 
lamented. Indeed, though the country is different, 
the saying remains the same1114 
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The Laws of Compassion certainly arose frcm Tsunayoshi's personal 
desire to improve society. This fact Yoshiyasu stated clearly. But the 
method of translating the shogun's lofty ideals into reality might well 
have been left to his officials. Yoshiyasu, according to the shogun's 
own words, was conducting private and official affairs single-handedly .ns 
If he could be entrusted with an important matter of state such as Ieno-
bu's succession, one might reasonably assume.that he also had a free hand 
in administering the Laws of Compassion. It seems likely, therefore, 
that the construction of the infamous dog pounds was based, if not on 
Yoshiyasu's decision, at least upon his suggestion. Similarly the de-
gree of punishment for offences against the orders might not have been 
decided by the shogun himself, but left at Yoshiyasu' s discretion, with 
the shogun's aim of perfecting the morals of his people as his guiding 
principle. 
If one looks at the second passage cited above, this view seems 
justified and if one keeps in mind that it is a continuation of the 
first-cited passage and consequently is likely to still refer to the 
Laws of Compassion, all other statements also fall into place. 
The administration of the Laws of Compassion might well be called 
"duties of great importance." Yoshiyasu's assertion that virtue was prcm-
ulgated throughout the country is suitably reflected in the many orders 
exhorting people to practise compassion. On the other hand, the wording 
114. Kembyo jitsuroku, Vol.30 (corrected in MS to Vol.34). Also quoted 
by Kurita, Edo jidai, 1:450. 
115. See above, Chapter 2, Section 4. 
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of. the Laws of Compassion can leave no doubt that cooperation on all 
levels of officialdom was greatly lacking. The shogun's aim of teaching 
his people to act compassionately was not achieved, but instead it 
brought to light another serious defect in his subjects, namely that of 
not unequivocally accepting the shogun's authority. Tsunayoshi, to all 
appearances, seems to have been striving for the idealistic world of Yao 
and Shun and one cannot question that his intentions failed. Finally, 
it appears as if Yoshiyasu again takes the blame on his own shoulders; 
the Chinese saying which he also finds appropriate for Japan, could im-
ply that his own talents as minister did not do justice to those of his 
lord. However, previously he had c1early pin-pointed the failure of the 
Laws of Compassion to the opposition from the officialdom, and whe.n he 
now states that the ministers failed their lord, he leaves it open for 
the reader to conclude which ministers - he or the traditional officials 
- had not lived up to their duties. 
If one accepts this interpretation of Yoshiyasu's own testimony, 
the so-called repeal of the Laws of Compassion takes on new meaning. 
Hakuseki's description of the event is the most detailed and best 
known version and has commonly been accepted as correct. Yet he intro-
duced the story with the words "according to what some people say," and 
consequently his account could well have been mere gossip, circulating 
amongst people like Hakuseki, not well disposed towards Yoshiyasu. 
Hakuseki's story goes that Tsunayoshi's funeral had been postponed 
not because. of continuing rain, as officially announced, but for alto-
gether different reasons. Apparently Tsunayoshi had once expressed the 
following wish in the presence of Ienobu and his own closest retainers: 
During recent years I have cared much for living 
beings and although it is a fo0lish matter I wish 
that, in this regard only, the practices of my 
reign should be continued even after an hundred 
years as an act of filial piety. You, who serve 
me, should heed this well. 
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Hakuseki's story continues that after Tsunayoshi's death, Ienobu wanted 
to stop the suffering caused by the strict enforcement of the Laws of 
Compassion, but was faced with the problem that in his own government he 
could not go against the express wish of his predecessor. Consequently 
he decided that the repeal of the Laws of Compassion must appear as if 
arranged by the previous shogun. Yoshiyasu, apparently, realising that 
his future lay in Ienobu' s hands, was eager to please the latter and 
protesting that from the very beginning he had not agreed with the Laws 
of Compassion, praised Ienobu' s plan as "the height of filial piety." 
The sixth shogun - Hakuseki relates - approached Tsunayoshi 's coffin and 
spoke: 
Orders primarily made by you should not be changed 
by my orders for many years to come. Yet since it 
concerns the people of this country, I feel that you 
would forgive me. 
According to Hakuseki, those who had originally received Tsunayoshi's 
order to uphold the Laws of Compassion were then also called in front of 
the coffin and asked to repeal them. As the funeral rites had not taken 
place, it was thought that people would regard the new order as the late 
shogun's last wish. 116 
Other sources give a different picture of the event. According to 
Rakush.ido nenroku, Ienobu instructed both Manabe Akifusa and Yoshiyasu to 
relay to the Senior Councillors that the Laws of Compassion should be 
116. Oritaku shiba no ki, p.226-27. 
202 
observed in future in the same way as they were under his predecessor, 
b t th t · h t h ld be 1 · ht d 11 7 u a punl.s men s s ou ig ene . There was nothing secret 
about this matter, for only one day later an order was issued to the 
Superintendents of Finance, Superintendents of Temple and Shrines, and 
the Edo City Magistrates, to this effect. The order stated clearly that 
Ienobu intended to continue with the Laws o.f Compassion according to the 
intentions of his predecessor' but as he had heard that they had caused 
great problems for the people, officials henceforth were to take pains 
to adjust punishments and administer them in such a fashion that they 
did not cause suffering. People were not to be indicted wrongly. The 
order continues to justify Ienobu's decision, stating .that it was up to 
each shogun to increase or decrease punishments, according to his own 
'd t' 118 cons1 era ions .. 
Just as in the above-cited passages from Kembyo jitsuroku, Ienobu's 
order indicates that officials did not discharge their duties correctly 
with regard to the Laws of Compassion. The question of falsely-made 
accusations, moreover, had already been dealt with in Tsunayoshi's 
orders. 
Ienobu, consequently, did not repeal the Laws of Compassion in 
principle, but attempted to correct the excesses that had developed from 
the way they had been implemented. The blame for their faulty administ-
ration he laid at least partly on the shoulders of the lower officialdom. 
There was no need for Ienobu to apologise in front of Tsunayoshi's cof-
fin, for he stated openly that he had a right to make such changes. 
117. Nenroku, Vol.225, 20D lM Hoei 6. 
llB. NZKS, 3,909, 21D lM lloei 6. 
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Similarly Hakuseki 's story that Yoshiyasu, motivated by self-inter-
est, asserted that he had disliked the Laws of Compassion from the start, 
must be considered as slander. Evidence to the contrary is furnished by 
Yoshiyasu's own testimony, where he clearly distinguished between the 
praiseworthy origins of the orders and the evil that arose from their 
execution. In fact, he might have welcomed this occasion to correct ex-
cesses without any detriment to shogunal authority, for it could be 
claimed that it was natural for a new ruler to make such adjustments. 
If Ienobu's order for changes in the administration of the Laws was is-
sued before Tsunayoshi's burial to comply with the Confucian saying 
119 
"change not your father's ways for three years," as some historians 
120 
suggest, it is likely that this procedure was adopted to observe in 
theory the proper rites, rather than to convince t~e public that it was 
Tsunayoshi's last wish. 
The Laws of Compassion as a severely oppressive measure was the re-
sult of the shogun's battle for authority. Wit~ his policy of compassion 
Tsunayoshi tried to institute changes from which the samurai both in 
their capacity as officials, and as individuals, had nothing to gain, 
but much to lose. The opposition to the Laws turned their enforcement 
into an issue of shogunal supremacy. The part Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu 
played in this conflict was an important one. In the face of opposition 
at all levels of the officialdom, Tsunayoshi would not have been able to 
wage this battle had it not been for the practical support of men like 
Yoshiyasu who totally identified themselves with the shogun's aims. 
119. Confucian Analects, Book 4, Chapter 20. 
120. E.g. Murdoch, A History of Japan, 3:216. 
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3. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE FORTY-SEVEN RONIN 
The Laws of Compassion are generally not seen as related to the in-
cident of the Forty-seven ronin. 121 On the contrary, while the former 
are condemned as the most scandalous policy in Japanese history, the 
latter incident is praised as one of its most glorious episodes. 
T'nis tendency to classify events subjectively according to their 
moral implications has obscured the fact t.~at both issues were merely 
different manifestations of the same basic conflict; the conflict, 
namely, between traditional military modes of behaviour and the new pol-
itical demands of the centralised state. The only difference between 
the two situations was that while the shogunate stood to benefit from an 
end to military aggressiveness, it could ill afford the neglect of mili-
tary virtues. With the Laws of Compassion, Tsunayoshi never wavere.d in 
forcing the samurai to abandon their war-like ways. When it came to the 
punishment of the ronin, however, the limitations of his government be-
came apparent. The origin of his authority was of feudal character, and 
if he were to permit the samurai to abandon such moral precepts as un-
conditional loyalty, the very foundation of his own power would be 
endangered. 
The question of whether the Forty-seven r~nin were to be praised as 
loyal samurai or condemned for violating the laws of the country was, 
therefore, one of the most difficult political decisions Tsunayoshi and 
his ministers were faced with, an issue which decades and even centuries 
later philosophers never tired of debating. 
The story of how a group of retainers of Asano Naganori, lord of 
Ako domain, revenged their lord by killing the Master of Court Ceremonies 
121. There were actually only forty-six ronin who surrendered themselves 
to the authorities. 
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(koke), Kira Yoshinaka, is so well known that only the details relevant 
122 to the judgement need be touched upon. 
'rhe incident which provoked the ronin to take justice into their 
own hands took place in Genroku 14 (1701) in an audience chamber of Edo 
castle. Asano Naganori, while waiting for the imperial messenger, whom 
he was to entertain, suddenly drew his sword and attacked Kira Yoshinaka 
in retribution for the latter's insulting behaviour on a previous occa-
sion. The bakufu acted swiftly, and that same day Asano was condemned 
to disembowel himself. 123 His crime had been not so much that of wound-
ing Kira, but of drawing his sword and desecrating the shogunal chambers 
by spilling blood at, moreover, a very important moment when the imperial 
124 
messenger was expected. 
From a letter to the bakufu written by Oishi Kuranosuke Yoshie, the 
leader of the faithful retainers, it becomes apparent that they did not 
object to their master's punishment, but to the fact that Kira Yoshinaka 
went free. Their lord's death was meaningless when the purpose for 
which he had died - namely that of killing Kira - had not been achieved. 
Oishi pointed out in his memorial that by traditional law, both samurai 
d . 1 b . h d 125 engage in a quarre were to e punis e . The bakufu, however, took 
notice neither of this protest, nor of the retainer's petition that 
Asano Naganori's younger brother be permitted to inherit the fief. 
The attack of Asano' s retainers on Kira's mansion nearly t\<'O years 
later (1702) consequently must be viewed from two aspects. Firstly, it 
122. A comprehensive description 
492-4, 15D 12M Genroku 15. 
gawa Tsunayoshi to Genroku 
TJ, 43:433, 140 3M Genroku 
of the event is contained in TJ, 43: 
For a modern version see Kuwata,Toku-
dai, pp.195-257. 
14. 123. 
124. Iio Kuwashi, Genroku chilshingura (Tokyo, 1975), pp.66-67. 
125. Kaseki kemOC>n ki, Vol. 1, cited in Tahara Tsuguo, Ako yonjilroku shi, 
ron (Tokyo, 1978), p.11. 
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was motivated by the ronin's desire to fulfil their dead lord's last 
wish of killing his adversary. Secondly, it was aimed at correcting the 
bakufu's judgement, which in their eyes had been unjust in sparing Kira. 
Thus.technically Asano's retainers were not only guilty of violating the 
general laws of the country by their act of attacking Kira, but of going 
against the express ruling of the bakufu. 
In the ronin's favour stood the fact that Tsunayoshi himself had 
laid great emphasis on the virtue of loyalty. In an attempt to impress 
upon his subjects the importance of this Con£ucian concept, he had gone 
to the extent of ordering the erection of public notices, which eXhorted 
his subjects to practise loyalty and filial piety. 126 Therefore, just 
as Tsunayoshi in the case of the Laws of Compassion could not consent to 
have the animals killed whose protection he had ordered, he could hardly 
totally condemn the exemplary loyal behaviour of the ronin. 
The full details of the debate that ensued in bakufu circles are no 
longer extant. Yet the very fact that in the case of Asano the sentence 
of disembowelment had been h&"lded down within hours and that now no such 
swift judgement was forthcoming, indicates that there was no ready solu-
tion to the problem. 
Kai shosho ason jikki notes that the Senior ColL~cillors were divi-
ded amongst themselves between condemning the faithful retainers and 
praising their display of loyalty. The author does not say on which 
sources he bases this statement, but it is a credible proposition, for 
after several days had elapsed sL~ce the incident occurred, an extra-
ordinary meeting of the Supreme Court (hyojosho) was convened with the 
express purpose of tendering its opinion on this matter to the Senior 
126. Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p.118. 
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Councillors. It appears that on this occasion neither Yanagisawa Yoshi-
yasu nor the Senior Councillors took part in the deliberations. The 
views expressed at the end of the meeting were represented as those of 
altogether fourteen men holding positions of either Superintendent of 
Temples and Shrines, Edo City Magistrate, Superintendent of Finance or 
127 Inspector General. The absence of more senior officials could be ex-
plained by the fact that these men were already deeply divided on the 
issue and that now the genuine opinion of the Superintendents, Magist-
rates and Inspectors was sought. 
The committee of the Supreme Court, however, either could not agree 
on a judgement or did not want to commit itself on this delicate issue. 
The fourteen members were unanimous in condemning Kira's adopted son and 
retainers for not making greater efforts in saving their lord. Yet when 
it came to the crucial point of judging the behaviour of the ronin, they 
both condemned the secret attack on Kira's mansion and praised their 
loya1 behaviour. Finally they suggested that judgement be postponed, a 
proposal readily accepted by the bakufu, especially in view of the fact 
that the elaborate New Year's rites and celebrations were about to begin. 
The opinion of the Head of the Confucian School, Hayashi Nobuatsu, 
was also sought. For him Confucian virtues constituted the ideal way of 
government and the practical demands of the centralised state counted 
for little. As long as loyalty such as that displayed by the ronin pre-
vailed, the government had nothing to fear, he contended. Nobuatsu sug-
gested that if the ronin could not be set free immediately for violating 
the laws of the bakufu, they should be kept under house arrest until an 
127. Ason jikki, Vol.30, 23D 12M Genroku 15; also reprinted in Iio, 
pp.266-68. 
128 
occasion to pardon them arose. 
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When Nobuatsu spoke of loyalty he obviously referred to loyalty to-
wards one's lord and not towards the state, for Asano's retainers had 
been disobedient to the bakufu in order to discharge their duties to-
wards their lord. The scholar's view confirmed the priorities of feudal 
society, where in hierarchical order a man's responsibilities were pri-
marily to his superior. It was a view which Tsunayoshi could not share. 
Some works maintain that the shogun sympathised greatly with the 
ronin and was seeking a way to acquit them without giving the appearance 
th f . . . . . . d 129 at the baku u condoned their disobedience to the original JU gement. 
Apparently in the secret hope of obtaining a pardon for them, he asked 
the imperial abbot, K5ben Shinn5, for a judgement. The latter, however, 
remained silent. 
If Tsunayoshi had really wanted to let the ronin off lightly, he 
would have followed the advice given by Hayashi Nobuatsu. A judgement 
along these lines could be justified by a precedent in Ietsuna's reign. 
Here the quarrel between two samurai had also resulted in punishment by 
disembowelment for one of the parties. On that occasion it had been the 
dead man's son who similarly revenged his father by attacking his foe's 
mansion in the dead of the night. The Grand Councillor, Ii Naozumi, 
whose task it had been to pronounce a judgement, had decided on a comp-
romise much in favour of the loyal son. The latter was exiled as punish-
ment for the night attack, but the fact that the sentence was only pro-
nounced to do formal justice to the laws of the bakufu became apparent 
128. Nobuatsu's original verdict is quoted by Iio, p.269. After the 
sentence had been pronounced he wrote another commentary on the in-
cident, this time justifying the bakufu 's judgement. 
129. E.g. TJ, 43:750. 
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when six years later the loyal son was pardoned and even found employ-
ment with the Grand Councillor's family. 130 
Tsunayoshi, consequently, had the opportunity to let the xonin off 
lightly and eventually pardon them, but he did not choose to do so. The 
judgement he adopted was, like that pronounced by Ii Naozumi., also a 
compromise, .but unlike Naozumi's verdict, it well reflected the gravity. 
with which the shogunate viewed the ronin's transgression against the 
laws of the state. Asano's retainers were to die. To do justice to 
their display of loyalty, they were permitted to disembowel themselves. 
It was not a great concession. The ronin were of samurai status, and it 
was the practice.that samurai committing such offences as the result of 
a quarrel, were punished in this way. 131 Had they been ordered to die 
as common criminals, it would have implied that they were not even 
worthy to be called warriors. In view of the shogun's great emphasis on 
loyalty, such a pronouncement would hardly have been feasible. The 
judgement, therefore, made relatively little Of the ronin's exemplary 
display of loyalty towards their lord and clearly placed the demands of 
the central government above traditional virtues. 
Controversy exists on how this decision was reached. Yanagisawa ke 
hizo jikki describes how Yoshiyasu consulted in secret two of his Confu-
cian scholars - Shimura Sanzaemon and Ogyu Sorai - about the implications 
of this incident. ·The former could only confirm that no precedent of 
such an event could be found in the classics, but Sorai was ready to ela-
borate on the subject. He criticised the Supreme Court for preoccupying 
itself with the details of the case forgetting the overall issue, and 
130. llson jikki, Vol.30, and Kuwata, pp.246-47. 
131. For instance, Asano had received just this punishment. For another 
example, see TJ, 43: 305, 13D BM Genroku 10. 
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then continued to interpret the case in the context of the shogunate's 
policies: 
Since at the present time those on high consider 
loyalty and filial piety the first virtues of 
government, it would be lacking in compassion to 
judge this case in which the plotters acted in 
accordance with these virtues, as a case of 
burglary. If cases in which people have loyalty 
and filial piety in mind and act accordingly, are 
considered as burglary, how then shall cases be 
judged which are committed with disloyal and un-
filial intentions. Therefore, leaving Chinese mat-
ters aside, if the decision orders that seppvku be 
carried out on the basis of precedents of our pre-
sent rule it would also be in .accordance with the 
wishes of those plotters, and how would it not set 
an example for the world? 
Apparently Yoshiyasu was exceedingly pleased with this opinion. The 
next morning he appeared earlier than usual in front of the shogun to 
inform him of the wise judgement pronounced by his retainer and the sho-
gun accepted it happily. 132 
Further evidence that the judgement of the Forty-seven ronin came 
from Sorai is, apparently, furnished by Sorai giritsu sho, a document 
found in the possession of the Hosokawa family. It is a more detailed 
exposition of the reasons behind the judgement, and here the argument 
already foreshadows Sorai's thoughts in his mature works. 
Gi [i, righteousness] is the way to uphold one's 
personal integrity. Law is the standard of measure-
ment for the entire society. Rei [li, rites or eti-
quette) is used to control the heart, while is 
used to control events. The fact that the forty-six 
samurai avenged the wrong done their lord shows that 
they possessed the sense of honour of the samurai. 
They followed the path of integrity. Their action 
was righteous. But this aspect of the situation con-
cerns only them and is a private matter.... If 
132. HJ, p.64, translated by Lidin, Ogyu Sorai,pp.48-49. 
private considerations are allowed to undermine 
public considerations, it will be impossible to 
uphold the law of the land .133 
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Nevertheless, there are several aspects which cast doubt upon the 
fact that Sarai was the author of the famous judgement. Firstly, it has 
always disturbed historians that no mention of the sc.'1olar 's part appears· 
. . • . . 134 . h . . h' • in Sora1 s own wr1 tings. For instance w en Sora1 received Yos 1yasu s 
praise for correctly judging the case of a peasant who had abandOned his 
th th . ·1 135 aged mo er, e event was recorded in deta1 • Consequently, if Sorai 
had won the shogun's admiration for finding a solution where his senior 
ministers had failed, the matter surely would have found mention in a 
later work; 
Secondly, the preawble to the above-quoted comment from Yanagisawa 
hizo jikki states that the Supreme Court had condemned the ronin to die 
as common criminals. Al though this argument had. formed part of the de-
liberations, it had not been the final judgement, and it appears that 
here Yanagisawa hizo jikki is wrong. Even weightier is the fact that 
this passage does not appear in Eibyo gojitsnroku on which the rest of 
Yanagisawa hizo jikki is based. 136 
Another difficulty concerns the aut.'1enticity of Sorai giritsu sho. 
The scholar Tahara Tsuguo questions how Sorai's deliberations for the 
bakufu could have come into the possession of the Hosokawa family. 
Moreover, as the document is not dated, he suggests that it could easily 
have been written as part of the debate which was to continue for decades 
133. Maruyama, Intellectual H.istory, p. 74. The italics are those of 
Maruyama. The passage is also translated in Lidin, Ogyii Sorai, p.49. 
134. ibid., p.50. 
135. See below, Chapter V, Section 3. 
136. See above, Chapter I, Section 3. 
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and even centuries and in which especially Sorai's disciple, Dazai Shun-
dai, had great interest.137 After the judgement had been made public, 
Hayashi Nobuatsu similarly philosophised about the reasons behind the 
decision, 138 and since this later statement did not reflect his original 
views, it appears likely that it was written as a justification pf the 
bakufu's verdict. 
So far no evidence has come to light to decide the argument unequi-
vocally, and in the face of this lack of evidence some historical specu-
lation may be permitted. 
Sarai later became farncus, while the reputation of Yoshiyasu in-
creasingly deteriorated. Thus works composed by Yoshiyasu, with which 
Sorai, as a member of the Yanagisawa mansion, assisted, were later attri-
buted to the famous philosopher rather than to the worthless upstart 
Chamberlain. 139 The suggestion that Sarai suddenly came up with the 
perfect judgement in the case of the Forty-seven ronin must, therefore, 
be treated with some suspicion. 
Yanagisawa hizo jikki states that Yoshiyasu had a secret consulta-
tion with his Confucian scholars about the incident. T"nis is quite 
likely. As Grand Chamberlain, Yoshiyasu would hardly have found the 
time to search the classics for a precedent. Yet whatever advice Sarai 
might have given to Yoshiyasu in this confidential meeting, the final 
judgement did not contain any new and original thought, but was no more 
than an exact application of the shogunate's stated policies. These 
policies enjoyed the complete support of and were executed by Yoshiyasu, 
and in the case of the Forty-seven r5nin he would naturally have sought 
137. Tahara, pp.68-69. 
138. Reprinted in Maruyama, Intellectual History, p.73. 
139. S.;;e above, Chapter I, Section 3, and below, Chapter V, Section 3. 
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a solution within this framework. If Sorai indeed formulated the judge-
ment, he did in fact do no more t,~an any bureaucrat does today, namely 
the technical work of accurately applying the government's policy to a 
question handed to him by his superiors. 
The process that can be reconstructed is a relatively simple one. 
Yoshiyasu asked his personal staff to look into the technical side of 
the problem and they came up with a solution which he, as head of Tsuna-
yoshi's government, considered to correctly reflect the shogun's politi-
cal aims. It was a compromise Tsunayoshi could accept. The reason why 
previous advice had been rejected was simply that it did not reflect the 
shogunate's policies·. Sarai might have formulated the judgement, but it 
would be incorrect to state that he influenced the judgement as Lidin 
tentatively suggests. 140 The shogun, therefore, did not find it necess-
ary to praise Sarai in particular - for he had not made any significant 
contribution - nor did the scholar later consider the part he had played 
an important one. 
Sorai, having had discussions with Yoshiyasu about the political 
implications of the ronin incident, was later well qualified to write a 
detailed exposition of the argl.llllent for the Hosokawa family. This house 
had kept Oishi and a number of the other ronin under arrest and ties of 
sympathy had formed between the prisoners and their guardians. 141 The 
fact that the Hosokawa house asked for a more detailed explanation of 
the judgement, therefore, is not surprising, nor is the fact that Yoshi-
yasu did not write such a document himself, but charged Sorai with this 
duty. 
140. Lidin, Ogyu sorai, p.50. 
141. Iio, pp.258-66. 
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Consequently the judgement of the Forty-seven rBnin, although it 
might have benefited from Sorai's work, is more likely to have been 
based on Yoshiyasu's proposal. He in turn, did no more than implement 
the shogun's policies; he was the tool to carry out Tsunayoshi's politi-
cal aims. 
The monetary reform, the Laws of Compassion and the judgement of 
the Forty-seven rBnin are the best known political issues of Tsunay6shi's 
government. There were other policies, less significant and not as well 
documented which, nevertheless, reflect the same political trend. Most 
conspicuous of these are perhaps the many instances of daimyo punishment, 
142 
either for their own misbehaviour or that of their vassals, as well 
as Tsunayoshi's strict supervision of his officials, as on the occasion 
when he sat in audience on several trials of commoners for petty offen-
t d f th . th . . 143 ces, s -age or is purpose at e Yanagisawa mansion. 
Common to all these policies is the fact that in some way or other 
they attacked the traditionally privileged position of the samurai and 
especially that of the daimyo. True to Weber's model they represented 
indeed expropriation of both material goods and authority. The fierce 
criticism of Tsunayoshi's policies was a testimony of their effective-
ness. 
The part Yoshiyasu played in the execution of these policies was an 
important one. Al though from c.ase to case the extent to which he di rec-
tly participated in their administration differs, one may say with some 
certainty that Tsunayoshi would not have been able to put into practice 
such unorthodox policies if his government had not been headed by a man 
142. See Oda Akinobu, On'eiroku haizetsuroku, Vol.6 in Nihon shiryB 
sensho (Tokyo, 1971); Bolitho, Treasures, pp.178-79. 
143. MK, p.159; TJ, 43:312, 14D llM Genroku 10. 
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like Yoshiyasu. Consequently the hypothesis stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, namely that. the three major political issues of Tsuna-
yoshi' s later government typified U1e struggle for authority between the 
shogun and the military aristocracy and that Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu acted 
as the essential tool to make the execution of these policies possible, 
may be confirmed. 
If the above conclusion is correct" one would expect that Yoshi-
yasu's controversial position as ilie shogun's tool in his battle for 
authority would already have affected his reputation during his lifetime. 
Next, therefore, this aspect of Yoshiyasu's life has to be examined. 
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CHAPTER V: 
THE REPUTATION OF THE MAN AND THE PERIOD 
The evil that men do lives after them, 
The good is oft interred with their bones; 
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 
Mark Antony's la.'11flnt at Caesar's death is more appropriate for Yana-
gisawa Yoshiyasu than the Roman statesman. Caesar has become one of the 
great heroes of the past, but Yoshiyasu is still depicted as the villain 
par excellence in most Japanese history books. Yet Yoshiyasu • s fate 
could have been worse. It is commonplace in history that "upstarts" 
rapidly come to fall at the de.ath of their patron. Yoshiyasu, on the 
contrary, even after Tsunayoshi's death, lived out his natural life-span 
in the comforts of his chosen seat of retirement, and his sons inherited 
his large and politically significant domain. Only ten years after 
Yoshiyasu's death in Ky6h5 9 (1724) was his son transferred to a strate-
gically less important domain in Koriyama, 1 but the size of his fief re-
mained unaltered. Over one hundred and fifty years later, when Tokugawa 
rule came to its end, the Yanagisawa family was still the second largest 
fudai daimyo in the country. 
In the first part of this chapter it is· suggested that Yanagisawa 
Yoshiyasu was acutely aware of the politically dangerous path he trod 
and the bad reputation it earned him. Consequently much of his effort 
during his lifetime was directed to ensure that testimony of his 
1. KCS, 3:257. 
achievements would remain and that his own fortunes, and those of his 
descendants, would continue even after the death of the fifth shogun. 
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The second part of this chapter turns to the reputation of the 
period. The suggestion is made that Ogyu Sorai's writings represent the 
theoretical framework of the actual policies of Tsunayoshi's government 
and that the discrepancy between the praise Sorai earned and the criti-
cism the policies encountered, is indicative of the bias with which this 
period has been viewed. Finally Kurita Mototsugu's evaluation of the 
period is discussed and his theory of change from militarism (budan 
shugi) to civil government (bunji/bunchi shugi) is contrasted and com-
pared with a classification according to the Weberian model. 
1. YOSHIYASU'S AWARENESS OF HIS REPUTATION 
Rarely in Japanese history has there remained any record of the 
personal feelings and reflections of t.hose who were instrumental in 
shaping the nation's political development. Yet in Yoshiyasu's case the 
diary of his concubine provides such insights. It is primarily from 
this work, Matsa~age nikki, that Yoshiyasu's great concern for his repu-
tation becomes apparent. Indeed the very existence of Matsukage nikki 
must be attributed to the Yanagisawa family's acute awareness of, and 
extraordinary sensitivity to the image t.1-iey had in other people's eyes. 
The writings of Yoshiyasu's concubine must naturally be expected to 
show bias in favour of the man to whose life the diary was devoted. 
Therefore, if one looks for criticism of Yoshiyasu and flaws in his 
character - such as his extreme anxiety about his reputation - one must 
expect to find only the tip of the iceberg. 
Consequently public censure and defamation of Yoshiyasu must have 
reached considerable proportions for Machiko to frankly admit that she 
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was writing the diary in the face of "rumours and nasty slander. "2 Nor 
was the opposition and criticism lightly dismissed as a passing phase. 
Though subtly clad in poetic analogies, Machiko 's wish that her clumsy 
writing might not obscure the brilliance of her subject, and that future 
generations might cherish her words, leaves little doubt that the Yana-
gisawa family considered the slander in circulation as something they 
would have to weather for generations to come. 
As Yoshiyasu's life unfolds in the pages of Matsukage nikki, it be-
comes apparent how his reputation increasingly became a source of an-
xiety with the advancement of his career. In the early years, the Yana-
gisawa family was still keen to boast about the shogunal favours they 
received. After describing how Yoshiyasu once again had been honoured 
with presents by Tsunayoshi, Machiko proudly wrote; "Our home has also 
recently been enlarged by four or five additional villas. Certainly, 
our prosperity is plain for all to see!" Already at this time, in Gen-
roku 2 (1689), she noted that the shogunal favours granted to Yoshiyasu 
were unprecedented and that "people talked about it with much agita-
. 3 
tion." Yet she conveys the feeling that then the family enjoyed being 
in the limelight and her report of such gossip does not harbour the ac-
rimony of later years. 
All the same, even at this early stage of his career, Yoshiyasu was 
not insensitive to his public image. For instance, when part of his do-
main suffered from a particularly bad harvest, he generously freed his 
farmers from paying tax for the season. It was not altogether unusual 
for a domain lord to make similar concessions and it might be cynical to 
2. MK, pp.303-304. See also above Chapter Ir, Section 6. 
3. MK, p.125. 
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attribute such behaviour to Yoshiyasu's desire to earn public praise. 
Nevertheless, the importance Machiko accorded to the expressions of 
gratitude from the farmers and the care with which she noted how every-
one highly praised Yoshiyasu's generous measure, indicate that the ef-
fects this gesture had on Yoshiyasu's reputation were self-consciousiy 
observed by the farnily. 4 
When in Genroku 7 (1694) Yoshiyasu became lord of Kawagoe castle 
and an increasingly large domain, he took pains to administer his fief 
as a model daimyo. With the cooperation of.the village heads he started 
an extensive programme of land reclamation and placed it under the Sl1J?E!r-
vision of his senior retainers. Roads, paddies, gardens and the location 
of houses were all planned in greatest detail and the poor and unern-
ployed settled in these new model villages. The settlers were furnished 
with spiritual guidance by being provided with their own temple, for 
5 
which a plot central to the three new villages was reserved. From a 
letter to one of his retainers, it becomes apparent that Yoshiyasu could 
not easily afford such temple building, for he found it difficult even 
6 to purchase the material for the shrine of his late father. All the 
same, the new temple for the settlers was adorned with all the appropri-
ate statues and symbols, and a priest from Edo was invited to become the 
7 
resident founder. 
One cannot say whether it was concern for his reputation that moti-
vated Yoshiyasu to exert himself to such an extent on behalf of a domain 
4. MK, pp.125-26. 
5. Nenroku, Vol.35, 21D 911 Genroku 8; MK, pp.146-47; saitama kenshi, 
p.390. 
6. Hayashi, pp.186-87. 
7. Nenroku, Vol.35, 21D 9M Genroku 8; MK, p.152. 
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which in all likelihood he would sooner or later exchange for another. 
T"ne fact remains, however, that the local histories of this area are 
some of the few works which have consistently provided a favourable 
image of Yoshiyasu. 
By the .turn of the century it was plain to see that Yoshiyasu's 
career was unprecedented in terms of Tokugawa history. His increasing 
concern about his ·public image reflected his unusual position. When he 
receivsd the name of Matsudaira from t.l)e shogun he marked this occasion 
with a public gesture of generosity of his own; proceeding to his temple 
to thank the gods for his good fortune, he bought all the goods of the 
stalls lining the roaa. 8 Here one cannot confirm that this generosity 
was motivated by the desire to win applause, but there can be no doubt 
that in the next year, Genroku 15 (1702), his fear of unfavourable pub-
lie opinion was a very real one. 
In the fire that nearly razed his whole compound to the ground his 
personal temple also fell to the flames. It had housed a particularly 
beautiful statue of the god Bishamon. Disasters, such as these, were com-
mcnly interpreted as punishment from the gods. Yoshiyasu, however, 
managed to turn this awkward situation to his advantage. From a remote 
temple he was able to obtain a statue of the god Bishamon which could 
not be distinguished from the one destroyed in the fire. The public was 
convinced that in some strange and wonderful way the statue had moved 
itself to escape the fire, a miracle which could only indicate that 
Yoshiyasu was particularly favoured by the gods. Machiko, in her turn, 
saw it as a blessing and a marvel that nobody doubted this divine inter-
vention. 9 
8. MK, p.190. 
9. MK, pp.198-99. 
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One of Yoshiyasu's great fears was that people would t.~ink him os-
tentatious. His strict instructions to the members of his household 
never to boast have already been mentioned.IO He believed that from the 
behaviour of the retainers that of their lord could be deduced and con-
sequently never ceased to exhort them to humility; going to the extent 
of warning them to keep modestly to one side when proceeding on a wide 
11 
road. 
Even the growing fame of his retreat at Komagome made him anxious. 
He was extremely worried that people would think him shallow for devo-
ting time to create the beautiful gardens and for taking so much pride. 
in earthly possessions. Thus when the Imperial Abbot, KOben Shinno, 
first expressed the wish to visit the gardens, Yoshiyasu was hesitant,' 
being nervous about the publicity it would attract. Finally his desire 
to have his artistic efforts judged and recognised by a member of the 
imperial family outweighed the fear of gossip and the visit was 
12 
arranged. 
This was not the only occasion when Yoshiyasu was torn between the 
thirst for recognition and the anxiety of being criticised for preten-
sions beyond his station. When the shogun's only child, Tsuruhime 
(Princess Crane), came to pay a visit to Komagome that same year (1703), 
he presented her with an incense burner in the shape of a crane of 
1 d '1 b ld ' 'd 13 p ate s1 ver, ut go 1ns1 e. It was a suitable compromise for a 
man who neither wanted to appear neither mean nor ostentatious. 
10. See above Chapter III, Section 8. 
11. Eibyo, natsu; HJ, p.84. 
12. MK, p.20Sl. 
13. NK, p.207. 
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The thought of public disapproval constantly haunted him. When it 
came to the wedding of his eldest son, he thought that people might con-
sider him pretentious were he to arrange an elaborate celebration. If, 
on the contrary, he were to entertain frugally, it might give rise to 
h h h 1 · l' d d h' h · 14 t e rumour t at e was not generous y inc ine towar s is eir. 
In a similar fashion Yoshiyasu was greatly honoured to receive the 
shogun's favour, but at the same time apprehensive of the jealousy it 
created amongst officials and daimyo. When at the end of Genroku 15 
(1702) Tsunayoshi ordered Yoshiyasu and his.eldest son to share the sho-
gunal sake cup during the forthcoming New Year celebrations, Yoshiyasu 
refused on his own behalf. 15 The reason for suggesting that his son be 
accorded honours which he himself felt unfit to accept is spelled out 
five years later when he attempted to refuse the concession of display-
ing the halberd: his son was born heir to a daimyo, while he himself 
16 
was no more than the child of a lowly bannerman. 
Yoshiyasu's humble origin provided the upper military aristocracy 
with a traditionally valid reason to criticise his rapid promotions. 
Consequently he made every effort to correct this flaw in his public 
iruage. Like most daimyo he found it appropriate to trace back his an-
cestry to the famous Seiwa Genji. Already in Genroku 14 (1701) he saw 
occasion to emphasise this fact and the relationship with the shogunal 
family it implied by restoring a small shrine in Kyoto dedicated to 
Rokuson 5 (Minamoto Tsunetorno, 917-961), their common ancestor.17 
14. H.K, p. 224. 
15. Nenroku, Vol.111, 15D 12M Genroku 15. 
16. See above, Chapter III, Section 9. 
17. Nenroku, Vol.83, 27D SM Genroku 14. 
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In addition Yoshiyasu put great emphasis on his alleged relation-
ship with a famous warrior of the more recent past, namely Takeda Shin-
gen. Already before Yoshiyasu was enfeoffed with Kai, Shingen's former 
domain, he ostensibly took care of an impoverished grandson of the war-
rior as his relative. 18 Once Yoshiyasu became lord of Rhingen's home-
lands, he spared no effort to play the role of his legitimate heir. Not 
only was Shingen's death anniversary commemorated with elaborate ceie-
brations, but Yoshiyasu even went to the extent of paying monetary com-
pensation (koden) to the families who had lost someone in Shingen's bat-
tles well over a hundred years previously. Generous donations to temples 
and shrines further established his position as lord of this area and 
greatly endeared him to the local people. 19 Later, on Yoshiyasu's fif~ 
tieth birthday, his wife (kita no kata) arranged for the most long-lived 
subjects of his domain - those aged seventy years and more - to come and 
pay their respects to him. According to Machiko there were over three 
thousand congratulants from Kai, who were all richly rewarded for their 
20 
attendance. As Shingen's supposed heir he even demonstrated his filial 
piety by petitioning the emperor for a posthumous rank to be awarded to 
the warrior. The court, however, refused, stating that there was no 
precedent to justify this act. 21 
The fifth shogun supported Yoshiyasu in his efforts to establish 
himself as an equal to the upper military aristocracy. When he bestowed 
the name of Matsudaira - that of his own clan - upon Yoshiyasu and his 
sons, he emphasised the symbolic meaning of this gesture by publicly 
18. See above, Chapter III, Section 8. 
19. MK, pp.266-67. 
20. ibid. 
21. Eibyo, haru; HJ, pp.57-58. 
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22 
stating that he considered the Yanagisawa family as part of his own. 
Later the patent of Kai pointed out emphatically that by tradition these 
strategic lands were to be held only by the shogun's kin, and that they 
were now bestowed upon the Yanagisawa family because they were consi-
dered to be his relatives. Yoshiyasu's descent from Takeda Shingen was 
stressed by the statement that ·the lands of his ancestors were now re-
d h .. 23 turne to 1m. 
The shogun's and Yoshiyasu's efforts tc legitimise the latter's 
claim to an illustrious ancestry - and consequently to imply that he was 
as qualified for high office as the fudai - gives some indication of the 
criticism surrounding his unprecedented rise to influence; criticism 
which neither Yoshiyasu nor the shogun apparently could afford to ignore. 
During Yoshiyasu's last years in office even the most private event 
in the Yanagisawa family was judged in terms of the effect it had on 
public opinion. Machiko was pleased to see that the birth of Yoshiyasu's 
youngest child won him the admiration of the public. People thought it 
was rare for a man to be blessed with so many children and attributed it 
to a saintly life in his previous existence. 24 Again, for Machiko the 
most important aspect of the promotions granted to her sons was the ef-
feet they had upon the opinion of the country. 25 Her emphatic statement 
that the prosperity of the Yanagisawa mansion "was the subject of common 
talk" and the topic of every "wise man" further reflects her concern 
over the family's reputation. 26 1-rnen a few pages later she feels 
22. See above, Chapter II, Section 4. 
23. ibid.; Nenroku, Vol.163, 9D 4M H5ei 2. 
24. MK, p. 2 75. 
25. lefK, pp .274-75. 
26. MK, p. 263. 
compelled to admit that some people were thinking less favourably of 
27 Yoshiyasu and condemns them as "mountains without ears," the reason 
for her concern becomes clear; Machiko's subtle remarks can leave no 
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doubt that there were people whose ears and eyes were closed to Yoshi-
yasu' s efforts at being a model minister. 
Looking retrospectively at Yoshiyasu's life it is easy to assume 
that his career, assured of the shogun's patronage, was built on a solid 
foundation. Yet evidence suggests that, on the contrary, some of his 
contemporaries regarded his position at the top of the political hier-
archy as rather frail. When in Hoei 2 (1705) the shogun agreed to Yoshi-
yasu's partial retirement, rumours immediately circulated that he had 
fallen out of favour. Only when it was made public that the shogun's 
order was in response to Yoshiyasu's own request, did the gossip stop. 
Officials, in fact, were rather pleased about Yoshiyasu's partial re-
tirement 28 and praised him for making the request, Machiko noted. 
Perhaps Yoshiyasu's relationship with Tsunayoshi was solid enough 
to preclude sudden dismissal for displeasing him. Yet the shogun, in 
spite of his efforts, was not an autocratic ruler. If the daimyo had 
been able to lay serious charges against Yoshiyasu, Tsunayoshi might 
have been forced to with.draw his favours. Yoshiyasu' s reluctance to 
d 1 . h th d . . th . . 29 . d ea wit e aimyo and receive eir gifts seems to point towar s 
this direction. Especially the.question of gifts was a sensitive issue 
and could soon lead to a charge of bribery. Yoshiyasu, apparently, was 
prudent enough not to fall for this temptation of high office, for even 
a sharp critic like Hakuseki could not accuse him of such a crime. 
27. ·MK, p.270. 
28. MK, p.252. 
29. ' See above, Chapter III, Section 9. 
227 
After Tsunayoshi's death the debate with the new shogun over Yoshi-
yasu's retirement brings i.:g;> a number of arguments, but in the final aha-
lysis again hinges on the question of public opinion. Ienobu argued 
that if Yoshiyasu were to retire "unkind people" would spread the rumour 
that there was some discord between them. Yoshiyasu, in turn, feared 
that people might consider him disloyal to his previous master if he now 
t . . . 30 were o remain in service. Both Ienobu and Yoshiyasu were painfully 
aware of an opposition that would seize every chance to discredit Yoshi-
yasu and bring about a rift between the shogun and the man who so effec-
tively worked on his behalf. 
Even when Yoshiyasu finally was permitted to retire and handed over 
the headship of his house to his son, his anxiety did not cease. He 
cautioned his retainers that many houses had come to ruin because the 
elder advisers had lacked the devotion to admonish the errors of their 
lord. His retainers were asked to sign a solemn pledge that they would 
never fail to serve and counsel his heir. . In a formal ceremony the doc-
ument was burned, the ashes mixed with water and ceremoniously imbibed 
by Yoshiyasu. 31 
2. MEASURES TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION 
Yoshiyasu was deeply aware of the dangers inherent in his contro-
versial position and the uncertainty it cast upon the future of his 
house. With this fact in mind his efforts to gain recognition in fields 
outside his political career, his association with the imperial court, 
as well as the important marriage alliances he arranged, must be viewed 
30. see above, Chapter II, Section 6. 
31. Eibyo, haru; HJ, pp.63-64. 
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at least partially as measures to consolidate his position and improve 
his reputation. One need not doubt that, for instance, his love of 
poetry was genuine. But one may question whether he would have thrown 
himself into such activities with the same feverish intensity if the 
need to achieve and to impress both his contemporaries and later genera-
tions had not constantly stood in front of his eyes. 
i. The Imperial Court and Poetry 
Significant in the context of Yoshiyasu's standing and reputation 
was his relationship with the imperial court. It had begun early in his 
life when he chose Machiko, the daughter of Ogirnachi Dainagon, as his 
.<.. 32 conc1u..;1ne ~ She not only brought to his house the refined lifestyle of 
the Kyoto aristocracy - which he, as the son of a lowly bannerman, .was 
lacking - but also, first through her father and later through her elder 
brother, provided him with a direct link to the imperial family. 
Yoshiyasu's relationship with the court worked to the advantage of 
both parties. He used this connection to obtain for the shogun's mother 
the coveted first imperial court rank, earning for himself the praise 
and deep-felt gratitude of the shogunal family. 33 In return the imperial 
messengers to Edo had their requests expedited with t.~e help of Yoshi-
34 yasu. Financially the court was greatly dependent upon the shogunate 
and when, for instance, in Hoei 5 (1708) the imperial palace was des-
troyed by fire, Yoshiyasu's goodwill was invaluable in obtaining the 
funds for rebuilding. 35 
32. See above, Chapter II, Section 2. 
33. See above, Chapter II, Section 4. 
34. E.g. MK, pp.218-21, 258. 
35. MK, p.277. 
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One project especially was to win Yoshiyasu not only the gratitude 
of the imperial family at the time, but also the praise of future empe-
rers:. • 11 d . 36 f th . . 1 mb the so-ca e restoration o e imperia to s. Machiko des-
cribed the sad state of the tombs in poetic terms: 
As the customs of the land declined and roads changed 
their course, nobody truly knew with certainty the 
location of the ancient imperial tombs. The fences of 
yesteryear had broken down and were covered with weeds; 
the traces of the herdboys were only too evident. What 
once was adorned by jewels now glistened with dewdrops; 
bit by bit they fell to ruin. Where the outlines re-
mained the lowly peasants did not even know what was 
the proper thing to do and slowly the tombs decayed. 
When his lordship heard of this he considered it most 
improper and sad and pondered how he could restore 
them. He petitioned the shogunate that officials in 
the various provinces be instructed to investigate any 
remains from the past, and where such ruins could be 
located, restore them to their former splendour and have 
the people worship them solemnly. After this order was 
issued, reports of scholarly investigations eventually 
arrived from various places. His lordship personally 
checked all of them in detail and gave the necessary 
directions. Since orders had also been sent to the 
governor of Kyoto, court officials heard of the matter 
and eventually it came to the ears of the emperor. 37 
If, indeed, Yoshiyasu anticipated that his exertions on behalf of 
the imperial house might earn him the recognition of later generations, 
then here his expectations were to be fully met. Over two hundred years 
later the Taisho emperor rewarded Yoshiyasu posthUlllOusly with court 
honours for his work, and even today archaeologists owe their successful 
excavation of the imperial tombs to the survey made in the Genroku 
period. Without Yoshiyasu's record of the tombs' location and the 
36. Naturally this did .not entail the opening of the tombs and restora-
tion of the inside. The work done was confined to tidying-up the 
environs, marking and fencing. 
37. MK, p.171. See also Nenroku, Vol.63, 28D 4M Genroku 12. 
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marking of the sites he ordered, the historical evidence contained in 
them might have been lost for ever. 
The restoration of the tombs not only raised Yoshiyasu's image in 
the eyes of the court, but also elicited the praise of other contempo-
raries. The philosopher, Hosoi Shinsuke, who had been instrumental in 
drawing Yoshiyasu's attention to the sad state of the tombs, was deeply 
impressed with his wise and foresighted attituae. 38 In the face of the 
slander surrounding Yoshiyasu's career, an extant letter of Shinsuke is 
valuable as a testimony of praise from outside the Yanagisawa family~ 
The significance of caring for the remains of the past might not 
have been equally appreciated by Yoshiyasu's other contemporaries. To 
them more impressive was, no doubt, the recognition he enjoyed as a poet. 
Yoishiyasu's love of poetry only becomes apparent during the latter half 
of his life. Once his interest had been aroused, however, he strove to 
excel in the art. By Genroku 14 (1701) poetry meetings were held at the 
Yanagisawa mansion under the direction of the eminent poet Kitamura 
Ki. . 39 gin. Kigin, in the employ of the shogun, consented to become Yoshi-
yasu's private teacher and was not disappointed by his student. In Gen-
roku 15 (1702) he presented Yoshiyasu with a manuscript of the secret 
tradition of the Kokin waka shu, an indication that his student had mas-
t d th ub . h' . t' f . 40 ere e s )ect to is entire sa is action. In the same year the 
emperor showed his recognition of Yoshiyasu's talent when he sent him a 
manuscript of the Three Imperial Anthologies, carefully copied out by 
the highest-ranking court nobles. As a mark of distinction it contained 
38. Letter of Hosoi Shinsuke quoted in Morita, p.159. 
39. MK, p.183; Nenroku, Vol.87, 13D 911 Genroku 14. 
40. Nenroku, Vol.102, 12D 7M Genroku 15. 
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a preface of the emperor's own composition. 41 
It is likely that the Yanagisawa family well recognised that poetry 
was a means to inunortalise their name. In the gardens at Komagome, 
Yoshiyasu had built miniature replicas of Tamano shima and Wakanoura, 
two places sacred to the tradition of poetry. Dwelling on the beauty of 
this scene, Machiko added a prayer to the goddess of poetry. The verse 
implored the goddess to protect the family and the poems that her gener-
ation would leave behind when they died.42 Machiko does not say who 
composed this verse or whether it was openly intoned at the time. All 
the same, the prayer indicates only too well, that the frail position of 
the family was never far from the minds of its members; it leaves little 
doubt that poetry was well recognised as an art that might enhance the 
ailing reputation of the house in the future. 
In Genroku 16 (1703) Yoshiyasu was given to understand that the re-
tired emperor would gladly judge a collection of his poetry, and he com-
posed one hundred verses for this purpose. Machiko proudly noted that 
even amongst the important nobility it was considered a rare honour if 
the retired emperor consented to look at just one or two verses. 43 A 
month had barely passed when high praise of Yoshiyasu's poetry was re-
ceived from Kyoto: it was accompanied by a detailed list as to which 
court nobles should be thanked with gifts for acting as go-betweens. 44 
Even as these presents were, hastily forwarded, Yoshiyasu was em-
barking on a more ambitious project; this time he hoped to submit one 
41. 11K, p.201. 
42. MK, p.200. 
43. MK, p.212. 
44. 11K, pp.212-15. 
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. ' 1 ' d 45 thousand verses for imper1a JU gement. And as if such effort would 
not suffice for the glory of his family, Yoshlyasu exhorted his eldest 
son to similarly present .one thousand poems to the court. After suit-
able encouragement had been received from Kyoto, both collections were 
ceremoniously despatched, naturally accompanied by an appropriately rich 
11 ' f . f 46 co ect1on o gi ts. In reply there was abW1dant praise of this 1Il1-
paralleled devotion to poetry by a father and his son. The poems were 
to be preserved in the imperial archives and would be handed down to 
future generations. As a sign of great recognition, and imperial fan 
and hat cord arrived at Edo. Machiko commented: "It is an honour un-
heard of in this world that a man from the distant Eastern provinces re-
ceives such attention from the imperial heights. ,,47 
Machiko was frequently present when Yoshiyasu was composing verse 
and carefully noted what he had to say about the art. In the end she 
also was persuaded to compose one thousand poems for judgement at court. 
Her brother acted as go-between and the retired emperor conveyed his 
' b h. ' ~· f f h . d b h' ' 48 praise y av1ng ri ty o er verses copie y is courtiers. 
In these times of financial stringency for the imperial house, the 
presents accompanying each set of poetry were greatly welcomed by the 
court. Often they included bales of silk .and finely lacquered household 
49 
ware, objects which were an integral part of court life, but difficult 
to afford. Yoshiyasu, in turn, was honoured with precious tokens such 
as scented leaves and handpainted fans, but of far greater value to him 
45. MK, p.215. 
46. MK, pp.222, 227. 
47. MK, p.227. 
48. i'!K, pp.228-30. 
49. MK, pp.225-26, 259. 
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was the promise that his works were securely stored for posterity in the 
imperial archives. Not only his verses were assured such distinguished 
treatment. His collected correspondence with Zen priests was given 
lustre and secured for posterity by the addition of an imperial preface. 
Yoshiyasu's letter of gratitude to the court ended with the revealing 
words: "Now, at long last the documents will be transmitted in this 
d d • h Wh . 1150 worl an not peris . at a blessing! They well expressed Yoshi-
yasu's hope that his close association with the court would preserve his 
achievements and enhance his reputation with future generations. 
ii. Alliances through Adoption and Marriage 
Yoshiyasu's efforts to profit from the lustre and formal prestige 
the Kyoto nobility still had, did not limit itself to the exchange of 
poetry, documents and gifts. Machiko, for instance, observed that with-
out any prompting on her part Yoshiyasu found a suitable husband for her 
sister amongst his friends at Edo. 51 Even closer ties were created when 
Yoshiyasu adopted Ikuhimc, the daughter of the Kyoto noble Noroiya Sai-
h - 52 s o. The girl's mother was a sister of Tsunayoshi' s favourite, concu-
53 bine Oden, and she was also related to Takehime, who was to become the 
54 
shogun's adopted daughter. Consequently the adoption of Ikuhime not 
only won Yoshiyasu the attention of the noble relatives of his new 
daughter,55 but also secured him access to the shogun's favourite and 
50. MK, p.258. 
51. MK, p.268. 
52. iVJK, p.258. 
53. ibid. See also Takayanagi Kaneyoshi, Shiryo Tokugawa fujinden 
(Tokyo, 1967), p.304. 
54. ibid., p.305; TJ, 43:704, 25D 7M Hoei 5. 
55. MK, pp.263-65. 
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most influential concubine as well as to one of the shogunal daugh-
ters* 
Yoshiyasu's association with the court, therefore, promised more 
than the prestige of the - in itself - rather powerless iroperial family. 
Not just Tsunayoshi's, but also Ienobu's wife and concubines, were of 
noble Kyoto descent, and the ease with which Yoshiyasu received the 
rarely granted perrnis,sion to visit the Grand Interior (o oku) even in 
Ienobu's time56 was likely to have been due to the intricate ties of re-
lationship linking him with the shogunal ladies. 
Yoshiyasu was foresighted enough not merely to build up his connec-
tions with the court and the shogun's immediate entourage. The necess-
ity for finding allies amongst that stratum of society which harboured 
his worst enemies did not escape him. 
The marriage of one of Yoshiyasu's adopted daughters, a relative of 
his wife's, to his assistant, the Grand Chamberlain, Matsudaira Terusada, 
has already been mentioned. 57 Later the adoption of Yoshiyasu's own 
daughter by Terusada further strengthened these family ties. 58 Terusada 
relinquished his office of Grand Cha~berlain on Tsunayoshi's death. 
Under the eighth shogun Yoshimune he again rose to prominence and in 
h l " (1730) th . . . . 11 59 Kyo o J even advanced to e position of Senior Counci or. 
It was a useful connection for the Yanagisawa family. 
Mention has also been made above of the marriage of Yoshiyasu's 
h . h" h dd h k . k' 60 eir, Yos isato, to t e gran aug ter of Sa ai Tada iyo. Yoshisato' s 
56. Eibyo, haru; HJ, p.49. 
57. see above, Chapter III, Section 8; l'1K 1 p.136. 
58. NK, p. 275. 
59 .. Ryiiei bunin, 1: 7; KCS, 5:7. 
60. See above, Chapter III, Section 4. 
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father-in-law, Sakai Tadataka, was well-liked by Ienobu and frequently 
formed part of his entourage, providing ready access to the shogunate 
even after Yoshiyasu had relinquished his offices. 
Another strategic move was the marriage of Yoshiyasu's adopted 
- . 61 daughter, Ikuhime, to the son of the Senior Councillor, Okubo Tadamasu. 
The usefulness of this connection was demonstrated in the discussion be-
tween the Senior Councillors about Yoshisato's domain of Kai. 62 Later 
Tadamasu 's grandson was betrothed to Yoshiyasu 's granddaughter, thus 
further tightening the connection between the Yanagisawa family and the 
63 powerful house of Okubo. 
Yoshiyasu's effort to link his family with that of another Senior 
Councillor was less successful. One of his daughters was promised as 
secondary wife to the heir of the Senior Councillo.r. Tsuchiya Masanao, 
64 but the groom died before arrangements had been completed. 
Several of Yoshiyasu's daughters were betrothed to members of Tsun-
ayoshi's entourage, such as Naito Masamori, who later, under Yoshimune, 
65 held the position of Master of Shogunal Ceremony. In Genroku 4 (1691) 
Tsunayoshi ordered two of his favourite Pages (kasho), Kuroda Naokuni 
and Yamana Yasutoyo, to marry daughters of Yoshiyasu. Three years later 
66 Yasutoyo fell out of favour and the alliance was broken off, but Nao-
kuni, although he had to resign his office on Tsunayoshi's death, came 
back in favour under Yoshimune and eventually held the position of Senior 
61. t.'fK, p.267. 
62. See above, Chapter III, Section 9 .• 
63. KCS, 11:386. 
64. KCS, 2:191, 3:257. 
65. KCS, 13:193. 
66. See above, Chapter III, Section 8. 
67 Councillor to the heir apparent. 
Yoshiyasu himself had five sons who reached the age of manhood, 
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but none of them entered an official career. While in power, Yoshiyasu 
would have had ample opportunity to establish at least his eldest son in 
a government position. He wisely refrained from doing so, adopting the 
much more subtle device of sponsoring his sons-in-law. The success of 
this strategy cannot be doubted. Yoshimune would have hesitated to emp- · 
loy a Yanagisawa in high position, but some of his sons-in-law succeeded. 
in obtaining influential appointments. It ironical that under the 
eighth shogun, Yoshiyasu's closest associate and son-in-law, Matsudaira 
Terusada, should join the ranks of the Senior Councillors. The former 
Grand Chamberlain, who had assiste.d Yoshiyasu i.n the administration of 
Tsunayoshi's much criticised policies, had become respectable enough to 
occupy an important post in the government of the much-praised Yoshimune. 
As generations passed the Yanagisawa family, in a similar vein, 
joined the ranks of the established houses. So intimately were they re-
lated to many of them that no one dared to deprive Yoshiyasu's heirs of 
their domain and reduce the family to its original status of bannerman. 
iii. Buddhism 
Of all Yoshiyasu's activities it appears that his involvement in 
Buddhism most closely accorded to his genuine personal interests. Un-
like his fascination with poetry, his efforts to seek instruction in 
Buddhism were already apparent when he was still serving in Tsunayoshi's 
Tatebayashi mansion as Page, and when the question of his reputation had 
be . 68 not yet come an issue. 
67. KCS, 2:95. 
68. See above, Chapter II, Section L 
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Yoshiyasu favoured the Rinzai sect of Zen Buddhism. '!Tie priest 
whom he had first sought out to obtain spiritual guidance had belonged 
to this sect, and the Obaku patriarchs, who later were to frequent his 
house, represented a branch of Rinzai Buddhism. Zen accords little im-
portance to the written word and it is therefore astonishing to note 
Yoshiyasu 's great concern for preserving documentar1 evidence of his de-
votion. Most sermons and religious debates held at his house were not 
only recorded, but also annotated with phonetic script, so that even the 
69 
uninitiated might understand them. In Genroku 8 (1695) he ordered 
that his correspondence with the Patriarch Kosen should be collected and 
preserved as it was getting "worm-eaten and discoloured. 070 His great 
joy at later obtaining an imperial preface for his collected correspon-
dence with religious dignitaries has already been mentioned. His letter 
of gratitude to the court unmistakably showed that he attached great 
importance to the fact that testimony of his religious devotion would be 
preserved for posterity. 
Yoshiyasu's efforts had not been in vain. Over 250 years later the 
documents headed by the imperial preface were published. 71 The fact 
that they are now occasionally read even beyond the shores of Japan, 
must surely more than fulfil any expectations he might have had. 
Another aspect of Yoshiyasu's deep interest in religion was the 
part he played in the restoration and construction of temples and 
shrines. The shogun had ordered that Yoshiyasu alone be responsible for 
authorising the repair of places of worship, with the result that a 
69. E.g. Nenroku, Vol.16, SD 4M Genroku 6; Vol.19, 170 9M Genroku 6. 
70. ibid., Vol.32, 29D 7M Genroku 8. 
71. The documents were published by the temple Eikeiji in 1973 as Yana-
gisawa Yosh.i yasu KO san zen rok-u. 
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great number of, supplicants thronged to his door. 72 The daimyo, who 
frequently had to furnish materials and manpower for such projects, 
would not have appreciated Yoshiyasu's interest in restoring temples and 
shrines, but in the eyes of religious dignitaries Yoshiyasu's image pro-
fited. 
The sect which gained most from Yoshiyasu's patronage was the ori-
ginally Chinese order of Obaku. Ingen, the first patriarch of this sect 
in Japan, had arrived from China during the reign of the previous shogun. 
But even now the order greatly relied on the assistance of the bakufu to 
establish itself in Japan, and the hospitable reception it enjoyed from 
an influential man like Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was invaluable. Yoshiyasu, 
in turn, was honoured by the expressions of gratitude and high praise 
contained in the letters of the Obaku patriarchs, letters which,provided 
worthy testimony for posterity. But also in other ways the reputation 
of the Yanagisawa mansion profited from this contact with China. Yoshi-
yasu's Confucian scholars had the rare privilege of conversing with 
native speakers of Chinese, and no other family could boast of retainers 
with a similar knowledge of this la.~guage. 
iv. Confucian Learning 
The knowledge of Chinese was instrumental in determining a Confu-
cian scholar's standing. Yet at a time when the Japanese were not free 
to travel, the acquisition of such knowledge was not easy. The scholars 
of the Yanagisawa mansion, consequently, profited greatly from the direct 
contact with the Obaku patriarchs and less senior monks of Chinese 
origin, who frequently visited Yoshiyasu. 
72. MK, p.152. 
Ogyu Sorai, for instance, who was deeply critical of Buddhism, 
nevertheless kept up his relationship with the Obaku monks even after he 
1 f h . . . f . d 73 e t t e Yanag1sawa mansion, and counted some as his very good rien s. 
This intellectual exchange with the Chinese-born monks showed its re-
sul ts. Under the eighth shogun, Yoshimune, Sorai apparently was the 
only scholar in the country able to punctuate and eXPlain the edicts of 
the first Ching emperor which the shogun was eager to have his officials 
read. It seems that neither the Head of the Confucian school, Hayashi 
Hoko, nor the scholar Muro Kyiiso, who was at the height of his influence 
and fame, had been able to satisfy Yoshimune in this respect, and 
Sorai's ability to complete the project earned him the admiration of 
. . . 74 
nis contemporaries. 
Well aware of Sorai's talents Yoshiyasu had arranged that even 
after the scholar had left his mansion he was to continue to re-
ceive his stipend. He was still a retainer of the Yanagisawa family, 
and wl1en Sarai became famous his contemporaries, at any rate, were un-
likely to forget his connection with that family. 
While Sorai excelled in classical Chinese, other retainers im-
pressed their contemporaries with their knowledge of the spoken language. 
Sarai wrote: 
I have known various people who were proficient in 
colloquial Chinese (kago): Seki (Ishiwara) Teian, 
An (Kuraoka) Sozan, and Okajima Kanzan, who served 
together with me in the Yanagisawa house; they were 
so exceptional and rare that people applauded and 
beat the table every time they listened to them.75 
73. Lidin, Ogyu sorai, pp.116-19. 
74. ibid., pp.59-61. 
75. "Lidin, Ogyu sorai, p.119. 
240 
1 h . f . h 76 Apparent y Yos 1yasu was not a Con uc1an at eart. Nevertheless, 
he was versed in the Chinese classics and gathered around him as his re-
tainers some of the most promising scholars of the time. With Tsuna-
yoshi's devotion to the classics it must have been obvious to Yoshiyasu 
- and even to his father when he was still a child - that he would not 
succeed in the service of this particular master unless he had acquired 
a thorough grasp of Confucian learning. Early in his life Yoshiyasu's 
studies earned him the distinction of becoming Tsunayoshi's disciple, 
and later as Grand Chamberlain, he profited.from being able to spice his 
advice and decisions with arguments from the classics. In addition, the 
Confucian s.cholars he selected - often brilliant young men with uncon-
ventional ideas - made the shogun's visits to his mansion especially 
attractive. 
Confucianism, therefore, was genuinely a part of Yoshiyasu's career 
as Grand Chamberlain to the fifth Tckugawa shogun. Nevertheless, here 
also one must question whether Yoshiyasu would have striven with the 
same intensity tc excel in the patronage of Confucianism if he had not 
constantly been painfully aware of the fact that he, as upstart chamber-
lain, had to greatly surpass his contemporaries before he would earn any 
praise. As the son of a bannerman, traditional officials would consider 
him unfit to serve as the shogun's closest adviser and head of the 
government, and his knowledge and patronage of Confucianism.proved to 
the world that when it came to "learning" he could compete with the best 
of his rivals of more noble birth. 
In spite of Yoshiyasu's efforts, he was not altogether successful 
in transmitting to later generations the extent of his own scholarly 
76. Ogyu Sorai, Seidan, Vol.9 in Nihon keizai taiten, pp.33-3~. 
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activities. In general, historians have belittled both Yoshiyasu's and 
Tsunayoshi's interest in the Chinese classics as either fanatical or 
hypocritical. OgyU Sorai, on the other hand, the man who gained his 
political experience and perfected his knowledge of Chinese in the Yana-
gisawa mansion, has been heralded as the first political thi1iker of 
77 Japan. Some thought must therefore be given to the relationship be-
tween the success of Sorai's political writings and his experience in 
the Yanagisawa mansion. 
3. YANAGISAWA YOSHIYASU AND OGYU SORAI 
The question of analysing Ogyu Sorai's political thought in the 
context of the policies of t.'le fifth Tokugawa shogun is a topic which 
would merit in itself a full-length thesis. Here the discussion must 
limit itself to some general observations and rely heavily on the work 
done by scholars such as Lidin, Maruyama, McEwan and Najita. 
Nevertheless, any reappraisal of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu cannot ignore 
the issue. The similarities between the policies which Yoshiyasu ad-
ministered and the political theories which Sorai expounded are - even 
after superficial examination - too striking to be ignored. I can only 
explain the fact that no other writer has explored this connection by 
the bias with which historians have generally viewed the government of 
the fifth shogun and his Grand Chawberlain and which has blinded them to 
the link between the harshly censured policies of Tsunayoshi and the 
greatly praised thought of Ogyu Sorai. 
Najita has argued that the conceptualisation of political thought 
is to be regarded "as a social phenomenon and not simply as the 
77. Maruyama, Intellectual History, p.83. 
I di k f . d . l . . "78 1an wor o genius an nu.racu ous invention. Later he states: 
Ideology is a system of legitimization that gives 
organized expressions of society as a hierarchal 
structure. Ideology gives to seemingly disparate 
phenomena and activities a coherence, meaning and a 
sense of form. ,.79 
It is argued here that Ogyu Sorai 's political writings are the 
"organised expression" giving legi tirnation to the society Tsunayoshi 
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tried to create, and that his theoretical framework expresses d1e under-
lying thought behind the seemingly disparate policies of Tsunayoshi's 
government. 
This does not mean that the political theories which have hitherto 
been ascribed to Sorai originated with the fifth shogun. Tsunayoshi did 
no more than respond to changing social conditions with policies die-
tated by his own educational background. His bac.~ground cannot be di-
vorced from the intellectual trends current at the time, and although 
there is no evidence that he was interested in or even familiar with the 
works of a Kurnazawa Banzan or ItO Jinsai, he nevertheless was subject to 
the same stimuli which prompted these philosophers to interpret the 
classics in new ways. Unlike these philosophers, Tsunayoshi's own posi-
tion depended on the strength of the shogunate and the continued support 
of the military class, and consequently the solutions he formulated in 
response to the changing conditions were less radical and in many ways 
very different from those, for instance, of Kurnazawa Banzan. Both, 
however, saw the need for talented men of lower origin to replace the 
78. Tetsuo Najita and Irwin Scheiner, Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa 
Period (Chicago, 1978), p.6. 
79. ibid., p.7. 
243 
traditional officials, 80 for increased education, 81 and some adjustment 
in the customs and behaviour of the samurai. 82 In short, changes in the 
administration. of the country had become necessary, and men who were not 
blinded by self-interest, like the upper military aristocracy, readily 
perceived this fact. 
ogyu Sorai was not immune to the intellectual reorientation that 
was taking place. On the contrary, he had been brought up in the coun-
tryside far removed from the stifling indoctrination of the official 
Hayashi school. Not being cast in the mould of the samurai-orientated 
intellectuals of Edo, he was free to observe socio-economic changes and 
in his own fashion grapple with the challenge the new conditions posed 
to Confucian learning. He stood at the periphery of the peculiar brand 
of Nee-Confucianism adjusted to the demands of Ieyasu's military regime 
which for over half a century had furnished a narrow but stable intel-
lectual background to the privileged military aristocracy, but which now 
increasingly could no longer cope with the new problems posed by chan-
ging realities. Sorai wrote: 
..• I escaped the influence of the manners of the 
gentlemen of the capital and at the same time I 
80. E.g. Dai gaku wakumon transl. Galen M. Fisher, "Daigaku Wakumon: A 
Discussion of Public Questions in the Light. of the Great Learning, 0 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2nd Series, Vol~l6 
(1938), pp.268, 275, 335-36. 
81, ibid., p.337. Tsunayoshi established the Confucian school at 
Yushima. 
82. ibid., p.314. Both Banzan and Tsunayoshi saw the need to occupy 
the samurai with activities outside the military field, and to re-
duce the great social distance between them and the common people. 
See Tsunayoshi's order to the Intendants, Chapter III, Section 5. 
But while Banzan considered farming an appropriate activity, Tsuna-
yoshi envisaged them as 0 civil servants" caring for the needs of 
the people and helping to establish an ideal society. 
became fa'tdliar with the outlying provinces and 
the life of the common people; and when I read my 
bocks I grasped thoroughly everything I read - as 
if I had put their precepts into practice myself: 
When we returned to Edo after my father was par-
doned and I disputed with the scholars and gentle-
men of the capital I found that with my poor rustic 
learning I could often bring forward good arguments 
and sometimes even prevail in discussion.83 
Tsunayoshi had not had the experience of becoming "familiar with 
the outlying provinces a"ld the life of the common people," but like 
Sorai, he had an education outside the normal pattern of samurai life. 
Like him, he had the opportunity and leisure to deeply probe into the 
meaning of the Confucian classics. As soon as Tsunayoshi succeeded to 
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the shogunate he demonstrated that he was not prepared to blindly follow 
tradition, but that during the years of his education, removed from 
. . . 84 Th everyday samurai life, he had formed his own ideas about society. e 
"rustic" training of Sorai and the unusual education of the fifth sho-
gun, therefore, had common aspects. 
It was presumably some affinity between the shogun's and Sorai's 
approach to the new challenges facing society and government which first 
led Yoshiyasu to recognise potential in the young scholar teaching out-
side the Z5j5ji temple. Sorai' s unconventional approach to classical 
learning facilitated his understanding of the underlying political phil-
h f h .' . . . . . 85 osop y o TSunayos 1 s similarly unconventional policies. 
This advantage of Sorai's over more traditionally trained scho-
lars quickly procured him promotion from the "lowermost seat in the 
83. Soraishu translated in J.R. McEwan, The Political Writings of Ogyu 
Sarai (Cambridge, 1962), p.l. 
84. Tsunayoshi' s individualistic approach to issues small and large is 
well described in Yi5genroku. 
85. See, for instance, above Chapter III, Section 5. 
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hall"86 of the Yanagisawa mansion to the position of Confucian scholar. 
The occasion was a consultation Yoshiyasu had with his retainers about 
the judgement to be pronounced over a peasant of his domain, who had 
been so poor that he had first divorced his wife and later abandoned his 
ailing mother. This man, by the name of D6nyu, was now charged with un-
filial conduct. 
Sorai's work, Seidan, relates the opinions of Yoshiyasu's scholars. 
They suggested that the man's conduct be judged in terms of that approp-
riate for an outcast, because D5nyu had been so pcor that he could not 
afford a home or wife. For an outcast, his behaviour of taking his 
mother along with him until he could no longer suppcrt her was commend-
able. As he originally had no intention of abandoning his mother, he 
should not be charged with this crime. 
Apparently Yoshiyasu was dissatisfied with this verdict. Seidan 
states: 
He insisted that abandoning parents could not be 
tolerated whatever the status of the person conmiit-
ting the crime. He therefore said he would consult 
the Shogun and seek his advice. In those days, the 
Shogun was a follower of Chu Hsi philosophy and in 
accordance with its rationalistic approach to things, 
he was concerned primarily with the examination of 
the heart [kokoro]. Mino-no-Kami87 was a Zen Budd-
hist and did not ordinarily believe in the reasoning 
of Confucian scholars. At this point, I expressed my 
opinion, stating that in times of famine, this sort 
of incident occurred frequently in other domains too. 
It could not be called an act of parent abandonment. 
If it "ilere judged as such and the culprit were puni-
shed, it would set a precedent for other domains. I 
believed that the responsibility for such incidents 
lay t'irst w.i th the local magistrates and county com-
missioners.. Next the ministers were responsible. 
86. Lidin, Ogyu sorai, p.41. 
87. Yoshiyasu. 
And there were still others above them who were 
responsible. DOnyu's crime was 'Tery insignificant. 
Upon hearing this, Mino-no-Kami agreed with what 
was said for the first time. He sent Donyu back to 
his village with a stipend to maintain one person 
so that he could support his mother.BB 
The version of this incident contained in the work of Yoshiyasu's 
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retainer, Eibyo gojitsuroku, is - at first glance - irreconcilable with 
Sorai's statement. The former work maintains that the matter had come 
to the ears of the shogun before Yoshiyasu discussed the incident with 
his scholars, and that the shogun had ordered Hayashi Nobuatsu to give a 
judgement. Nobuatsu was of the opinion that D5nyu had committed the 
crime of "parent abandonment," and should be banished. Yoshiyasu, how-
ever, was not satisfied with this judgement of guiH."an'd therefore con-
sulted his scholars. He explained to them that he did not consider 
Donyu guilty, because he had not intended to abandon his mother. Eibyo 
gojitsuroku then cites the judgement made by Sorai, which is the same as 
outlined in Seida.n, and similarly records Yoshiyasu 's approval of Sorai's 
. . 89 
op:m1on. 
What was Yoshiyasu's position in this case? Did he consider Donyu 
guilty, because Seidan states that Yoshiyasu was not prepared to tolerate 
"abandoning parents," or did he consider Donyu not guilty as explained 
in Eibyo gojitsuroku? Must one of the two sources be considered wrong? 
The likely answer Is that the two sources do not contradict but 
complement each other in their description of the incident. Yoshiyasu 
did not consider Donyu guilty - as Eibyo gojitsuroku states - but, on 
the other hand, he was not prepared to tolerate "abandoning parents" as 
88. Seidan, translated in Maruyama, Intellectual History, p. 70. (The 
italics are those of Maruya1'la.} 
89 • EibyCi, na tsu; HJ, pp . 66-6 7. 
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socially acceptable behaviour, in line with the words of Seidan. He 
was, in fact, challenging his retainers to see the problem in terms dif-
ferent from the traditional Confucian concept of filial versus unfilial. 
Sorai was the only scholar who could meet this challenge, his previous 
training not having limited him to interpret the classics and see the 
world in such narrow terms. 
Seidan's reference to the shogun's attitude in this case is ambi-
guous. It seems to imply that Tsunayoshi agreed with the Neo-Confucian 
views of Hayashi Nobuatsu, but does not precisely state that he agreed 
with Nobuatsu's judgement. The statement in Seidan could be interpreted 
to mean that in "those days" Tsunayoshi mainly relied on Nobuatsu, while 
later he often discarded the latter's opinion in favour of that subscri-
b d b th . 1 'k . 90 e. to yo er scno ars lie Sorai. At any rate, in whatever terms 
Seidan describes the shogun's philosophical orientation, the fact re-
mains that Sorai's judgement of the case was not the sudden inspiration 
of genius, but a faithful application of the shogun's stated policies. 
With his order "the people are the foundation of the state" of Erop6 8 
(1680), Tsunayoshi had clearly stated that it was the responsibility of 
the officials to see that the people suffered neit.~er from hunger nor 
91 
cold. To anyone familiar with this order, as Yoshiyasu presumably was, 
it must have been obvious that D6nyu's indictment was the result of be-
haviour by the officials contrary to this order. Although - to our know-
ledge - the order had only been issued to the Intendants of the shogunal 
domains, it seems reasonable to assume that Yoshiyasu with his efforts 
to act as a model daimyo would have instructed his subordinates in 
90. As, for instance, in the judgement of the Forty-seven ronin. 
91. See above, Chapter III, Section 5. 
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similar terms. 92 Yoshiyasu, consequently, is likely to have made up his 
mind how the case of D6nyu was to be handled before he consulted his 
scholars, and submitting the case to them stating that he could neither 
accept "abandoning parents" nor believed DOnyu to be guilty was a way of 
testing their understanding of the shogun's policies. 
Sorai's position in the case of DOnyu is similar to the role he 
played in the judgement of the Forty-seven ronin. In both cases he ex-
celled as a scholar, not because his proposal contained any unheard-of 
and totally new ideas, but because he, apparently, was the only scholar 
who understood the shogunate's policies well enough to translate them 
into a judgement which would satisfy the men - the shogun and his Grand 
Chamberlain - heading the government. If Sorai's proposals had been 
based on ideas contrary to Tsunayoshi 's and Yoshiyasu' s beliefs, it is 
unlikely that they would have been so readily accepted. 
For Maruyama these two judgements reveal "the unique character of 
Sorai' s thought" foreshadowing "the primacy of the political t.hat runs 
93 like a leitmotif through Sarai' s later thought." Maruyama is right in 
stating that the principles underlying the two pronouncements were those 
of Sorai's mature work. Yet they were not unique to him, but reflected 
the political thought of Tsunayoshi's government. 
Sorai is generally depicted as a keen critic of Tsunayoshi's 
government and several passages, especially in Seidan, seem to support 
this view. It must be remembered in this context that this document was 
written as a secret memorial to the eighth shogun, Yoshimune, and that 
92. Yoshiyasu had in fact ordered the issue of relief rice as a famine 
had occurred in his domain. The relief rice had obviously not 
reached Donyu. Eibyo, natsu; HJ, p.67. 
93. Maruyama, Intellectual History, p. 75. 
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Sorai in his criticism of Yoshimune's government would hardly have been 
so foolhardy as to openly praise the government of the fifth shogun as 
superior to that of the eighth. Whenever Sorai criticised Yoshimune • s 
government and wanted to remind the latter of policies practised -under 
Tsunayoshi, he either had to somehow pretend that Yoshimune, in spite of 
the criticism voiced, was even so a far wiser ruler, or couch his pro-
posals in terms which did not uphold Tsunayoshi as model for Yoshimune 
to emulate-. 
When one reads the two passages generally cited to demonstrate 
Sorai's disapproval of the fifth shogun's government without the pre-
conceived idea that the latter was totally evil, one cannot fail to no-
tice how Sorai carefully outlined Tsunayoshi's practices, without, seem-
ingly, praising them, and t.~en exhorts Yoshimune to do even better. 
For example, Sorai states in Seidan that Tsunayoshi greatly loved 
1 ' 94 earning. This resulted in learning becoming fashionable. Since 
Tsunayoshi, however, placed too much emphasis on lectures, Chinese writ-
ten language was neglected and, Sarai concludes, Tsunayoshi's efforts 
were of no avail. This statement might sound damaging enough, but it 
loses considerably in strength in the light of Sorai's critical view of 
the situation under Yoshimune: 
Since that time on the scholars of the bakuf u have 
become ignorant.95 Therefore, if we were to have 
poetry meetings and so forth it would by far out-
weigh the benefits of Tsunayoshi 's lectures. 
94. Nihon keizai taiten, 9:191. McEwan (p~l40) translates the word 
sabakari as "somen in the statement that 11Tsunayoshi had some fond-
ness for learning." Neikai kogo jiten (Tokyo, 1967), p.458 reads 
sabakari as hi jo ni , taihen. 
95. Nugaku; McEwan (p.140) translates the word as "neglected their 
studies," which is not forceful enough. 
Moreover, if learning were to become fashionable96 
to that degree in all daimyo,:mansions,,throughout 
Japan, with the [consequent) recognition of the 
correct status of scholars, good scholars would be 
produced and the scholars of the bakufu would, on 
their own account, devote themselves to learning. 97 
Sorai criticises Tsunayoshi for his emphasis on lecturing, but at 
250 
the same time points out that it resulted in learning becoming "fashion-
able." This term might have a frivolous ,connotation in English, but the 
fact t.~at Sorai employs it in a positive sense is demonstrated by the 
use of the word "fashionable" in his own pr0posal when he states that 
"if learning were to become fashionable" bakufu scholars wculd adopt 
higher standards. Previously he had also stated: "If men who had ac-
quired some learning were selected for promotion to office in the bakufu 
administration, learning would become fashionable." 98 
Under Tsunayoshi learning flourished, a situation Sorai thought 
highly desirable. Since that time, however, scholars had become igno-
rant and Sarai leaves no doubt that they were still in that deplorable 
state at the time of his writihg. He suggests, therefor~, that poetry 
meetings be held, which, he states, would be even better than the lee-
tures of Tsunayoshi's period. 
One must question whether Sorai's criticism of the fifth shogun's 
lectures is genuine. Lectures and debates were the medium through which 
he himself gained recognition under Tsunayoshi; his oral skill was such 
96. McEwan translates hayaru as "fashionable" when he refers to learn-
ing becoming fashionable under Tsunayoshi, and as "encouraged" in 
"if learning were encouraged to the same degree in the· households 
of all daimyO. 0 His translation, consequently, contains a bias 
against Tsunayoshi not present in the original. 
97. Nihon keizai taiten, 9:191. 
98. McEwan, p.138. 
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that even in his early days he managed to "bring forward good arguments 
d t . ·1 . d' . o.99 an some imes even prevai in 1scuss1ons ~ 
The problem Sorai was faced with at the time of writing Seidan was 
tl1at Confucian lectures were still being given, but the lectures under 
Yoshimune were very different from those of Tsunayoshi's time, and did 
not suit him at all. In Taiheisaku, another secret memorial to Yoshi-
mune, Sorai states plainly: "Lectures on the texts of the classics 
(koshaku) are one of the greatest evils of the day" and continues to 
l . th .. . . d .. 100 comp ain at now no other form of scholarly study 1s recognise • 
Another of his grievances was the treatment of Confucian scholars. "The 
attitude of those who attend the lectures consists in reverence for the 
books, rather than confidence in the lecturers," he laments, and thinks 
it outrageous how some gentlemen make scholars squat outside their room 
while they· themselves listen to the lectures inside. 101 
Sorai contrasts this kind of behaviour with that of the sage empe-
rors, who apparently visited the mansions of the scholars from whom they 
sought advice and did not merely summon them in such an undignified 
fashion. Is it mere coincidence that Tsunayoshi frequently visited the 
Yanagisawa mansion to hear the resident scholars debate? During the 
time of the sage kings "in matters of learning it was improper to en-
force the distinctions of status according to rank, ,,l02 Sorai reminded 
Yoshimune. Again Tsunayoshi had followed well the example of the sage 
kings, for the scholar himself made much of the honoured treatment ac-
corded to him under the fifth shogun: " although I was only a 
99. ibid.' p .1, and also cited above. 
100. ibid., p.133. 
101. ibid., p.134. 
102. ibidt p.135. 
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baishin retainer, yet I went to the golden castle of court, I ascended 
th . d t I t t .,103 e Jae s eps, was agues among grea guests .•. Now, on the 
contrary, not even bannermen deigned to attend the lectures scholars 
were ordered to give at the Confucian hall at Yushima. "The audience 
consists only of a few of the household retainers of these places and 
some doctors and chonin. The efforts of the bakufu are wasted in cater-
ing for people of this sort . .,l04 
Sarai is diplomatic in his criticism of Yoshimune's government. 
When he states that the bakufu' s efforts are wasted, it more likely 
meant that he considered his own efforts wasted in lecturing to such an 
uneducated audience. He nostalgically recalls the deferential treatment 
scholars received in the past and upholds the sage kings as an example 
for Yoshimune to emulate. Yet his mind, one may assume, was focused on 
the more recent past, when under the fifth shogun he occupied a privi-
leged position at Edo castle. 
It would have been awkward for Sarai to propose to Yoshimune that 
in future lectures be given, as in Tsunayoshi's time, in front of the 
shogun and his entourage. At any rate, he might have concluded that 
Yoshimune had not much interest in such learned presentations. Couse-
quently he proposes that in future poetry meetings be held, hoping, per-
haps, that the eighth shogun might show more interest in this lighter 
side of Chinese learning. Even if Yoshimune showed no interest, poetry 
meetings, even without the shogun, would at l<>ast spe.11 the end of the 
public lectures Sorai so despised. 
103. Lidin, Ogyu Sarai, p.80, also cited in Chapter I, Section 3. 
104. McEwan, p.136. 
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Y;aruyama cites another passage of Seidan to emphasise Sorai's cri-
ticism of Tsunayoshi. His translator, Hane Mikiso, puts it in the follow-
ing words: 
During Shogun Tsunayoshi' s regime, the Shogun amused 
himself by listening to lectures, so that the Confu-
cian sch9lars neglected all other learning and liter-
ature and behaved as if it was their sole duty to 
lecture on Confucianism. As a result, they have all 
now becol!>:> ignorant and useless.105 
Is it conventional prejudice against Tsunayoshi which prompted 
Hane to translate the honorific verb for nasaru, namely asobasu, as 
"amuse?" Strictly speaking.the original simply reads' 
Since the fifth shogu.~ was devoted to lecturing, 
scholars engaged in no other learning and considered 
lecturing as their duty. Now everyone is ignorant and 
of no use to the higher authorities.106 
The passage is in fact ambiguous, leaving it up to the reader to 
decide whether the ignorance of scholars was the result of Tsunayoshi 's 
love for lectures or perhaps some other factor, such as the attitude to-
wards scholars of Yoshimune's government. At first glance Sorai appa-
rently criticises lecturing. To improve their oral presentation of the 
classics, scholars under Tsunayoshi neglected all other forms of Chinese 
learning, such as, presumably, composition and the pu.~ctuation of texts. 
Still, scholars were not "ignorant" as they were at the time of Sarai 's 
writing. 
Sorai's secret memorials to Yoshimune never praise Tsunayoshi's 
105. Maruyama, Intellectual History, pp .114-15. 
106 •... koshaku o moppara ni asobasaretaru yori. Nihon keizai taiten, 
9:192. 
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policies. Yet frequently they criticise the reversal of these same 
policies; a very diplomatic way of saying the same thing. 
Sorai deplores, for instance, that under Yoshimune the Hayashi 
family only was consulted by .the bakufu. 107 The fifth shogun had given . 
recognition to the Hayashi family by building the Confucian hall at Yu-
shima as their official seat. Yet in the intellectual debate of the 
shog11Ilal court they had only been one of many scholars. T"neir opinion 
was not always accepted by the shogun and Sorai might have recalled that 
in the case of the Forty-seven ronin the shogun decided on a judgement 
which reflected Sorai's own way of thinking rather than that of the 
Hayashi school. 
Another criticism of Sorai • s concerns the lack of talented men in 
government affairs. He is emphatic that "in the Way of the Sages the 
108 first thing spoken about is the promotion of talent from below." If 
one recalls that Sarai was the retainer of the very man whose career 
furnished an unprecedented example of "promotion of talent from below," 
one cannot doubt that either Sorai or his contemporary readers failed to 
see the connection between "tJie Way of the Sages" and the policies of 
the fifth shogun. 
It is one of Sorai • s recurrent themes that the military aristocracy 
were not fit for government service and should be deprived of their sta-
tus if they neglected their duties. At a time when fewer and fewer do-
mains were confiscated in retribution for offences, Sorai spoke out 
1 . f th f " d . . " 109 h strong y in avour of e system o rewar s and pun1snments ; e, 
107. Nihon keizai taiten, 9:192. 
108. McEwan, p.81. 
109. ibid.' pp. 76-81. 
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of course, omits to mention that it was also a system Tsunayoshi adhered 
to. 
Even Yoshimune's famous suggestion-boxes find no favour in Sorai's 
eyes. He plainly states: 
Some think that if the present rulers are left as 
they are and good suggestions from the lower orders 
are put into effect, this fulfils the Sages' injunc-
tion to "raise up worthy and talented men." This is 
useless quibble which slanders the doctrine of the 
Sages.110 
Previous to this statement Sorai had pointed out that if the ruler 
wanted to be aware of the sufferings of the common people, men from the 
lower orders should be advanced to high official positions. It was the 
policy adhered to by Tsunayoshi. 
Sorai's concern for the lack of talented men of lower origin in 
Yoshimune 's governrnent can easily be attributed to self-interest. So, 
no doubt, it partly must. Yet for this very reason it is logical that 
Sorai would prefer a governrrent like Tsunayoshi's in which his talents 
were recognised to one like Yoshimune's, in which he rarely had the 
honour of being invited to Edo castle. 
Sorai's advocacy of Tsunayoshi's policies is not limited to such 
issues in which the scholar himself was subjectively involved, but can 
also be traced in his more abstract and lofty ideals. 
For instance, Sorai singles out the Confucian virtue of benevolence 
(jin) and devotes the greater part of his work (BendO) to explain the 
concept and elaborate on its importance; it is the virtue the sage kings 
110. ibid,. p.82. 
256 
used to bring peace to the world.111 Tsunayoshi also considered benevo-
lence to be one of the most important concepts in the government of the 
country. Only a few months after his accession he had ordered Hatta Masa-
. . . . . " ( '" . ) 112 toshi to adm:mister the people with "benevolent goverrmient J:wsei , 
and the shogun's concern for benevolence in all aspects of his adroinist-
ration i.s a recurring theme in YOgenroku, describing the early years of 
his reign. Later the concept of benevolence was central to the Laws of 
Compassion, and many an order reminded officials and people that the 
reason for the unprecedented protection of all living creatures was the 
shogun's wish that benevolence might grow in the hearts of his subjects. 
Tsunayoshi was not a mere dreamer. He was realistic enough to know 
that perfection was impossible to achieve in this world. When Hatta 
Masatoshi had questioned him about the improprieties the much revered 
King Wu of ancient China had committed in order to bring peace to the 
world, the shogun had answered with the following parable: 
We all want everything to be perfect, but it is impos-
sible to achieve. :r~or instance, when we have a small 
vessel made, we look at it and at first consider it 
beautiful. Yet when it is completed we realise that 
it has defects and we are not altogether pleased with 
it. It is the same with everything we do. The ancients 
said that in the purest water fish cannot exist. We, who 
rule the country, should ponder deeply about this roatter~13 
Tsunayoshi's philosophical acceptance of imperfections even in the 
most well-intended government is reflected in Sorai's theory of politi-
cal compromise. When the scholar wrote: 
111. Olaf G. Lidin, Distinguishing the Way [Bendo] {Tokyo, 1970), pp.36-
38, 40-42. Sarai asserts that true benevolence does not limit it-
self to the love of people but includes all "things and beings." 
112. See above Chapter III, Section 5. 
113. YBgenroku, p.38. 
There can be no more roundabout method of doing 
things than to insist that we must set aside all 
consideration of matters of govermnent until we 
become Sages •••. 114 
he simply reiterated the same principle with which Tsunayoshi had ex-
plained the imperfections of the Chinese King Wu. Hotta Masatoshi's 
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criticism of King Wu had referred to the authoritarian measures employed 
by this ruler and might well have been an allusion to Tsunayoshi's own 
authoritarian behaviour. In his justification of King Wu's behaviour, 
Tsunayoshi implied that at times even measures which in themselv<>s are 
not perfect must be employed in good government. 
Sorai, similarly, asserted that in the govenunent of the country it 
was not the absolute morality of policies that counted, but the relative 
merit they had in relation to the welfare of the people. In Taiheisaku 
he went so far as to state: 
The ruler of the people must carry out all measures, 
even if they conflict with just principles and become 
the object of ridicule, so long as this brings peace 
to the people.115 
Tsunayoshi's attitude towards the Laws of Compassion well demon-
stratas the practical application of this theory. The actual benefit of 
the Laws of Compassion can be disputed. The important fact is that 
Tsunayoshi bel'ieved them to be an essential measure in his efforts to 
bring peace to the world. Consequently, he did not waver when they be-
came "the object of ridicule" nor when - in the punishment of offences -
they conflicted "with just principles." In both Tsunayoshi' s and Sorai' s 
114. McEwan, p .134. 
115. Maruyama, Intellectual History, p.82. 
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eyes it was permissible to violate the absolute ideals of morality for 
political expendiency. 
Sorai was well aware of the contradictions inherent in this policy, 
contradictions for which the fifth shogun was severely criticised. In 
BendB he justifies them as follows: 
The principle of good government forbids violence, 
yet people are killed by the wars and the laws of 
the state. Can this be called benevolence? The 
essential fact is, however, that it brings peace 
to the world.116 
Political expediency cannot exist side by side with the lofty and 
pure ideals of absolute morality; as Tsunayoshi put it, well over thirty 
years before Sorai expressed his ideas in writing, "in the purest water; 
fish cannot exist .. 11 For Tsunayoshi and Sorai the government's priority 
was the wellbeing of the people and the concerns of the individual were 
of secondary importance. The ruler and his winisters; as well as the 
individual members of society, at times had to sacrifice their personal 
morality for the corranon good. This was the principle inherent in Tsuna-
· yoshi' s policies such as the Laws of Compassion and tJ1e judgement of the 
Forty-seven .rl'lnin. 
Throughout Sorai's writing there is much in agreement with the pol-
itical thought underlying the policies of the fifth shogun, though often 
not expressed in direct terms. W"nen Sorai, for instance, discusses the 
monetary reform, he does not praise it, but he condemns the reversal of 
this policy. Moreover, he expresses beliefs which fully justify the de-
basement of the coinage. Firstly, he maintains that the value of metal 
contained in the coinage is completely irrelevant to its value. 
116. Lidin, Bendo, p.47. (Here I do not follow Lidin's translation be-
cause it makes the text appear more comj].icated than it is.) 
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Secondly, he questions why tax is levied from farmers only and not from 
th f h . 117 e rest o t e community. 118 It has been argued above, that the de-
basement of the coinage was akin to a flat tax on the cash assets of 
every single one of the shogun's subjects. Consequently it partly ful-
filled Sorai's demand for a more equal system of taxation. In addition, 
Sarai condemned the alternative to the monetary reform, namely Yoshi-
mune 's measure of humbly asking the daimyo to assist the government in 
its financial plight. Sorai's criticism of the eighth shogun's low-key 
approach to the daimyo is indicative of his. "absolutist ideas"119 and 
some mention must be made here of this important aspect of his thought. 
Guided by the classical history of China, Sarai and his contempora-
ries distinguished between two forms of government: the feudal (hoken) 
and the centralised ( gunken) . 
The feudeil state was divided into vassal territories, with the 
ruler governing directlyronly a small portion of the land. The system 
was a hereditary one; the concept of law was little developed and perso-
nal obligations between lord and vassals were of prime importance. A 
man's position was determined by his status at birth, and only in excep-
tional cases did he advance beyond it. 
In the centralised state, on the contrary, official positions were 
not hereditary. There were no fiefholders and only small emoluments in 
the form of salaries were paid for government service. It was a fluid 
society for even a lowly peasant could advance to the position of chief 
. . 120 
minister. 
117. McEwan, p.100. 
118. Chapter IV, Section 1. 
119. Maruyama, Intellectual History, p.243, fn.5. 
120. McEwan (TOmonsho), pp.21-22. 
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Sorai saw the government of his times as feudal, but an analysis of 
his theories leaves no doubt that he favoured centralisation. "Unless 
the affairs of the entire land can be dealt with as the shogun wishes, 
the course of government will from time to time be obstructed"121 Sorai 
states emphatically and leaves no doubt, that he considered the govern-
ment of his time, which did not have such powers, as inefficient. In 
this vein he is critical of Yoshimune's reforms because they lack thi' 
characteristics of strong central authority. Sorai's proposals, such as 
that the size of daimyo fiefs should be limited, rightly brings Maruyama 
to the conclusion that Sorai's aim was "an 'equalization' of subjects 
beneath a Tokugawa absolutism. "122 Elsewhere Maruyama explains that 
Sorai • s theories presented not only a frontal attack upon the existing 
feudal system but also slowly corroded its values from within by break-
ing up the closed social sphere, essential for the functioning of feudal 
government, leaving nothing but the empty shel1. 123 
The unifying element behind Tsunayoshi' s diverse policies was the 
same striving for absolutisrr advocated in Sorai' s writings. In the 
strict enforcement of his policies the fifth shogun demonstrated that -
like Sarai - he believed unconditional shogunal authority to be essen-
tial for successful government. Although Tsunayoshi could not go so far 
as to limit t.~e size of established fiefs - as suggested by Sorai - his 
policies, nevertheless, attacked the daimyos' privileqed position as do-
main lords and tried to weaken their authority by formulating laws to be 
observed throughout the country. With the monetary reform he threatened 
the domains' economic independence, while the Laws of Compassion enforced 
121. Maruyama, Intellectual History, p.133. 
122. ibid. 
123. ibid, p.243. 
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the observance of the shogun's moral standards in areas which tradition-
ally had been subject to the daimyo's rulings. Both were instances of 
what Maruyama would call attacks on the daimyo's closed sphere of 
government, attacks on the feudal mode of government. So was the judge-
ment of the Forty-seven ronin. This left no doubt that under Tsunayoshi 
the bond of loyalty between master and retainer, essential to the feudal 
order, came second to the demands of the central state. Finally, the 
promotion of newcomers, like Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, who were totally de-
pendent on the shogun's favours, to carry out the administrative func-
tions of the established military aristocracy, leaves little doubt that 
it was central authority Tsunayoshi was striving for. 
Tsunayoshi legitimised the changes he introduced by taking the sage 
kings of ancient China as his example. The ideals of their government 
found expression in the early Chinese classics, which were debated at 
length in Edo castle or on his visits to the Yanagisawa mansion. 
Sorai also discarded the later Confucian texts favoured by the Neo-
Confucians and used the early classics to legitimise the philosophical 
system he presented to the world. He theorised that although the 
teachings of the ancient sages had eternal validity, with the passage of 
time discrepancies were bound to occur requiring change. It was a 
theory which led his later critics to point out that, if taken to its 
logical conclusion, this would not even guarantee the continued exis-
. 124 
tence of the feudal order. Sorai was fully aware that the government 
of prehistoric China could not be applied unaltered to the world he 
lived in. Yet, brought up in the Confucian tradition, he was not able -
or did not dare - totally to neglect the Chinese classical tradition and 
124. Maruyama, Intellectual History, pp.242-43. 
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create his own system of statecraft. The early Confucian classics were 
vague and diverse enough to furnish support for his novel ideas. When, 
at times, he could find no sentences to justify his political thought, 
he attributed the divergence from the classics to the "passage of time" 
and claimed that appropriate changes were permissible. 
The use of tradition to justify change was not devised by Sorai. 
Tsunayoshi had extensively made use of it to justify changes which went 
125 
against the tradition of the more recent past. 
Writers have already indicated that Sorai acquired much of his 
. . 126 practical scholarship during his service in the Yanagisawa mansion. 
It is suggested here that also the fundamental concepts of his political 
philosophy were based on his experience in Yoshiyasu's service. 
Sorai's political writings appeared after the accession of Yoshi-
mune. It was a time when Yoshiyasu's sons-in-law - some of \.vhom were 
. ' d 127 . . d . . . . th Sarai s stu ents - once again occupie important positions in e 
government. After the dismissal of Arai Hakuseki, his fierce opponent, 
Sorai might have hoped that under the new shogun he, too, would again 
win the trust of the ruler and be consulted in important government af-
fairs. Sorai' s great disappointment with Yoshimune 's low esteem for 
scholars found eloquent expression in his secret memorials to the sho-
gunate. In his eyes, Yoshimune's policies compared unfavourably with 
Tsunayoshi's, but he did not dare to say so openly. 
The affinity between Sorai's theories and Tsunayoshi's policies de-
monstrates that the latter were more than the arbitrary orders of an 
125. See above, Chapter III, section 5. 
126. E.g. Lidin, Ogyu Sarai, pp.112-15. 
127. ibid., pp.102, 129. 
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eccentric ruler. They were a systematic attempt to establish centra-
lised government. If Sorai is praised for his political thought, then 
Tsunayoshi's policies must also be given some favourable recognition. 
Failure to do so demonstrates the bias with which the govemment of the 
fifth Tokugawa shogun and his Grand Chamberlain has been viewed. 
Yoshiyasu consequently was more than t,~e fawning favourite of the 
shogun, sacrificing his own integrity to satisfy the whims of his lord. 
For t.~e sake of good government it was essential for Tsunayoshi to have 
autocratic powers otherwise "the course of .govemment" would "from time 
to time be obstructed"; 128 Yoshiyasu devoted his life to prevent the 
government from being obstructed. For him total obedience to the sho-
9\h~'s commands was not undignified behaviqur, nor was the strict enforce-
ment of his policies harmful to society. The shogun attempted to make 
the world a better one and Yoshiyasu considered it his sacred duty to 
h . lf . . . h' . h' f 'd 1 129 exert 1mse 1n assisting is master to realise 1s lo ty 1 ea s. 
4. KURITA AND WEBER 
One of the most influential and most interesting reappraisals of 
the period under discussion was made in the 1920s by the Japanese 
scholar Kurita Mototsugu. His theory which still today is discussed if 
not adhered to, sees the period of Tsunayoshi's government as one when 
militarism (budan shugi) was replaced by civil administration (bunj.i/ 
bunchi shugi). The essential features of this changeover were, for him, 
the bakufu's rejection of hostility in favour of friendship and esteem, 
of oppression in favour of enlightened education, of military force in 
128. Maruyama, Intellectual History, p.133, and also cited above. 
129. Compare also, Yoshiyasu's testimony in Kembyo jitsuroku cited above 
Chapter IV, Section 2. 
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favour of rites and music and the rule of might in favour of the rule of 
right. 130 On a practical basis this reorientation manifested itself for 
Kurita in the development of the bakufu's etiquette, in veneration of 
the imperial court, in a lenient attitude towards daimyo, ronin and 
foreign countries, in the education of the people, in the influence of 
Confucianism upon government as well as in the importance attached to 
learning and the arts. 
Kurita notes that scholars previously had already seen the period of 
Arai Hakuseki 's influence as one when civilising elements, such as rites 
and literature, took on new importance. But, he points out, the period 
was also interpreted as a weakening of the bakufu and was unfavourably 
co!l',pared with Yoshimune's reforms, which were believed to have restored 
the originally strong and sober government of the country. 
Kurita opposes this interpretation and maintains that the change 
from militarism to civil administration was one of the most significant 
events of the Tokugawa period. He is emphatic that it signified prog-
ress and not regression and condemns those as prejudiced who see these 
changes only in terms of declining military and financial power. Yoshi-
mune's reforms, on the other hand, Kurita regards as destructive, and in-
strumental in ushering in the Tokugawa's ultimate downfall. He exempli-
fies this statement with reference to the shogunate's relationship with 
the imperial court. Under Tsunayoshi and Ienobu ties with the court had 
been close, but under Yoshimune the trend was reversed, leading, during 
the second half of the eighteenth century, to the movements which event-
ually were to topple the shogunate and bring back the emperor to head 
the nation. 131 
130. Kurita, Edo jidai, p.419. 
131. ibid., pp.420-22. 
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Kurita sees the first signs of this change from militarism to civil 
administration happening under Ietsuna. The bakufu's permission for 
deathbed adoptions and other dabnyo- and rorrin-orientated policies of 
this period are, for him, early indications of this trend. The conse-
quent change in policies with Tsunayoshi • s accession he considers no 
more than different expressions of the same principle, reflecting the 
d "ff l' . f th 132 i erent persona 1t1es o e rulers. 
Thus Kurita classifies the changes that were taking place solely in 
terms of declining militarism and the spread of "civilised behaviour." 
Inherent in this analysis is the weakness that it does not account for 
the most prominent policies of Tsunayoshi's government, those for which 
he has so severely been criticised. Kurita is well aware of this and 
tries to get round this problem. 
He explains the fact that Tsunayoshi' s political measures do not 
always conform to his theory by following the traditional approach and 
suggesting that these controversial policies were due to the evil char-
acter of the shogun and his chamberlains. Though Kurita took the rather 
revolutionary of condemning Yoshimune's reforms as regressive, he 
could not bring himself to include Tsunayoshi' s controversial policies 
as a positive element in his theory. The Laws of Compassion he regards 
as a manifestation of civil administration, which later degenerated on 
account of the shogun• s superstitions and the flattery of his close of-
ficials. The loss of military power and prowess by the military class 
Kurita sees not as an inevitable result of anti-militarism, but merely 
as caused by Tsunayoshi's excessive compulsion for peace and compassion; 
something, moreover, which a man like Arai Hakuseki, apparently likewise 
132. Kurita, Edo jidfli, p.420. 
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133 
committed to civilian government; managed to correct. The monetary 
reform, he concedes, was partly brought about by the bakufu's poor fi-
nances before Tsunayoshi•s accession. All the same, Kurita maintains, 
to some extent it must be attributed to Tsunayoshi's spendthrift habits. 
Finally he explains the discrepancy between the large number of daimyo 
fiefs confiscated by the fifth shogun and his principle of "leniency to-
wards daimyo" by pointing out that the amount of land confiscated by 
Tsunayoshi was small when compared with that appropriated by the first 
t.'lree Tokugawa shogun. This was indeed the. case, but all the same, 
Tsunayoshi's system of strict punishment can hardly be called "leni-
ency. ,.134 
Historia~s have criticised Kurita for seeing in Yoshimunets govern-
ment a return to militarism. With some justification they argue that 
while not particularly fond of Confucian learning, the eighth shogun did 
encourage the study of.medicine and foreign books, and showed concern 
f . . dm' . . • l . . 135 or civil a inistrat1on rather tlan military matters. 
Kurita's theory well defines some features of Tsunayoshi's period. 
It does not, however, account for the most important policies of his 
government and furthermore, relies on a subjective and historically 
doubtful judgement of the shogun's and his ministers' personality. The 
discussion of two issues might throw light on these weak points in his 
model. 
Firstly, Kurita's own explanations of his theory do not totally 
conform to the labels he uses. For instance, in a change from 
133. Kurita, Edo fidai, pp.616-17. 
134. Oishi, Genroku jidai, pp.18-20, and Fujino, Bakuhan taisei sbi no 
kenk:yu, p.418, also criticise this fact. 
135. Oishi, Genre.Im jidai, p.20; Tsuji, Kyoho kaikaku, p.28. 
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militarism to civil administration one would el<flect to hear of declining 
privileges for the military class, while Kurita, on the contrary, empha-
sises leniency towards daimyo and ronin. On the other hand, except for 
his reference to education and compassion, he makes little of the in-
creased significance of social considerations, inherent in such a change. 
Secondly, Kurita gives sow~ indication of the background to his 
theory by stating that the change from militarism to civil administra-
tion was a universal feature of governments in ancient and m::>dern times, 
in the East as well as in the West. 136 He published this view in 1927, 
six years after Max Weber's Wirtschaft: und Gesellschaft had come into 
print. The latter work treated in some detail a theory which at least 
in name had some similarity with Kurita' s model, namely the change from 
feudal society to bureaucratic state; a theory for which Weber, too, 
claimed universal validity. The question comes to mind whether Kurita, 
if not directly influenced by Weber's writing, did not at least indirec-
tly partake of the developmei\ts in historical analysis that were taking 
place in Europe at that time. 
In any case, if Kurita wants to claim universal validity for his 
theory he cannot afford to neglect the issue of centralised versus de-
centralised authority •. He must follow the example of Weber for whom the 
location of authority was one of the most important issues, and adjust 
his labels accordingly; for "militarism" does not indicate in whom autho-
rity is VeSted, aS 0 feudaliSID 11 dOeS e 
It is Kurita's omission to address himself to the subject of autho-
rity which brings about the inconsistencies in his theory. If Weber's 
model is followed, the historian is spared the onerous and dubious task 
136. Kurita, Edo jidai, p.421. 
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of judging Tsunayoshi's policies in the light of his controversial per-
sonali ty. Instead the extreme policies of the fifth shogun's government 
can be explained in terms of the fierceness with which the struggle for 
authority between central and decentralised elements was fought. 
Neither need the difference in political measures between the fourth and 
the fifth shogun be attributed to the rulers' difference in character, a 
topic on which there is little reliable information. According to 
Weber's model they are accounted for by the that Ietsuna 1 s govern-
rnent was dominated by men interested in the .decentralisation of autho-
rity, while under Tsunayoshi, centralisation of authority was of para-
mount importance. Again, the changed orientation of Yoshirnune 's govern-
rnent can be attributed to the eighth shogun's willingness to make conce-
ssions to dairnyo autonomy. 
In addition, Weber's model explains the phenomenon of the much 
hated chamberlain. Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu served as the tool for execu-
ting the shogun's policies and to the extent that these measures were 
opposed by the established military aristocracy, his bad reputation was 
inevitable. Kurita, too, made some attempt to rehabilitate Yoshiyasu, 
but without a clear understanding of the unavoidable clash of interests 
between the shogun and the daimyo, he, in the final analysis, again had 
h d . . . h' ' h 137 to resort to t e ev1ce of denigrating Yos iyasu s c aracter. A man 
who served the shogun with devotion and faithfulness in his design to 
establish autocratic powers could not help but encounter the antagonism 
of the dairnyo. His behaviour, so much at variance with that of the 
daimyo, was scoffed at by t~em as the crawling antics of a flattering 
sycophant. It is not suggested that Yoshiyasu was devoid of faults, but 
137 ~ See Kurita, 11 Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu ron. 11 
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simply t.~at his reputation was due to other factors than his personal 
character. 
In the final stages of his career Yoshiyasu himself became an estate 
holder, theoretically at least joining the class of men against whom the 
shogun's policies were directed. Paradoxically it was the upper military 
aristocracy, his fiercest enemies, who were ultimately responsible for 
his great material fortunes. Their strong censure of low-born men 'in 
high position prompted the shogun to increasingly greater efforts tc es-
tablish Yoshiyasu as a man of ancient and noble descent. As such he 
could not justifiably live on a small stipend, but of necessity required 
l d . 138 a arge omain . As the acrimony against Yoshiyasu intensified, the 
shogun responded with continually more extravagant gestures to convince 
the rest of the country that Yoshiyasu was not an upstart, but like a 
member of the shogunal family. It was a development which Weber also 
' 1391 
noted as a universal ~ccurrence in the process of centralisation. 
During his lifetime Yoshiyasu was fully aware of the animosity his 
unprecedented rise to power and his execution of the shogun's unpopular 
policies caused. Consequently he considered it important to win fame in 
areas outside the controversial arena of politics and to record these 
achievements for posterity. In addition he attempted to overcome the 
opposition of the daimyo by making some his allies through intermarriage. 
In spite of these precautions the slander circulating during Yoshiyasu's 
lifetime increased after his death and traditional scholars cast him in 
the mould of the evil counsellor pandering to the vices of his master. 
138. Not all men who rose to some influence under Tsunayoshi were so 
generously rewarded. The Superintendent of Finance, Ogiwara Shige-
hide, for instance, never received more than 700 koku, the appro-
priate salary for his office. 
139. WG, p.633; Economy and Society, 3:1081. 
270 
Yet in spite of Yoshiyasu's bad reputation his family succeeded in 
holding on to the material gains and the status he had acquired for 
them, something rare for the descendants of an upstart. Furthermore, 
Yoshiyasu's fastidious concern for the preservation of documentary evi-
dence of his achievements has resulted in enough material on his life to 
stimulate historians to continuously attempt yet another reappraisal of 
his career. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the turn of the last century one of Japan's leading politicians 
defined Japan's bureaucracy as one in which "laws are highly developed, 
where there is little room for arbitrary decisions by officials, and 
·l 
where at last administration is becoming a specialized technique." 
Traditional historiography has it that less than three decades previously 
Japan had emerged from the feudal age and in this short span of time had 
succeeded in transforming itself into a state with a fully-fledged cen-
tral bureaucracy, a process which it took Western states often half a 
-2 
,millennium to achieve .. 
Scholars are increasingly critical of the view that Japan's sudden 
emergence as a modern nation was due solely to some mystical ability to 
imitate the West. 3 Edwin o. Reischauer, for instance, has suggested that 
the question of whether Japan's feudal experience resulted in similar 
characteristics to that of Western Europe and whether such developments 
aided her in the adoption of Western institutions, was in need of inves-
tigation. 4 George Sansom proposed that many changes of Meiji Japan must 
be seen as "a natural process of evolution which produced results similar 
1. Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) translated by Bernhard s. Silberman in 
"Bureaucratization of the Meiji State," Journal of Asian Studies, 
35.3:427 (1976). 
2. WG, p.831. 
3. Robert N. Bellah, Tokuga«1a Religion (Glencoe, 1957), p.2. 
4. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Japanese Feudalism" in R. Coulborn, Feudalism 
in History (Princeton, 1956), p.48. 
to those which had arisen in tne West out of similar circumstances. "5 
Other scholars such as Hall, Najita and Silberman, 6 have all in some 
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form or other concluded that the answer to Japan's sudden transformation 
into a mcdern state must be sought in the developments that took place 
during the Tokugawa period. 
In line with this argument it is also proposed here that Japan's de-. 
velopment of a central bureaucracy had its origins in the rokugawa era. 
Bureaucratic institutions in Japan date back as far as the Heian 
period. Yet both the Heian bureaucracy and the administration of the 
Kamakura bakufu fall, like their Chinese model, under Weber's classifica-
tion of patrimcnial bureaucracy; they lacked some of the essential char-
acteristics of the mcdern bureaucracy, such as the attainment of office 
7 by merit, specialisation of knowledge and rational procedure. 
When the Tokugawa established their hegemony over the country a cen-
tral bureaucracy again began to develop. By the time of the third shogun 
Iemitsu, offices and duties were increasingly defined and separated and 
a formally organised system began to grow. Under the fourth shogun this 
development stagnated and a rigid system of hereditary qualification for 
appointment to office came to dominate the administration. 
With the accession of the fifth shogun new demands were made on the 
bureaucracy. To ensure greater efficiency in the administration of the 
country specialised offices were created for the first time at senior 
5. G.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan. (New York, 1950), pp.314-
15. 
6. J.W. Hall, "New Look at Tokugawa History" in Studies in the Insti-
tutional History of Early Modern Japan, p.61; T. Najita, Japan 
(Englewood Cliffs, N .J., i974), p .13; Silberman, "Bureaucratization 
of the Meiji State," p.430. Also R. Bendix and G. Roth, Scholarship 
and Partisanship, Essays on Max Weber (Berkeley, 1971), p.206. 
7. WG, pp.608-11; Economy and Society, 3:1047-51. 
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levels of officialdom. The growing need for trained administrators made 
the system of hereditary qualification increasingly impractical and var~ 
ious means and measures were employed to bypass it. 
The fudai daimyo, who occupied the senior offices in the administ-
ration, saw their privileges threatened by the changes initiated by the 
fifth shogun and used their power as officials to obstruct the shogun's 
policies. Tsunayoshi attempted to overcome fudai protest and obstruc-
tion by creating his own personal staff outside the structure of bakufu 
hierarchy. The men he selected for his personal staff were mainly samu-
rai of lower origin whose interests were not divided bet-ween domain and 
shogunate. Their advancement totally depended upon the favours of the 
shogun and consequently they identified with the latter's aim of increas-
ing central authority. In accordance with Weber's model, they served 
the ruler as his most effective tool in his fight for autocratic powers. 
They were, to all intents and purposes, Japan's first "professional 
poli ticiaris. 11 
The changes that took place in the administration of the country in 
Tsunayoshi's period foreshadowed the development of Japan's modern bu-
reaucracy. As unprecedented measures, many of the policies initiated by 
the fifth shogun were severely criticised and some of them reversed by 
his successors. On the whole, however, the trend towards specialisation, 
rationalisation and promotion by talent continued, making it possible for 
Japan to pride itself on a fully fledged bureaucracy ,at the beginning of 
this century; 
The career of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu was the direct outcome of these 
political developments. By the circumstances of his birth as son of a 
bannerman in the household of the shogun-to-be, Yoshiyasu was placed in 
an ideal position te profit from the changes that were taking place. 
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From childhood on he had t.~e opportunity to become intimately acquainted 
with the personal preferences and Weltanschauung of the future ruler, but 
his lo>I samurai origin nevGr permitted him to forget the vast difference 
in status between himself and his master. He was trained to serve and 
prepared to work hard in order to better his station, and as such was 
eminently qualified to succeed under the fifth shogun. After he had de-
monstrated his ability and loyalty over many years as Attendant, Yoshi-
yasu was ready to prove his worth as administrator at a point of tirre 
when Tsunayoshi had become disillusioned with traditional offic~aldom 
and his early confidant, Makino Narisada, was pressing for retirement. 
Yoshiyasu soon became the shogun's model official and acted as "leading 
politician~ 11 
Yoshiyasu's unprecedented prow.otion to a position of influence could 
only have earned him the animosity of the upper military aristocracy. 
Firstly, he replaced the fudai daimyo in their traditional position as 
senior administrators and advisers to the shogun. Secondly, he executed 
policies on behalf of the shogunate which went against the interests of 
all the upper military aristocracy and threatened their hitherto privi- . 
leged status. 
The protest of Yoshiyasu's powerful enemies found eloquent expres-
sion in the many chronicles slandering his reputation. For the upper 
military aristocracy the shogun's promotion of upstarts to execute his 
autocratic policies was immoral and despicable, and t.~eir hatred and con-
tempt for Yoshiyasu fostered a bizarre image of him in the popular mind 
as a fawning eunuch, while the policies he directed became the evil mach-
inations of a corrupt government. 
Both Ogyu Sorai's philosophical interpretation of L~e political 
trend under Tsunayoshi and an application of Weber's theory to this same 
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period confirm that it was not immorality in the strict sense of the 
word but the shogun's autocratic ambitions which prompted such extreme 
criticism. Although writing in very different cultures and in very dif-
ferent ages both men reached a clear .understanding of the inevitability 
of political centralisation and the changes it brings to society; an 
understanding essential for an appreciation of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu's 
career. 
The Grand Chamberlains of the Fifth Shogun 
Appointment Resignation Previous Reason for 
TJ KCS RB TJ KCS RB Position Resignation 
Makino Narisada llD 12M 12D l2M 9D lOM 29D llM ibid lD 12!-': osoba requested Tenna 1 Tenna 1 Empo 8 Gen. 8 Gen. 8 ret.irement 
21D 7M ibid 22D 7M 22D 3M ibid ibid wakatoshi sickness Matsudaira J5ky5 2 Jokyo 2 Gen. 2 yori 
Tadachika 
(Tadayasu) 21D 9M ibid ibid 17D lM ibid ibid okuzume Tsunayoshi • s Hoei 2 Hoei 6 death 
6D 9M 6D 9M 2D 2M 2D 2M kosho/ disobedience 
YJ.tami Tenn a 2• Tenna 2* Gen. 2 Gen. 2 osoba 
Shigemasa 26D 7M 26D 7M 
Jokyo 2t JOkyo 2t 
Ota Sukenao llD lM ibid ibid 29D 6M ibid ibid wakadoshi sickness Jokyo 3 Jokyo 3 yori 
. 
. 
f:A.akino 12D 9M I ibid ibid 13D lOM ibid 13D llM osoba insufficient Tadata.'k:a Gen. l Gen. 1 Gen. 1 devotion 
Yan.agisawa 12D llM ibid ibid 3D 6M ibid ibid konando requested Yoshiyasu Gen. 1 Hoei 6 joza retirement 
. 
Nambu 12D llM ibid ibid 26D lM ibid ibid osoba sickness Naoniasa Gen. 1 Gen. 2 
Kanamori llD SM ibid ibid 14D 4M ibid 2$D 7M okuzume unsuitable Yoritoki Gen. 2 Gen. 3 Gen. s 
/.... continued 
Appointment Resignation Previous Reason for 
TJ KCS RB TJ KCS RB Position Resignation 
---
Soma 4D 6M 14D 4M 
okuzume illness Masatane Gen. 2 Gen. 3 
Hatakeyama 6D 12M 14D llM lD 12M 28D SM 17D 12M SD 2M okuzume/ appointed 
Motoharu Gen. 2 Gen. 1 Gen. 2 Gen. 4 Gen. 2 Gen. 4 osoba soshaban/ 
old age 
Sakai llD 2M ibid 21D 2M lD 3M ibid 2D 3M okuzume (reason Tadazane Gen. 6 Gen. 6 Gen. 6 Gen. 6 not given} 
Y..atsudaira 7D lM ibid 27D SM 17D lM ibid ibid osoba Tsunayoshi's 
Terusada Gen. 6 Geri. 7 Hoei 6 death 
Toda Tadatoshi/ SD 12M lSD lOM 
osaba (reason Tadatoki H6ei 1 H5ei 3 . not given} 
-
Matsudaira lD lOM 19D 4M 
okuzume promoted to 
Nobutsune Gen.· 9 Gen. 10 shoshidai 
NOTES FOR TABLE: 
1. "ibid" applies to entry to the left. 
2. * - Apprenticed as Grand Chamberlain. 
3. -r - Appointed as Grand Chamberlain. 
4. "---" indicates that appointment as Grand Chamberlain not listed. 
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